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Abstract
In this thesis, I assess the propagation power of financial rigidities, related to
firm and bank financial health, and their impact on the fluctuations of external
finance premium (efp) and on business cycles. The thesis is organized in four
chapters.
The introductory chapter is a review of the literature related to the role of
firm and bank financial health in general equilibrium models. The emphasis
is on the most recent papers that are related to my thesis.
In the second chapter, I empirically assess the relative significance of financial
health of non-financial and financial sector for the external finance premium
(efp) based on US and limited UK data using unrestricted vector autoregression
(VAR). I also evaluate to what extent fundamental shocks like the total factor
productivity (tfp), investment specific technology (ist) and monetary policy
drive efp and output. The result that emerges from this analysis is that efp and
output are primarily driven by the tfp shocks and second by monetary policy
shocks. In addition, financial sector net worth, rather than non-financial sector
net worth, drives efp and output when fundamental shocks are absent.
In the third chapter, I set up a general equilibrium framework with two fi-
nancial rigidities on firm and bank level to investigate the propagation of the
fundamental shocks on efp and other macro and financial variables. Finan-
ii
cial frictions are set-up as leverage constraints on borrower and lender in this
framework (named FAGK).
To evaluate the propagation of shocks in each model I compare the second
moments and impulse responses to those from a financial accelerator (FA) and
a bank friction model (GK). Two main results come out. First, baseline FAGK
model yields greater volatility of efp and of real variables, compared to FA or
GK when driven by shocks of the same size. Second, the dynamics of overall efp
are dominated by the fluctuations of the lender premium which is propagated
by the bank constraint in FAGK model. In the second part of the chapter, I
evaluate how changes in the severity of frictions or in the conduct of monetary
policy may lead to greater propagating power of shocks in the model economy.
The main conclusions are that, negligible policy response to output gap and
a more persistent policy rate may contribute to greater propagating power of
financial frictions.
In chapter 4, I estimate the baseline FAGK model and two single-friction
models, FA and GK, employing Bayesian estimation method with quarterly
data spanning 1955-2014. I assess the business cycle properties of each esti-
mated model-economy and compare them to actual data. The baseline model
can outperform the other two models, FA and GK, in describing the economy
for the period.
To assess the stability of parameters I estimate the baseline FAGK model
in two sub-samples, a tranquil sub-period, 1985-2004, and a recession period,
2005-2014. Next, I analyse the factors behind the increase in volatility during
the recession period. Quantitative analysis based on counterfactual exercises
leads me to conclude that the decline in investment adjustment cost and the
increase in dispersion of returns across firms have shaped the business cycle
properties of efp and of most indicators during the recession.
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Chapter 1
Financial Frictions in General
Equilibrium Models: Introductory
Review
Standard real business cycle models and new Keynesian models have become
very popular tools for analysing the propagation of technology shocks and the
role of monetary policy in recent decades. It is a common feature of these
models to assume that the financial market is a perfectly competitive market.
The assumption is based on the hypothesis of the irrelevance of firm capital
structure (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). The hypothesis implies that firms
can easily borrow at the risk free rate as the amount of debt they accumulate
relative to their own equity does not matter for their cost of borrowing. In new
Keynesian (NK) and real business cycle models this principle is articulated as
an arbitrage condition implying that the required return on capital is risk free
rate.
Over the course of the following decades it has been evident that the
Modigliani-Miller hypothesis does not hold in financial markets. Neither is
the arbitrage condition in NK models consistent with the data. In the long-run
1
firms pay a borrowing premium above the risk free rate on loans. In the short-
run this premium is volatile and negatively correlated with the financial health
of borrowers. The borrowing premium is also negatively correlated with out-
put gap. It goes up in times of recession or in periods of low economic growth
and declines during booms.
Indeed, in the most recent crisis the premium of external borrowing above
risk free rate jumped to unprecedented levels. At the same time investment
and output dropped to trigger the greatest recession in post-war time. The
negative correlation between output (or investment) and the premium on ex-
ternal financing (hereby efp) suggest that efp amplifies the business cycles and
the latter potentially affects efp. Such strong relationship between borrowing
premium above risk free rate and output growth has been a rough indicator of
the severity of financial rigidity (friction) in the economy. At the core of these
financial frictions are the pro-cyclical behaviour of borrower and lender finan-
cial health. The strong positive correlation of firm and bank net worth with
output amplifies the severity of financial frictions giving rise to more volatile
cost of external finance.
The empirical literature triggered by the recent crisis supports the link be-
tween the premium on cost of external finance and key macroeconomic vari-
ables. Empirical evidence indicates that fluctuations on efp can predict eco-
nomic aggregates by suggesting credit tightening (Gilchrist et al. (2009b)). In
a separate study Gilchrist et al. (2009a) find that corporate bond spreads in
credit-risk portfolios are good indicators of economic activity. Further find-
ings suggest, a considerable portion of the ability of an index of credit spread
to predict economic activity is due to excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Za-
krajšek (2012)). In a similar line of research, Faust et al. (2011) find improved
accuracy in forecasting real economic variables using credit spreads based on
corporate bond portfolios. The basis for this link is the counter cyclical be-
2
haviour of credit flows (Covas and Den Haan (2011)). If these credit flows
respond to fluctuations in the price of credit that is partly due to efp, then they
are a key channel for the transmission of the efp impact on business cycles.
Earlier studies have reported similar findings for different time periods in US
(Gertler and Lown (2000), Mody and Taylor (2003)).
The above selected studies quantify the relationship between credit spreads
and the real sector. The evidence points to the hypothesis that variations of
premium on external borrowing lead to financial frictions that further amplify
the business cycle fluctuations.
In my thesis I analyse how the degree of the financial rigidity that arises
due to borrower and lender financial health relate to efp. I assess the prop-
agation power of financial frictions and the relative impact they have on the
dynamics of efp and of business cycles.
In this introductory chapter, I review the literature related to the role of firm
and bank financial health in general equilibrium models. Initial literature has
focused on the effects of the pro-cyclical firm leverage driven by fundamental
shocks. Post-recession literature focuses on frictions arising due to counter-
cyclical behaviour of lender net worth. The most recent studies that are related
to my work consider both. I emphasize how my work distinguishes from other
similar double-friction studies that bring the dynamics of lender and borrower
financial health in a single general equilibrium framework.
The remaining part of the thesis is organised in three chapters.
In chapter 2, I empirically analyse three fundamental shocks, total factor
productivity (tfp), investment specific technology (ist) and monetary policy
shocks. These shocks compete to explain the fluctuations in external finance
premium and output. The result that comes out is that tfp is the main driver
of efp and output fluctuations. Monetary policy shocks also have a significant
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impact. In the absence of these shocks, the exogenous innovations to financial
sector net worth, rather than firm net worth, explain a significant fraction of
efp and output fluctuations. These results set the stage to set up a general
equilibrium model to further investigate these relationships.
In the 3rd chapter I propose a framework with two layers of financial fric-
tion. The first layer relies on a financial accelerator (FA) mechanism building
on the information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. The sec-
ond layer builds on the moral hazard problem in bank-depositor relationship
to give rise to a bank friction (GK). The two mechanisms, the FA and the GK,
introduce financial frictions as leverage constraints on firm and bank, respec-
tively. Firm and bank financial health are critical for the severity of the two
frictions in my set up named the FAGK model. The model features other nom-
inal and real frictions typical for a new Keynesian framework. I evaluate the
propagation role of endogenous fluctuations in firm and bank net worth to
explain the fluctuations of external finance premium efp, and potentially of
output.
To evaluate the propagation of shocks in my model I compare the impulse
response functions against two single friction models, a financial accelerator
model and a bank friction model. I conclude that the framework with con-
straints on bank and firm balance sheets delivers significantly greater response
of efp and macro variables to standard shocks. The model with double financial
frictions has stronger propagation power compared to single friction models.
Impulse responses show that the constraint on bank balance sheet is the dom-
inant driver of total external finance premium.
Next I assess how the interaction of both frictions might have contributed
to propagation of fundamental shocks to financial variables, particularly efp,
during the recent crisis. The fundamental shocks I consider here are neutral
4
technology shock, investment specific technology shock and monetary policy
shock (Rn). To do so I evaluate how changes in the behavior of the agents
present in this model can explain sudden increases in fluctuations of efp and
real macro indicators. Two results stand out. Changes in monetary policy
response to output gap and in investment adjustment costs (IAC) are critical
for the propagation of shocks. Compared to single friction models, double
friction mechanism propagates shocks of the same size by a greater magnitude
when monetary policy is sluggish and less responsive to output gaps. Second,
changes in investment adjustment costs lead to greater volatility of asset prices,
(Q), investment (I) and of firm and bank net worth. Following these changes
standard shocks of the same size have the potential to generate much greater
volatility in external cost of financing in a model implied economy when both
frictions are present.
In chapter 4, I evaluate the performance of the three model frameworks, the
financial accelerator model (FA), the bank friction model (GK) and the baseline
model with both frictions (FAGK), using Bayesian estimation method.
First, the three models are estimated based on observable series covering
the full sample of data available, 1955-2014. Business cycle properties of the
model-implied economy from each framework are compared to those from
actual data. FAGK can outperform the other two models, FA and GK, in de-
scribing the economy for the relevant period. In particular, it describes better
the properties of the series not included in estimation.
Next, the baseline model FAGK is estimated to evaluate the stability of pa-
rameters in two sub-samples, 1985-2004 and 2005-2014. I assess the quantita-
tive effects of changes in potential candidate parameters for the business cycle
properties of the model-implied economy in 2005-2014. Main candidate param-
eters that come out from estimation are the decline in investment adjustment
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costs IAC parameter, the increase in dispersion of returns across borrowing
firms and the rise of monitoring costs. Results that come out from the counter-
factual exercises suggest that changes in the former two parameters, lower IAC
and higher dispersion of returns across borrowing firms, have shaped the busi-
ness cycle properties of most variables in the model implied economy during
the recession.
1.1 Bank and Firm Financial Health in General Equi-
librium Models
In this section I review the literature that brings in the impact of firm and bank
financial health on external finance premium in general equilibrium models.
1.1.1 Balance Sheet Channel
Early literature on implications of frictions present in borrower-lender rela-
tionships focuses on the equilibrium that leads to full credit rationing due to
adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). In the equi-
librium with no credit rationing, lenders discount expected returns on basis
of risks that the asymmetric information problem creates. Therefore, risk is
accounted for in the inevitable deadweight losses arising due to asymmetric
information, called agency costs. Agency costs have been a key concept for
modeling frictions arising in borrower-lender relationship. These costs are al-
located either into monitoring or in screening the borrower. The optimal debt
contract with costly state verification (CSV) of borrower upon his default as-
sumes monitoring costs (Townsend (1979)). In these type of contracts, lower
borrower net worth aggravates the agency problem as higher leverage is asso-
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ciated with lower ability to repay. The inability of borrower to repay involves
costly monitoring by the lender to liquidate upon default. To account for this
agency cost, that is monitoring and state verification of borrower, the lenders
charge higher premiums on the whole pool of borrowers.
The alternative agency cost that lenders can incur is the screening cost of
the pool of borrowers. Lenders chase high quality borrowers to keep monitor-
ing costs and the number of defaults in their loan portfolio to a minimum. To
minimize agency costs lenders keep a balance between screening and monitor-
ing. Gilchrist et al. (1994) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) noticed a "flight-to-
quality" in lending, as the share of credit flowing to small firms had declined.
Small firms are identified as borrowers with potentially high monitoring costs.
Screening based only on the size of firms keeps the screening (agency) costs at
negligible levels. Identifying high quality borrowers (in terms of ability to re-
pay) with firm size means lower total agency costs by lenders. Higher agency
costs imply lenders will pass these costs on borrowers through a higher pre-
mium on loans above risk free rate.
Agency costs are inversely related to net worth of the borrowing firm.
Lower net worth signals to a lender a higher probability of incurring moni-
toring costs. Bernanke and Gertler (1994) make use of this inverse relationship
to model the impact of adverse shocks on external finance premium. A small
decline in borrower net worth raises agency costs which in the following pe-
riod give rise to higher borrowing premium. The original impact of an adverse
shock is amplified as higher premium leads to lower demand for loans, lower
investment and output. Bernanke et al. (1999) (hereby BGG) demonstrated in
a partial equilibrium model how the propagation by procyclical borrower net
worth of exogenous shocks depends critically on the size of agency cost.
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The propagation mechanism of shocks arising due to credit market fric-
tions has been an appealing feature of research in the late ’90s following the
publication of two studies by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al.
(1999)1.
Agency costs are a rough measure of the financial friction related to bor-
rower financial health present in a model economy. The more severe the fric-
tion, that is higher agency costs, implies that low net worth firms pay higher
premium on external finance. Higher efp is associated with lower credit flows
and larger declines in investment and output. This chain of effects adds the
existing layers of amplification that nominal and real frictions generate in a
new Keynesian framework.
Severity of agency costs is critical for the magnitude of efp and the size of
financial frictions due to firm balance sheet health. It comprises an elasticity
measure of the efp to borrowers’ leverage. The financial accelerator mecha-
nism amplifies the effects of adverse technology and monetary policy shocks
by driving down investment and output. Lower output drives borrower net
worth downward giving rise to second round effects. Explicit time-varying
agency costs can also account for efp volatility due to the severity of asym-
metric information problem, implying positive relationship with efp (Gilchrist
and Leahy (2002)). The motivation for time-variation assumes deteriorating
information asymmetry gives rise to rents associated with cost of monitoring.
Results by Levin et al. (2004) featuring a partial equilibrium version of BGG
with a panel of 900 US non-financial firms for the period 1997-2003 are strong
empirical evidence of time variation in the marginal cost of bankruptcy.
Agency costs are not the only way to incorporate this financial friction in
new Keynesian models. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) set-up a framework em-
1 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) framework is similar to FA of Bernanke et al. (1999). Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) proposed a slightly different set up where the borrower net worth has the role
of collateral.
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phasizing the collateral function of borrower net worth. Thus asset prices and
net worth feed into each other exacerbating the impact of the initial shock on
firms’ net worth, hence on their capacity to borrow, leading to higher borrow-
ing premium or limited borrowing capacity. The inability of borrowers to raise
new equity adds persistence. Other studies like Iacoviello (2005) and Mona-
celli (2009) have highlighted the significance of housing wealth and consumer
durable goods respectively for the severity of financial frictions.
Typically in these studies authors emphasize two key facts, the procycli-
cal financial health of borrowers and magnitude of agency costs. The former
captures borrower balance sheet effects, hence the name balance sheet channel.
The second, agency costs, capture informational frictions in borrower lender
relationships. A full list of papers that make use of the extra layer of fric-
tion coming from the financial accelerator set up is impossible and beyond the
scope of my thesis2.
An interesting dimension along which this literature expanded is the intro-
duction of exogenous shocks to the financial contract or on the borrower net
worth. Exogenous shocks to net worth of the borrower may seem a solution
to obtain larger variations of agency costs and of the premium in calibrated
models. These extra shocks have become more common in estimated mod-
els. Estimation of dynamic stochastic equilibrium models (dsge) has made
a technical necessity the introduction of additional shocks. These additional
shocks have also become statistically important in driving macroeconomic fluc-
tuations. Shocks to agency (monitoring) costs aim at explaining the higher
magnitude of fluctuations in real and financial variables. Varying agency costs
during financial stress periods has been empirically supported by Levin et al.
(2004).
2 Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve (2008), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Queijo von Hei-
diken (2009), Gerali et al. (2010), De Fiore and Tristani (2013), Fernández-Villaverde (2010)
among many others.
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Similarly, a strand of literature applies shocks to borrower net worth to ad-
dress the requirement of matching the number of shocks with that of observ-
able variables in estimation. Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) motivate financial
shocks as exogenous variations on the efficiency of contractual relations be-
tween borrower and lenders. Gilchrist et al. (2009b) introduce shocks to net
worth and the external finance premium itself. Beyond the technical necessity
for extra shocks, the authors find that a large share of flcutuations is due to
these financial (or net worth) shocks. Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) lend close
to half of volatility in output and investment to shocks to borrower net worth.
Gilchrist et al. (2009b) estimate that a financial (efp) shock depresses the level
of output and of investment by 15 % and 75 % respectively. In this strand
of literature shocks to financial variables or friction mechanisms, rather than
fundamental shocks, have gained importance for business cycles 3.
There are two dimensions where my framework is different from this stream
of literature. First, adding exogenous shocks to endogenous variables like net
worth shocks in dsge models does not determine the fundamental source that
drives external finance premium. The approach leaves a gap by not address-
ing the more fundamental question of how these adverse shocks to financial
variables themselves took place.
Second and more important, this stream of literature is silent regarding the
health of financial sector. The recent crisis emphasized that financial health
of banks can be crucial for their ability to intermediate funds. The financial
health of lender may propagate exogenous shocks through higher premium
on external finance. Low net worth of financial intermediary may lower its
ability to absorb funds from the saving agents or to monitor the borrower.
This channel is commonly referred as the lending channel. In the next sections
3 Investment-specific shock, initially introduced by Greenwood et al. (1997) has become common
among this set of technology shocks.
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I review the literature incorporating this channel and its potential to explain
features not captured in the literature above.
1.1.2 Bank Lending Channel
Banks’ ability to intermediate funds does depend on their financial soundness.
The better financial health of banks contributes to the ability of banks to moni-
tor borrowers or to raise risk free funds from saving households. When low net
worth firms are adversely hit, banks may also see their financial health deterio-
rate and struggle to access the external funds. Access to deposits will depend
on how reliable banks are to households. The financial soundness of banks
boosts their reliability and their ability to reach on their savings. Banks that
lend in risky projects, or have non-diversified loan portfolios, expose house-
holds deposits to risk. Higher capital is a layer of protection against the risk in
the loan portfolio of the bank. Alternatively, low net worth intermediaries may
have to raise the premium they charge on loans to accumulate higher levels of
net worth.
Accessibility to the pool of depositors is critical for the economy. Inability
of banks to raise funds and supply financing may squeeze small firms out of
the market. Empirical evidence using bank level US data indicate that banks
with low capital squeeze lending more upon an adverse monetary policy shock
(Kishan and Opiela (2000), Van Den Heuvel (2007b), Van Den Heuvel (2007a)).
The findings emphasize how important the financial health of intermediaries
is for the functioning of the credit supply channel. This friction arising due to
loan supply by intermediaries is not related to firm financial health or to any
features of a new Keynesian model.
The loan supply channel has gained more attention after the recent crisis.
The erosion of bank capital that followed after a drastic decline in asset prices
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in US led to sharp spike in cost of external borrowing and further decline in
investment. The propagation of shocks by intermediary capital in an imper-
fectly competitive banking sector triggers a fall in output and investment in
the study by Gerali et al. (2010). Meh and Moran (2010), Dib (2010a) introduce
frictions due to bank’s inability to meet specific capital targets. The thresh-
old level of net worth is motivated by a regulatory requirement. Bank capital
channel propagates effects of technology shocks to output, investment and in-
flation. Capital adequacy ratios depend on returns on bank equity and bank
deposits. Shocks to bank capital affect real sector through bank balance sheet
size (Aguiar and Drumond (2007), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Dib (2010a)). The
models impose shocks to financial variables, bank net worth or capital quality,
to replicate the sharp increase in volatility seen in external finance premium.
They do not address why these financial variables became so volatile in the
first place. This stream of literature does not emphasize the role of bank net
worth as a mitigating buffer for the cost of external finance on the supply side.
The recent crises emphasized the risk premium’s critical role for real activ-
ity, rather than the squeeze in credit amount (Adrian et al. (2012)). In that light
Dib (2010b) had introduced a moral hazard problem in interbank market and
an adverse selection problem in bank capital market to emphasize liquidity
risk on efp. There is also a different stream of papers that looks at the role of
cost of external finance, but they look at the liquidity premium effects on efp
(Angeloni and Faia (2013), Dib (2010a)). In these models, there is no amplifica-
tion by the procyclical net worth of intermediaries on real sector through the
cost of external finance.
A framework that builds a connection between the endogenously evolving
lender net worth and efp is proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (GK)4.
They propose an agency problem between intermediaries and depositors giv-
4 A similar mechanism is present in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
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ing rise to moral hazard risks. The moral hazard problem arises between
banker that may abscond after collecting deposits and households. Depositors
require banker to maintain the value of the bank net worth above a threshold
as a guarantee for them not to withdraw deposits. Due to such threat, banker
has the incentive to keep the value of the bank above that threshold value for
depositors not to liquidate the bank.
The moral hazard problem gives rise to a mechanism where fluctuating
net worth drives the dynamics of lending rate relative to the risk free rate.
The mechanism works as follows. Bank value is equivalent to the discounted
stream of future profits. Adverse shocks will lower bank profits and therefore
drive down bank value. When bank’s net worth declines, banker faces the risk
of a bank run. As management faces the risk of being liquidated by depositors,
the bank has to raise the premium on loans to build up higher levels of net
worth. This wedge between the required return on loans and the risk free rate
is net of monitoring costs or any other costs to cover default losses. Propa-
gation of the fundamental shocks due to lower firm net worth or any agency
costs capturing information asymmetry between banks and firms is absent in
these frameworks.
The mechanism has similar appealing features as the FA model had ini-
tially. The models recognize the role of bank net worth for the variations in the
premium at which external finance can be obtained by a potential borrower.
To explain the unprecedented increase in external finance premium and the as-
sociated decline in real variables the authors appeal to capital quality shocks.
The purpose is to simulate the financial crisis and contribute by evaluating
policy alternatives.
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1.1.3 Review of Recent Literature
The literature that addresses the implications of financial conditions of borrow-
ers and lenders has boomed in the recent years. There is a long list of works
that replicate the standard models with friction at firm or bank level and focus
on estimation of parameters for different economies. In this section I focus on
a selected list of studies that contribute in the literature with new models or
that are closely related to my work. A short list of studies are related to models
with a friction at firm level or with a friction arising due to credit constrained
bank. I save more space for the studies with constraints arising at both, firm
and bank level.
In the financial accelerator literature, my works is related to Fuerst et al.
(2016) who modify the BGG framework to allow for the sharing of aggregate
risk by the lender and the entrepreneur. Unlike in BGG where the return to
the lender does not depend on realization of aggregate risk, in their contract
the average return to the lender varies with macroeconomic conditions. In
my framework I let the lender share the idiosyncratic risk. Both lender and
borrower share some of the risk.
Similar to Fuerst et al. (2016) I conclude that the financial accelerator is
weak compared to the bank friction. That firm friction is weak is also consistent
with the results of Suh and Walker (2016). They estimate three different models
with credit constraint firms and find that financial frictions at firm level are not
able to explain large fluctuations seen during the financial crisis.
A notable contribution is the paper by Christiano et al. (2010). At firm level,
they replicate the financial accelerator mechanism and let banks issue working
loans to make bank’s net worth fluctuate. Their object of research is not a com-
parison of the relative significance of bank and firm friction for the external
finance premium. Banks are designed as entities that own a technology to con-
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vert labor and capital into deposit accounts, and short term security accounts.
These liabilities are then offered to firms as debt loans and working capital
loans. The latter transmit the impact of firm default on bank financial health.
A direct exposure of bank net worth to asset price fluctuations does not take
place. The model is estimated with 16 shocks. They add two financial shocks,
one on firm net worth and the other on the idiosyncratic project returns of the
borrowing firm. They find the latter, named risk shock, important for the dy-
namics of the model and in particular for the correlation of credit flows with
output.
Finally, in the financial accelerator literature, my work in chapter 4.1 is
related to the work by Galvao et al. (2016) who estimate a time varying DSGE
model only with a financial accelerator and find that volatility of financial
friction shock has changed during 2007-2011 compared to 1985-2006.
More recent bank channel models emphasize the collateral value of bank
net worth. Among these studies there is a strong support to the role of financial
sector leverage for the risk premium or macroeconomic stability.
Nuno and Thomas (2017) analyze the dynamics of bank leverage subject
to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks on bank asset returns. In their model
banks borrow in the form of short-term collateralized risky debt and own the
firms. Due to a moral hazard problem on the part of the banks, leverage is
endogenously evolving. They conclude that idiosyncratic shocks, rather than
aggregate technology ones, help replicate the procyclicality of bank leverage
and the size of its volatility. The similarity with my framework is that they
make banks subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks while I evaluate
the impact of sudden a change in the long-run value of idiosyncratic shock.
My framework is related to the work of Boissay et al. (2013) with two fric-
tions in the bank-depositor relationship and in the interbank market. Banks
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are credit constrained as they can divert the non-collateralized funds (against a
diversion cost). Interbank market arises due to private information on banker
skills as a borrower giving rise to asymmetric information. The difference is
that they evaluate the probability of endogenously arising banking crisis.
My paper is related to He and Krishnamurthy (2013) who analyze the dy-
namics of risk premia during crisis in asset markets where the investor (bor-
rower) is a financial intermediary. In continuous time model the authors eval-
uate the probability of change in risk premium in equilibrium rather than in a
loglinearized model around the steady state. In a similar framework, Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2014) analyse the links between intermediaries’ financing
positions to risk premia while Phelan (2016) investigates implications of finan-
cial sector leverage for macroeconomic instability and welfare5.
The recent literature with two-sided (double) frictions has blossomed in
the recent years. While most double friction models have some similarities
in common with my work there are two papers, Kühl (2017) and Rannenberg
(2016), that share many features with my model framework. I dedicate more
space in this section to those two studies and discuss the remaining studies
shortly.
My work is closely related to the work of Kühl (2017). The similar fea-
tures are that both banks and the small firms with loans on their balance sheet
are financially constrained by assuming a limited enforcement problem as in
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Similar to my framework, banks hold a combi-
nation of state contingent assets - 100% of the equity securities of large firms-
and non-state contingent loans issued to smaller firms.
My work differs from his as in my framework firms can default (as in a
Bernanke et al. (1999) model), while he abstracts from loan defaults in his
5 Continuous-time models with frictions at intermediary-level allow the authors to set up highly
non-linear relationship between the financial health of intermediary and the risk premium (He
and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Phelan (2016)).
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model. With some modifications as in Fuerst et al. (2016), this feature allows
me to pass some losses to the banks. In Kühl (2017) banks suffer losses only
from equity securities. In his framework only (small) firms that take a loan are
financially constrained and accumulate net worth.
Another difference is that the objective of Kühl (2017) work is to investigate
the implications of state contingency of bank assets by changing the equilib-
rium composition of bank balance sheets. He analyses how bank net worth
evolution depends on the composition of bank assets (in equilibrium) and how
this composition matters for the transmission of shocks and for the procycli-
cal behaviour of bank leverage. His key result is that amplification of shocks
depends on bank balance sheet composition. In my framework, I compare the
propagation of shocks in a two-sided (double) friction model relative to the
financial acclerator model and the simple GK model. I do not explore the im-
plications of different compositions of bank balance sheet. Another difference
is that I estimate the model in two subsamples to evaluate how certain friction
parameters may have changed during the recent recession in US.
The second paper that my work is related to is Rannenberg (2016). In his
work both banks and firms are constrained as in my framework (GK and BGG
respectively). In a similar way Rannenberg (2016) models firms as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) and adds a set-up borrowed from Gertler and Karadi (2011) to
model banks. He analyzes the dynamics of cyclical behaviour of bank and
firm leverage as well as the dynamics of external finance premium. He makes
a horse-race of (exogenous) firm and bank net worth shocks. I differ from
his paper in that I include two types of financing for the firm which become
two assets on bank’s balance sheet. In addition, Rannenberg includes within
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period working loans which pay no interest and are of a negligible amount to
make bank leverage procyclical6.
A second difference is that, these studies rely on capital quality shocks or
exogenous net worth shocks to simulate the fluctuations on bank or firm net
worth during the recent crisis. I assess the propagation of standard technology
and policy shocks as driving forces of the model through the interaction of the
two frictions. Finally, a critical part of my work which is different from Ran-
nenberg (2016) is that I estimate the parameters for two different sub-samples,
1985-2004 and 2005-2014, which allows me to identify shifts in deep parame-
ters to explain the dynamics during the recent crisis.
To bring in a role for the bank net worth Zhang (2009) modifies the BGG
model by introducing fixed lending rate contract (instead of state-contingent).
In his framework both borrowers and lenders share aggregate systemic risk.
The capital stock has to be maintained to keep the required return on de-
posits and on equity at low levels. Though there is loan supply channel in his
framework, the bank is only exposed to the friction due to agency costs. Bank
balance sheet in his model is not exposed to changes in asset prices which are
the main cause triggering the loan supply channel in US.
Finally, a common feature between the above papers, Zhang (2009), Ran-
nenberg (2016) and Fuerst et al. (2016), and in my framework is that we use
predetermined contractual loan rate which allows for some the aggregate risk
to be shared between the banker and the firm. Bernanke et al. (1999) assume
the entrepreneurs will absorb all the aggregate risk, as lenders get risk free
rate by issuing state contingent (not fixed) contract.
My work is related to Hirakata et al. (2011) and Hirakata et al. (2013) who
employ a costly state verification contract (financial accelerator mechanism) to
6 While the author mentions loans within the period which are critical for the procyclical be-
haviour of bank leverage, they are not explained in the model section.
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model frictions at firm and bank level. Their work is different first because
they rely on exogenous net worth shocks, and second because their objective
is to explain fluctuations in output and investment and to analyze optimal
Taylor rules, respectively7.
My thesis is related to Hristov and Hülsewig (2017), Bonciani and van
Roye (2015) and Iacoviello (2015) who set up two-sided friction models. The
objective of Hristov and Hülsewig (2017) is to replicate the procyclicality of
bank profitability, counter-cyclicality of firm default rates and credit spreads
to monetary policy shocks. Their FA mechanism allows banks to share the
losses. Bonciani and van Roye (2015) set up a double moral hazard framework
with a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (hereby KM) type constraint on firms and a
monopolistic banking sector. Their model is different as they investigate the
effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity in the euro area. Iacoviello
(2015) builds a framework with credit-constrained banks, firms and house-
holds in the form of collateral constraints as in KM. He evaluates the impact
of financial shocks for the business cycles. Clerc et al. (2015) also bring three
credit constraint agents, households, banks and firms, in a general equilibrium
framework. Unlike in my thesis, they analyse the implications of default for
capital regulation.
My work has a common feature with other papers that consider two-sided
financial frictions allowing for interaction between constrained borrowers (or
firms or households) and financial shocks arising in interbank market as in
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Dib (2010a), Ajello (2016). A series of other papers
evaluate the interaction between frictions due to credit constraints of borrower
and intermediary at a more theoretical level (Rohan (2016), Sandri and Valencia
(2013), Zeng (2013)).
7 Another difference of my framework is that the wholesale producer finances the purchase of
capital stock with standard debt and by selling equity stake securities.
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Finally, my work is related to Verona et al. (2017) who consider two types
of financing, bonds and loans. While the loan market works as in the financial
accelerator of BGG, the bond market is slightly different from the equity secu-
rities market used in my framework. The objective of their work is to evaluate
interest rate rules in the presence of financial frictions.
None of the studies addresses the relative significance of financial and non-
financial sectors in propagating fundamental shocks. Where lender net worth
is modeled, in one stream of literature, the authors are interested on policy im-
plications of exogenous fluctuations in (lender) net worth. Alternatively, most
studies compare propagation of exogenous firm and bank net worth shocks
rather than propagation of fundamental, tfp, ist and monetary shocks.
1.2 Concluding Remarks
There is a broad consensus among economists that Modigliani-Miller hypoth-
esis of irrelevant capital structure is only a textbook case. The assumption
of perfectly competitive markets inherent in new Keynesian models is a base-
line simplification from which general equilibrium modeling is increasingly
departing. Since the ’90s frictions arising in credit markets have been shown
to produce a better representation of data moments. The recent crisis in US
emphasized a strong role for financial markets as well. The latter models have
been useful in evaluating policy implications, particularly macro-prudential
measures aiming at smoothing frictions in the financial market. The critical in-
teraction between non-financial sector and financial sector in propagating the
fundamental shocks has only recently gained momentum.
In this introductory chapter I review how the literature has treated the
role of firm and bank financial health in amplifying the impact of standard
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fundamental shocks. That countercyclical fluctuation of firm net worth leads
to procyclical behavior of borrowing premium by firms has been identified
since the 90s. A financial accelerator mechanism in a partial equilibrium model
has become a popular tool to illustrate how endogenous movements in firm
net worth lead to higher premium on external borrowing.
I review to what extent the current literature has explored the significance
of firm financial health and of bank financial health for the cost of external
financing. I refer with the term the balance sheet channel the modeling of the
asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender in dsge models.
In this literature, the dynamics in the firm balance sheet, particularly the fluc-
tuations of firm net worth, are critical for the fluctuations of external finance
premium.
Frictions arising due to countercyclical bank net worth have come to focus
only after the recent recession. Declining lender net worth drives the pre-
mium above the risk free rate for any type of firm. Therefore, easy access to
household savings by the lender will depend on his ability to maintain sound
financial health. I refer to this mechanism as the the bank lending channel. In
the last section of this chapter I reviewed to what extent the significance of
these two frictions for the external finance has been treated in a single general
equilibrium framework.
In the next chapter, I make an empirical investigation of the impact of firm
and bank net worth for the fluctuations of external finance premium. I focus
mainly in US where I get a rich set of financial and nonfinancial sector balance
sheet data. I also empirically analyse the implications of fundamental shocks,
like tfp, ist and monetary policy shocks, for the business cycle properties of
the cost of external finance and the macro variables in US. A similar empirical
inquiry for UK economy is based on a limited set of data.
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Chapter 2
Significance of Bank and Firm
Financial Health for the Borrowing
Premium
In this chapter I make an empirical assessment of the determinants of the cost
of external borrowing. My work expands in two directions. First, is the assess-
ment of the relative impact of the financial health of two main sectors of the
economy, financial and non-financial sector, on cost of external borrowing. Sec-
ond, is the analysis of the potential of fundamental technology and monetary
policy innovations to drive the financial variables and output.
This chapter is organised in five sections. The first and second sections are
dedicated to data construction and methodology.
The empirical exercises and respective results are reported in the third and
fourth sections. The issue addressed in third section is the relative importance
of the financial health of lenders relative to borrowers on the cost of external
borrowing. The tests to address it look at the extent that innovations to net
worth of each sector, non-financial and financial sector, can explain fluctuations
in cost of external borrowing. The main result that comes out is that bank net
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worth has become a significant determinant of external finance premium and
of business cycles after the 80s with the start of the Great Moderation period.
Results based on UK series are in line with those based on US data. Robustness
checks do not change this result.
The tests above assumed that variations of net worth of each sector are
solely due exogenous innovations of their own. One issue that still remains is
that the net worth of either sector, financial or non-financial, can be driven by
fundamental technology and monetary policy shocks.
In the fourth section I analyse how primary technology and policy variables
interact with net worth to drive the variations of the external financing pre-
mium and output. I run a 6-variable VAR with three additional series of total
factor productivity (tfp), investment specific technology (ist) and nominal in-
terest rate (Rn).
The result that emerges is that total factor productivity and monetary policy
shocks, rather than net worth shocks, explain the variations in external finance
premium fluctuations. Similarly, these shocks explain a great fraction of output
fluctuations. I make a short summary of those results in the fifth section.
2.1 Data
I collect data that serve as proxy for three key indicators under analysis, exter-
nal finance premium, financial health of firms and financial health of banks, for US
and UK.
External Finance Premium in US. A quick review of literature suggests
there are several measures used as proxy for the premium on external financ-
ing. A typical reference is the study by Bernanke et al. (1999). They consider
the historical average of the difference between the prime loan rate and the
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six-month T-bill as an average for the steady state premium. This measure
has the disadvantage that does not reflect market behaviour of interest rates.
Christiano et al. (2010) consider the difference between Baa and Aaa yields on
corporate bonds as measure of the premium. The advantage of these series is
that they are market based and are easily available. Similar to Christiano et al.
(2010) I make use of the available measures based on Moody’s corporate bond
yields. I obtain two measures of premium on external financing1.
• The first variable, named efpBA, is the difference of Moody’s Baa-rated
corporate bond yield less the Aaa-rated corporate bond yield.
• The second proxy, called efpB, is the difference between the Moody’s Baa-
rated corporate bond yield and Fed’s risk free rate.
These two measures are easily available and can be replicated over time.
Moody’s corporate bond yields are highly liquid borrowing instruments based
on trade of corporate bonds that are most active in the market. I use both
measures as proxy of the cost of obtaining external financing.
Net Worth of non-financial sector. There are slightly different measures
of firm net worth used in literature. I find slightly different measures used
in three works, Jermann and Quadrini (2006), Fuentes-Albero (2014) and Ran-
nenberg (2016). The common thread is that they all originate from the Flow of
Funds accounts provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. I follow Fuentes-Albero (2014) and define the net worth of non-financial
sector as the real per capita net worth of business sectors: non-financial corpo-
rate business plus non-financial non-corporate business sector. Net worth of each
sector is defined as tangible assets minus credit market instruments (market
value). Tangible assets are related to the physical capital of the firms (includ-
ing inventories), but not financial capital. Net worth is evaluated at current
1 Gilchrist et al. (2009b) calculate the average credit spread constructed from corporate bond
data. These data are only provided by Lehman/Warga and Merril Lynch.
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market prices, though deflated by GDP deflator. The purpose is to let changes
in the value of collateral due to asset prices be reflected in net worth in line
with the theoretical assumption of general equilibrium models.
Net Worth of financial sector. I use the series from the Financial Account of
the Unites States (table Z1) of the Federal Reserve Board to get a market value
for the net worth of Financial Sector. I obtain the series ’Financial business;
corporate equities (liability)’ (code LM793164105.Q from table Z1/L108). I deflate
the nominal net worth series using the GDP deflator provided by Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
Technology shocks. I construct series for two technology shocks. Total
factor productivity series is defined as the change in tfp series provided by
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco website. To get a measure of investment
specific technology (ist) I consider the ratio of investment price to overall price
index2. I can obtain these data starting from first quarter of 1950.
UK data
External Finance Premium. I obtain a proxy for the average lending rate
and a proxy for the risk free rate from Datastream database. The proxy for
external finance premium is the difference between the two.
• The lending rate is average interest rate on consumer loans provided by
Oxford Economics (code name:UKXRLND.R). The series is available from
first quarter of 19803.
• The risk free rate is measured as the interest rate on 6-month sterling cer-
tificates by Thompson Reuters (code name: LDNCD6M). The series is
2 Consumption deflator and total consumer price index series are similar for US so the relative
price of investment will be the same using either index.
3 The lending rate for consumer loans is the best proxy at this length under the assumption that
lending rate to consumers and to firms have a strong correlation.
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a market based rate closely following the fixed interest rate of Bank of
England.
Net Worth. To obtain net worth series for financial sector in UK, I make use
of two equity indices of financial and banking sector, respectively, constructed
by Datastream (Datastream code names: FINANUK and BANKSUK). Similarly,
to obtain net worth series for non-financial sector I use the equity index con-
structed by Datastream for non financial firms listed in UK (Datastream code
name: TOTLIUK).
GDP. Gross domestic product at constant prices is obtained from the Office
for National Statistics, UK.
Cyclical Components
I filter the data using one of the band-pass filters to extract fluctuations in
series that are relevant to behaviour in the series consistent with the business
cycles in the economy. Band pass filters are combinations of moving average
(MA) filters, which in turn are defined by polynomials in the lag operator.
These filters are designed to eliminate both high and low frequency move-
ments in the data. I filter the series with the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003)
(CF) filter by selecting the range 6 to 32 quarters. CF filters out low frequency
(of less than 6 quarters) noise and very high frequency (more than 32 quarters)
fluctuations. As a cross check I also filter the data with Hodrick and Prescott
(HP) filter. The two filters generate series with very similar second moments.
The reason for preferring the CF filter is that, following Canova (2007), other
filters leave or exaggerate the portion of variability that is present at high fre-
quency and that is not relevant for business cycle properties.
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2.2 Methodology
To run empirical tests I make use of vector autoregressive (VAR) models (Amisano
and Giannini (1997)). xt is a set of n economic variables expressed as a vector
of n stochastic processes jointly covariance stationary and possessing a finite
order (p) autoregressive representation. In matrix form it evolves as a n-variate
dynamic simultaneous equations model.
A0xt = A1xt−1 + ...+Apxt−p + t (2.1)
where, A0 is a n x n matrix of coefficients with diagonal elements normalised
to 1 and xt is a vector of n variables by T observations. The non-diagonal
elements of A0 capture the contemporaneous impact of variables in matrix xt
on each other. Ap is the matrix of coefficients on the pth lagged variables and
t is the vector of n structural shocks such that
E(t) = 0
E[t
′
t] = Σ
E[t
′
s] = 0 ∀t 6= s
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with elements σ2i for i = 1 to n.
Assume A is a n x n invertible matrix that pre-multiplies both sides of
equation 2.1 to induce a transformation of disturbances t:
AA0xt = AA1xt−1 + ...+AApxt−p +At (2.2)
Setting A = A−10 , assuming it exists, yields a reduced form representation
of VAR,
xt = Φ1xt−1 + ...+Φpxt−p +A−10 t (2.3)
27
2.2. Methodology
where, Φp = A−10 Ap is the coefficient vector on the p
th lagged variable.
et = A
−1
0 t are the reduced form (forecast) errors with E(et) = 0 and a non-
diagonal variance-covariance matrix Ω which now captures the contempora-
neous effects of shocks on the variables.
• Structural VAR: The A-B Model
The vector At can further be written as a product of
• a matrix B, and
• n independent orthonormalised disturbances ut with zero mean and co-
variance equal to the unit matrix In (Et[utu
′
t] = In).
At = But (2.4)
Matrices A and B can be chosen to capture the contemporaneous interac-
tions among the xt along with the standard deviations of the structural shocks.
In the next section I use the structural formulation of VAR (SVAR) to evalu-
ate to what extent shocks to net worth of banks and on net worth of firms explain
the fluctuations on a third variable of interest. Although the SVAR model
allows me to obtain non-recursive orthogonalization of the errors terms, t,
initially I make use of the simplicity of recursive formulation to obtain a lower
triangular A matrix and a diagonal B matrix4. Next, I add further restrictions
on the lower triangular A matrix to define contemporaneous effects of one
net worth shock on the other net worth variable consistent with my interest.
These additional restrictions on A matrix will be defined in each subsection
separately.
4 In a normalised system the diagonal elements of A will be normalised to one while the diagonal
elements of B matrix will contain the size of the variances of each structural innovation.
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2.3 Empirical Results from a 3-variable VAR
In this section I analyze the impact that variations in firm and bank net worth
have for the fluctuations of the premium of external financing and for the
business cycles.
I run a three-variable vector-auto-regression (VAR) for the set of observed
variables x ′t = [nwFt,nwBt, efpt], where efpt is either efpBt or efpBAt. As the
variables are filtered there is only a vector of constants α but no deterministic
trend (eq. 2.5).
xt = α+
T∑
j=1
Φjxt−j +At (2.5)
where, α is a vector kx1 and Φj is a matrix kxkj of coefficients, and xt =
[nwFt,nwBt, efpt] is a vector of three variables, firm net worth, bank net worth
and external finance premium respectively. T is the time lag of the VAR and the
matrix A
′
t = A[
nwF
t , 
nwB
t , 
efp
t ] is the set of observed residuals obtained from
the unrestricted VAR. I use a lag of T = 4 across all VARs.
I define a 3-variable structural VAR (S-VAR) whereby I give equal weights
to the innovations of the first two variables to affect the third one. In this S-
VAR model both firm net worth and bank net worth are considered to vary only
due to exogenous innovations of their own while both affect the efp variable.
It ensures equal weights of each net worth shock on the efp variable. To set up
the S-VAR I define matrices A and B as in equation 2.6.
At = But (2.6)
A =

1 0 0
0 1 0
NA NA 1

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B =

NA 0 0
0 NA 0
0 0 NA

where ut is the unobserved orthonormal structural innovation ([ut,u
′
t] = I).
The assumption of orthonormal innovations implies B is a diagonal matrix.
The diagonal elements of B to be estimated are the sizes of unobserved or-
thonormal innovations driving the VAR. A non-zero A(i, j) = NA (for i 6= j)
element implies the innovations of the jth variable have an impact on the fluc-
tuations of ith variable.
Definitions of matrices A and B in the structural VAR (S-VAR) above as-
sume that exogenous innovations of firm net worth and of bank net worth do not
affect each other. Based on ordering of the variables this definition of matrices
A and B gives the innovations on firm net worth and bank net worth an equal
chance to explain the fluctuations of external finance premium.
I run two alternative tests to check the robustness of results. The first is a
Cholesky decomposition of shocks given the current ordering of the variables
(named Cholesky VAR). For a Cholesky VAR the element A(2, 1) = NA of
matrix is non-zero (eq. 2.7). When the A(2,1) coefficient is not restricted to zero
the innovations of the 1st variable are allowed to have an effect on fluctuations
of the 2nd variable. In a separate subsection, I will check how results would
differ when a Cholesky VAR is estimated.
At = But (2.7)
A =

1 0 0
NA 1 0
NA NA 1

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The second robustness test is a Cholesky decomposition of shocks with
reversed order of net worth variables. I run a similar VAR as in equation
2.7, but the order of variables now is x ′t = [nwBt,nwFt, efpt] so that bank net
worth affects firm net worth in addition to their individual effect on the third
variable.
2.3.1 How strong is the Impact of Firm and Bank Net Worth
on the Premium?
The focus of these empirical tests is the period 1985-20014. Given the long
series of data in US it allows me to compare fluctuations in efp series due to
innovations on firm net worth or bank net worth.
I run the tests for the two measures of external finance premium, efpBA
and efpB, as defined earlier in section 2.1. I will use an index of forecast error
variance decomposition (FEVD) to compare the variance decomposition of efp
variable due to innovations on each net worth series. Define by index Πiefp the
average forecast error variance decomposition of the efp variable due to shock i for
lags 1-12, where i stands for either firm net worth (nwF) or bank net worth (nwB).
Results from a S-VAR in US
Table 2.1 shows the fraction of forecast errors of borrowing premium efpBA
explained by an exogenous innovation on firm net worth and on bank net worth
for US. Column [1] shows that 47% of fluctuations of efpBA is mainly explained
by innovations of bank net worth for the full sample 1950-2014.
To identify during which periods this effect is stronger I split the full sam-
ple into two sub-periods and run the same S-VAR with data from each sub-
period. I split the full sample in a Great Moderation period (1985-2014) and
a sub-period before that (1950-1984) (column [2] of table 2.1). Then I split the
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Table 2.1: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of efpBA,
pi
j
efp, due to innovations on net worth of j = nwF, nwB.
Lags 1-12 1950-2014 1950-1984 1950-1997 1950-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
US ΠnwFefpBA 2 16 7 3
US ΠnwBefpBA 47 19 23 33
1985-2014 1998-2014 2002-2014
US ΠnwFefpBA 10 11 6
US ΠnwBefpBA 58 72 69
Structural VAR (S-VAR) with matrices A and B as in equation 2.6. VAR order: nwF, nwB, efpBA;
neither net worth affects the other, both affect the premium.
full sample at an arbitrary selected year (1997) and further into the year 2002
right before the start of the recession (columns [3] and [4] of table 2.1)5. For
each case I report the average forecast error variance decomposition index, Πiefp,
calculated from the two sub-sample estimations. In lower (upper) part of the
table I report the results from the recent (earlier) sup-period. The choice of
years to split the sample indicates my interest in the Great Moderation period
and in the recession period.
Columns [2] to [4] in upper panel of table 2.1 show results from the S-
VAR tests for the first sub-sample period. In lower panel I show results of the
remaining sample period. A bird-eye view of the table in columns [2] to [4]
indicates the impact of bank net worth innovations on external finance premium
has become stronger since the end of 80s or the beginning of 90s. These results
are displayed in lower part of table 2.2. This period corresponds with the Great
Moderation period in US economy (Stock and Watson (2002)).
5 Ideally the sample for the crisis period would be 2007-2014. The problem with such a sample
is that the time series are not stationary in such a short sample due to large drops in all three
variables in 2007 which take several quarters to bounce back.
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Table 2.2 shows the variance decomposition of forecast errors of the other
premium measure, the efpB series, due to innovations on the same two net
worth series, nwF and nwB. Definitions of matrices A and B are the same.
Table 2.2: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of efpB,
Π
j
efp, due to innovations on net worth of j = nwF, nwB.
Lags 1-12 1950-2014 1950-1984 1950-1997 1950-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
US ΠnwFefpB 4 13 12 18
US ΠnwBefpB 5 11 2 2
1985-2014 1998-2014 2002-2014
US ΠnwFefpB 11 7 17
US ΠnwBefpB 7 49 77
Structural VAR (S-VAR) with matrices A and B as in equation 2.6. VAR order: nwF, nwB, efpB;
neither net worth affects the other, both affect the premium.
For the full sample period 1950-2014 in column [1], the variations in the
premium series, efpB, can be explained by the exogenous innovations of its
own6. In the more recent periods, starting from the end of ’90s, around 50-70%
of fluctuations in the premium series efpB have been driven by exogenous in-
novations on bank net worth (lower panel of columns [3] and [4])7. The results
echo the findings above. One difference from previous results is that the im-
pact of bank net worth on efp becomes stronger slightly later during the Great
Moderation period and therefore does not show up in the full sample S-VAR.
6 As this is a 3-variable VAR where firm net worth and bank net worth explain 4 and 5 % of
efpB fluctuations respectively (column [1]), the remaining 91% of variations are explained by
innovations on efpB.
7 It is possible that the strong monetary policy stance undertaken during Volcker rule of Federal
Reserve is dominating the behavior of series efpB during 1985-2014.
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Robustness check
I check how robust these results are to the ordering of the VAR variables. I
now re-run the VARs with Cholesky ordering to check the robustness of the
results for both efp measures, efpBA and efpB. For that I redefine matrices A as
in equation 2.8 while the diagonal B matrix remains the same. The difference
from the S-VAR case shown earlier is that I set no restriction on the element
A(2, 1) = NA. It implies that, now I let innovations on first variable to have a
contemporary effect on the second one.
At = But (2.8)
A =

1 0 0
NA 1 0
NA NA 1

B =

NA 0 0
0 NA 0
0 0 NA

This standard Cholesky decomposition of forecast errors assumes that now
the innovations on firm net worth matter for the variation of bank net worth. This
is in addition to their individual effects on the third variable, efp. This seems
a reasonable ordering given that it is the firms’ assets that are first exposed
to fundamental exogenous shocks in the economy. In any financial system
firm liabilities are mostly bank assets. Both firm liabilities and net worth will
depend on quality of firm assets. Any adverse shock deteriorating the value
of firm assets will affect both, the firm net worth and its ability to repay its
liabilities. Hence will affect bank assets and its financial health (net worth).
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In each column of table 2.3 I report an index Πiefp. It is the 12-quarter
average forecast error variance decomposition of efp due to shock ‘i’, where ‘i’
stands for either firm net worth [nwF] or bank net worth [nwB]. In column (i) I
report the same S-VAR results shown in column [3] (lower panel) of tables 2.1
and 2.2 for the period 1998-20148. In column (ii) I report the VAR results for
the same period but with Cholesky ordering.
As a final robustness check, in column (iii) I report the VAR results for
the same period but now with the reversed order of the variables as x ′t =
[nwBt,nwFt, efpt]. In what I name the reverse order VAR I switch the ordering
of variables where bank net worth is the first and firm net worth is the second
variable. This ordering assumes innovations on bank net worth are now allowed
to explain variations in firm net worth while both affect efp variable.
Table 2.3: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of efpBA
and efpB, ΠiefpBA and Π
i
efpB respectively, due to innovations on net worth
i = nwF, nwB (US).
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR [ii] Cholesky VAR [iii] Reverse order VAR
efpBA ΠnwFefpBA 11 10 11
efpBA ΠnwBefpBA 72 71 69
efpB ΠnwFefpB 7 4 7
efpB ΠnwBefpB 49 46 44
(*) Order: [i] SVAR: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable;
[ii] Cholesky VAR: nwF, nwB, efp-variable; [iii] Reverse Cholesky VAR: nwB, nwF, efp-variable.
(**) IRFs in figures A.1 to A.3 of appendix A.
The results are very similar across the three columns. Columns (ii) and (iii)
suggests that innovations on bank net worth are important for the variations
in the efp variable, efpBA or efpB, and do not depend on ordering, S-VAR or
Cholesky VAR. The impulse responses from the VAR results of table 2.3 are
8 I choose a shorter sample period for the robustness tests to match the period when bank net
worth becomes significant in the VAR results with efpB as a proxy for premium (column [ii] in
lower panel of table 2.2). Bank net worth has become important for external finance premium
proxy, efpB, only after this period
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shown in figures A.1 to A.3 of appendix A. Each figure shows the responses
of the two measures of external finance premium, efpBA and efpB, following
innovations on firm and bank net worth.
< Figures A.1 to A.3 here >
Is bank net worth more significant in UK?
The data for UK are of a shorter time span. I can collect data on net worth
based on stock indices from Datastream as proxy for net worth9. These data
are different from balance sheet data collected in the case of US as described
earlier in section 2.1.
In table 2.4 I report average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
of one borrowing spread measure for UK, efp due to innovations on net worth
based on UK data.
Table 2.4: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of efp,
Πiefp, due to innovations on net worth i = nwF, nwB (UK).
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR [ii] Cholesky VAR [iii] Reverse order VAR
[A]
efp ΠnwFefp 11 12 7
efp ΠnwBefp 54 34 39
[B]
efp ΠnwFefp 14 9 8
efp ΠnwBefp 44 24 25
(*) Order: [i] SVAR: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable;
[ii] Cholesky VAR: nwF, nwB, efp variable; [iii] Reverse Cholesky VAR: nwB, nwF, efp variable.
Bank net worth for UK is an equity index of banking sector in panel [A] and of financial sector in panel [B].
Source: Datastream 1985-2014.
9 US and UK are two economies that have well developed financial markets that allow for a
considerable share of market based financing for corporate firms to take place and for equity
securities to be traded in the financial markets.
36
2.3. Empirical Results from a 3-variable VAR
I use two different series of bank net worth. One is an equity index of
banking sector in UK (panel [A]) and the other is an equity index of finan-
cial sector in UK (panel [B]). Data are obtained from Datastream for the period
1985-2014. The results are similar to those in US. Exogenous innovations of
bank net worth are significant for the variations in external finance premium. Im-
pulse response functions (IRFs) A.5 in appendix indicate that external finance
premium declines following a positive innovation on bank net worth.
< Figure A.5 here >
One possible argument to motivate these latter results is the largely de-
veloped market-based financial system in US and partially in UK. In market-
based financial systems firms can obtain financing by selling equity stakes to fi-
nancial institutions. While these equity securities can also be bought by house-
holds and other entities banks and other financial entities buy the majority of
them. The amount that may go to households and non-financial institutions is
negligibly small.
2.3.2 Do fluctuations in net worth have real effects?
In this part I explore whether the innovations on firm net worth and bank net
worth explain the variations in output gap. I run similar S-VARs as in previous
section but now instead of a series for the external finance premium I test how
the exogenous innovations on bank net worth and firm net worth affect the
fluctuations of per-capita-GDP. Y is per-capita-GDP deviations from the potential
GDP per capita (Y¯). The latter is approximated by the trend of the HP filter.
The rationale for replacing the external finance premium with output gap is
to check for robustness of the previous results. If the bank net worth effect on
external finance premium is strong and robust then it must have an impact,
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through credit flows, on output gap fluctuations as well. Results are reported
in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of GDP
per capita, ΠiY , due to innovations on net worth i = nwF, nwB.
Lags 1-12 1950-2014 1950-1984 1950-1997 1950-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Y (US) ΠnwFY 1 10 1 0
Y (US) ΠnwBY 23 15 15 19
1985-2014 1998-2014 2002-2014
Y (US) ΠnwFY 10 15 23
Y (US) ΠnwBY 47 51 41
Structural VAR (S-VAR) with matrices A and B as in equation 2.6. VAR order: nwF, nwB, Y;
neither net worth affects the other, both affect the output.
The results resonate with the previous ones regarding the role of bank net
worth for the fluctuations of the efp. Innovations on bank net worth explain the
variations of output during the Great Moderation period. Results support the
hypothesis that the significance of bank net worth relative to firm net worth
on efp measures, as seen in previous tables, is strong and robust enough to
show up as an effect on the variations of output in the US economy.
For the sake of comparison I follow the same robustness tests with output
gap as with efp. Yt is the variable of interest (measured as GDP per capita less
potential output). Results are reported in table 2.6. In column (i) I list the
same S-VAR results shown in column [3] of tables 2.5. In columns (ii) and (iii)
I report the Cholesky VAR results for both cases when innovations of firm net
worth affect bank net worth and vice verse.
The results from these alternative VAR tests confirm the same findings from
the structural VAR. Bank net worth is more significant for the dynamics of US
business cycles. Impulse response functions (IRFs) in figure A.4 of appendix
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Table 2.6: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of Y, ΠiY ,
due to innovations on net worth i = nwF, nwB (US).
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR [ii] Cholesky VAR [iii] Reverse order VAR
Y (US) ΠnwFY 15 6 15
Y (US) ΠnwBY 51 46 51
(*) Order: [i] SVAR: neither net worth affects the other, both affect Y variable;
[ii] Cholesky VAR: nwF, nwB, Y variable; [iii] Reverse Cholesky VAR: nwB, nwF, Y variable.
(**) IRFs in figure A.4 of appendix A.
indicate that positive innovations on bank net worth give rise to higher output
gap10. Occasionally, depending on the ordering of the variables, output gap
responds positively to innovations on firm net worth. The magnitude of their
impact measured by the forecast error variance decomposition shown here in
table 2.6 indicates that the impact of bank net worth is strong and robust for any
ordering in the VARs.
< Figure A.4 here >
Is there any real effect of firm and bank net worth in UK?
I report the average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of output
gap, Y, due to innovations on net worth based on UK data in table 2.7. Results
are similar to those in the case of US. It is exogenous innovations of bank net
worth that are significant for the variations in output in UK.
Impulse response functions (IRFs) in figure A.6 on page 54 of appendix
indicate that output goes up upon a positive innovation on bank net worth.
IRFs indicate a slightly positive impact of output due to innovations on firm
net worth as well. Output response to firm net worth is not strong as shown by
10In the IR graphs in appendix, innovations on bank net worth take the name ’shock 2’ in the S-VAR
and Cholesky VAR. With reverse ordering of variables in reversed Cholesky VAR, innovations
on bank net worth get the name ’shock 1’.
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Table 2.7: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of Y, ΠiY ,
due to innovations on net worth i = nwF, nwB (UK).
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR [ii] Cholesky VAR [iii] Reverse order VAR
[A]
Y (UK) ΠnwFY 17 14 10
Y (UK) ΠnwBY 47 27 31
[B]
Y (UK) ΠnwFY 25 11 16
Y (UK) ΠnwBY 52 33 28
(*) Order: [i] SVAR: neither net worth affects the other, both affect Y variable;
[ii] Cholesky VAR: nwF, nwB, Y variable; [iii] Reverse Cholesky VAR: nwB, nwF, Y variable.
Bank net worth for UK is an equity index of banking sector in panel [A] and of financial sector in panel [B].
Source: Datastream 1985-2014.
FEVD results in table 2.7 above. The share of output variations explained by
innovations on firm net worth is less than 20%.
< Figure A.6 here >
Firm and bank net worth are endogenous variables in the economy driven by
technology innovations and possibly exogenous policy and other shocks. The
positive correlation of net worth series with output and investment (table A.1 in
appendix) is a potential signal that fundamental shocks have strong impact on
all these variables (table A.1 in appendix). To assess how productivity or policy
shocks affect fluctuations of the two net worth variables, in the next subsection
I add technology and policy shocks to the list of variables in the current VAR.
< Table A.1 here >
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2.4 What are the fundamental drivers of net worth
and the efp?
Fluctuations in bank net worth and firm net worth variables are not solely due
to exogenous innovations of their own. They also respond to key fundamen-
tal shocks. In this section I analyse how the results from the previous section
change when (proxy for) key technology or policy shocks are present in a VAR.
I ask ”what fraction of the fluctuations of efp do innovations in fundamental
shocks and in both net worth variables explain in the VAR system?”. To do
so I add three additional variables to the previous 3-variable VAR system. I
add a proxy for total factor productivity (tfpt), one for investment specific technol-
ogy (istt) and one for the Fed’s nominal interest rate (Rnt ). This is a 6-variable
VAR system that identifies the extent to which technology or policy shocks are
critical for external finance premium and for net worth variables. Bank net worth
and firm net worth can still have an impact on the variations in external finance
premium.
I run the 6-variable vector-auto-regression (VAR) with data from the period
1985-2014. The selected sample is based on results in previous section that
bank net worth had become significant for efp in US.
xt = α+
T∑
j=1
Φjxt−j +At (2.9)
x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt, efpt]
where xt is now a matrix of six variables. Tfpt is total factor produc-
tivity shock, istt is investment technology shock and Rnt is Fed’s nominal
interest rate. The three variables from previous section are firm net worth,
bank net worth and a proxy for external finance premium. The matrix A
′
t =
A[tfpt , 
ist
t , 
Rn
t , 
nwF
t , 
nwB
t , 
efp
t ] is the set of observed residuals obtained from
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the unrestricted VAR and the remaining coefficients have the same meaning as
before. The number of lags is T = 4 again.
2.4.1 Definition of Structural VAR
Definition of S-VAR 1
A and B matrices for a structural VAR (S-VAR) are defined in equation 2.10.
ut is the vector of unobserved orthonormal structural innovation such that
[ut,u
′
t] = I. Matrix B is defined as a 6-by-6 diagonal matrix. Its non-zero
(diagonal) elements, denoted ’NA’, imply that the size of the exogenous inno-
vations of each variable will be determined by the data. Definition of matrix B
will remain the same in all the 6-variable S-VAR tests of this section. For the
structural VAR (S-VAR 1) I will explain in detail the definition of A matrix.
At = But (2.10)
A =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
NA NA NA 1 0 0
NA NA NA 0 1 0
NA NA NA NA NA 1

B =

NA 0 0 0 0 0
0 NA 0 0 0 0
0 0 NA 0 0 0
0 0 0 NA 0 0
0 0 0 0 NA 0
0 0 0 0 0 NA

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All A(i, i) = 1 elements for i = 1 to 6 assume that each variable in the
vector of variables x ′t responds to its own exogenous orthonormal innovation.
All non-diagonal elements of the first three rows of A are zero (all A(i, j) ele-
ments for i 6= j and i, j = 1, 2, 3). This definition assumes that tfpt, istt and
Rnt respond only to their own exogenous innovations. The motivation is to
replicate the definition of these shocks in general equilibrium models11. The
current set-up gives an equal chance to the innovations on these fundamental
variables to affect the net worth and efp variables.
A non-zero element A(i,j), for i 6= j and denoted ’NA’, assumes that the
innovation of the jth variable is allowed to have a contemporaneous impact
on the fluctuations of ith variable. In rows 4 to 5, ’NA’ elements imply that
innovations on tfpt, istt and Rnt are allowed to contemporaneously affect the
two net worth variables, nwFt and nwBt. In row 6 the ’NA’ elements imply
that innovations on all the other 5 variables are allowed to contemporaneously
affect the last variable of x ′t, that is efp. Note that element A(4,5)=0 implies that
innovations on the 4th variable, firm net worth, has a zero contemporaneous
effect on the 5th variable, bank net worth.
Definition of S-VAR 2
I define a second structural VAR model which I name it S − VAR2. Matrix
B is the same. Here I do not restrict innovations on firm net worth to have a
zero contemporaneous effect on bank net worth. Instead I let element A(4, 5) =
NA 6= 0 assuming that innovation on firm net worth have a contemporaneous
11Reporting results from VARs where the three shocks affect each other would overload this
section with results that do not add much and that goes beyond the scope of this analysis.
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effect on bank net worth (eq. 2.11). All the other elements of A matrix remain
unchanged.
At = But (2.11)
A =

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
NA NA NA 1 0 0
NA NA NA NA 1 0
NA NA NA NA NA 1

Definition of S-VAR 3
Finally I define a third structural VAR named S−VAR3 where matrices A and
B are the same as above but the order of variable changes such that nwFt and
nwBt switch places as shown in equation 2.12.
x ′t = [tfpt, istt,R
n
t ,nwBt,nwFt, efpt] (2.12)
The definition of A matrix is the same as in equation 2.11. The re-ordering
of two net worth series assumes that innovations on bank net worth have a
contemporaneous effect on firm net worth.
Finally in each of these three S-VAR models I replace the external finance
premium proxy variable, efp, with the output gap variable, Y. The motivation
is to compare the impact of fundamental shocks in explaining external finance
premium to their impact on output. An impact that is similar in size would be
a robustness check for the role of external finance premium.
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2.4.2 Which fundamental shocks drives efp in a 6-variable S-
VAR?
I run the tests for the two measures of external finance premium, efpBA and
efpB, as defined earlier in section 2.1. I use the same index of 12 lag average
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of an efp variable, Πiefp, due to shock
i where i stands for either tfp, ist, Rn, firm net worth (nwF) or bank net worth
(nwB)12.
Table 2.8: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of efp
(ΠiefpBA and Π
i
efpB respectively) due to innovations on i = tfp, ist, Rn, nwF
and nwB for the period 1985-2014.
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR 1 [ii] S-VAR 2 [iii] S-VAR 3
[A] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBAt]
efpBA ΠtfpefpBA 55 61 61
efpBA ΠistefpBA 7 8 8
efpBA ΠRnefpBA 9 10 10
efpBA ΠnwFefpBA 10 4 8
efpBA ΠnwBefpBA 12 10 6
[B] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBt]
efpB ΠtfpefpB 25 27 27
efpB ΠistefpB 6 7 7
efpB ΠRnefpB 41 44 44
efpB ΠnwFefpB 10 5 10
efpB ΠnwBefpB 13 12 7
(*) [i] SVAR 1: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable; [ii] SVAR 2: Shocks on
firm net worth affect bank net worth; [iii] SVAR 2: bank net worth shocks affect firm net worth.
The numbers do not add up to 100 column-wise (for each panel) as I have not included the
percent of variations explained by own shocks of each variable.
In table 2.8 I report results with US data series for the period 1985-2014 for
the two different proxy series of external finance premium.
• In panel [A] the vector of variables is x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt, efpBAt].
• In panel [B] the vector of variables is x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt, efpBt].
12I do not report FEVD due to exogenous efp shock. Hence column-wise the sum of each column
is not 100.
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In each column I report the percentage of variations in efp variables ex-
plained by variations of the other 5 variables of vector x ′t. The results in panel
[A] indicate that tfp innovations explain around 55-60% of variations of the
variable, efpBA. The fraction of variations of efpBA explained by innovations in
other variables is negligibly small.
In panel [B] the VAR results with the second proxy series, efpB, indicate
that innovations on policy rate, Rn, and on tfp explain around 40% and 25%,
respectively, of fluctuations of efpB. The results do not depend on the ordering
of the two wealth variables, firm and bank net worth.
In a 3-variable VAR in previous section, bank net worth was explaining
both efp fluctuations. From these tests I learn that, as expected, tfp takes over
in explaining the variations in premium measures. Investment specific technol-
ogy shocks do not seem to matter for the efp while policy shocks have a strong
impact only on the second premium measure, efpB.
2.4.3 Impact of fundamental shocks for Output fluctuations
In a separate test I repeat the above exercise with the vector of variables
x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt, Yt] where Yt is the output variable replacing
the efp variable. I ask ’what fraction of output fluctuations do these three exogenous
innovations explain?’. If the results from the previous two VARs are robust then,
given the strong counter-cyclical nature of external finance premium shown
earlier in table A.1 (see appendix), then the same policy shocks should have
similar impact on output variations. Therefore, the aim is to verify to what ex-
tent the above VAR results are consistent with this argument of counter-cyclical
external finance premium.
In table 2.9 I show that a fraction of around 20-25% of output fluctuations
are explained by innovations of policy rate and a similar share by tfp. While
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Table 2.9: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of Output
(ΠiY ) due to innovations on tfp, ist, Rn and net worth i = tfp, ist, Rn, nwF,
nwB for the period 1985-2014.
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR 1 [ii] S-VAR 2 [iii] S-VAR 3
[C] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,Yt]
Y ΠtfpY 25 24 24
Y ΠistY 6 7 7
Y ΠRnY 23 22 22
Y ΠnwFY 7 5 7
Y ΠnwBY 3 3 2
(*) [i] SVAR 1: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable; [ii] SVAR 2: Shocks to
firm net worth affect bank net worth; [iii] SVAR 2: bank net worth shocks affect firm net worth.
The numbers do not add up to 100 column-wise (for each panel) as I have not included the
percent of variations explained by own shocks of each variable.
negligibly small fraction can be explained by other variables, the remaining
variations are explained by own shocks13. The significance of policy and tfp
shocks for output and for efpB variations is consistent with a counter-cyclical
external finance premium.
2.4.4 What drives net worth?
What explains the variations in net worth of firm and bank in these same S-VARs? In
this subsection I report share of net worth fluctuations due to fundamental and
own shocks from the same S-VARs reported in section 2.4.2.
In tables 2.10 and 2.11 I report the share of fluctuations of net worth vari-
ables, firm net worth and bank net worth respectively, that are explained by vari-
ation in tfp, ist, Rn and in both net worth variables. These results are obtained
from the same S-VARs that delivered the results reported in table 2.8 with ma-
trices A and B defined in equations 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12. Note that in the upper
13The sum of numbers in each column do not add to 100. In these tables, I have not included the
fraction of output variations explained by own shocks. In table 2.9 exogenous output shock
explains around 30% of output fluctuations.
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panel the vector of variables is x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt, efpBAt] while
in lower panel I replace the proxy for the premium, efpBAt, with efpBt.
Table 2.10: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of firm
net worth, nwF, (ΠinwB) due to innovations on tfp, ist, Rn and net worth i =
tfp, ist, Rn, nwF, nwB for the period 1985-2014.
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR 1 [ii] S-VAR 2 [iii] S-VAR 3
[A] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBAt]
nwF ΠtfpnwF 27 32 32
nwF ΠistnwF 9 10 10
nwF ΠRnnwF 22 26 26
nwF ΠnwFnwF 33 24 28
nwF ΠnwBnwF 8 7 4
[B] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBt]
nwF ΠtfpnwF 11 13 13
nwF ΠistnwF 9 10 10
nwF ΠRnnwF 26 29 29
nwF ΠnwFnwF 30 24 29
nwF ΠnwBnwF 23 23 18
(*) [i] SVAR 1: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable; [ii] SVAR 2: Shocks to
firm net worth affect bank net worth; [iii] SVAR 3: bank net worth shocks affect firm net worth.
The numbers do not add up to 100 column-wise (for each panel) as I have not included the
percent of variations explained by shocks to the last variable.
The result indicate that policy shock explains around 25-30% of firm net worth
fluctuations in both VAR tests, independent of whether efpBAt or efpBt is
included in VAR (panels [A] and [B] of table 2.10). Innovations on tfpt explain
around 27-32% of firm net worth fluctuations only when efpBAt is used in the
VAR system (panel [A])14.
In table 2.11 I show the fraction of FEVD of bank net worth explained by each
shock. Innovations on tfp and policy rate each explain around 27-30% of bank
net worth fluctuations in the S-VAR with efpBA proxy for the premium (panel
[A] of table 2.11). In panel [B], with efpB as proxy for the premium, none of
14A large fraction of net worth variations in tables 2.10 is explained by own (net worth) shocks
as shown. Fraction of FECD explained by efp shock are not shown.
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the shocks is significant for the bank net worth. Its fluctuations are driven by
exogenous shocks of its own (75-80%).
Table 2.11: The 12 lag average forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of bank
net worth, nwB, (ΠinwB ) due to innovations on tfp, ist, Rn and net worth i
= tfp, ist, Rn, nwF, nwB for the period 1985-2014.
Lags 1-12 [i] S-VAR 1 [ii] S-VAR 2 [iii] S-VAR 3
[A] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBAt]
nwB ΠtfpnwB 29 30 30
nwB ΠistnwB 9 9 9
nwB ΠRnnwB 27 28 28
nwB ΠnwFnwB 2 6 1
nwB ΠnwBnwB 32 24 29
[B] : x ′t = [tfpt, istt,Rnt ,nwFt,nwBt,efpBt]
nwB ΠtfpnwB 3 3 3
nwB ΠistnwB 2 2 2
nwB ΠRnnwB 7 7 7
nwB ΠnwFnwB 4 8 4
nwB ΠnwBnwB 80 75 80
(*) [i] SVAR 1: neither net worth affects the other, both affect efp variable; [ii] SVAR 2: Shocks to
firm net worth affect bank net worth; [iii] SVAR 2: bank net worth shocks affect firm net worth.
The numbers do not add up to 100 column-wise (for each panel) as I have not included the
percent of variations explained by shocks to the last variable, which are negligibly low.
Earlier in table 2.1 I reported strong and significant impact of bank net worth
on the borrowing premium starting from the end of ’80s. To reconcile the cur-
rent results with those in table 2.1 I can argue that tfp and policy shocks are key
drivers of efp. Net worth fluctuations have potentially become critical transmit-
ters of these two shocks in US since the start of the Great Moderation period15.
2.5 Conclusions
There are three main fundamental drivers of business cycles that I analyse in
this chapter, the total factor productivity (tfp), the investment specific technol-
15In one case, in panel [B] of table 2.11, the results indicate that shocks other than tfp and policy
rate may be affecting the bank net worth.
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ogy (ist) and monetary policy. The shocks on these variables are employed in a
horse-race to explain fluctuations of financial and output variables in a vector
autoregressive model. Two main results emerge from this analysis.
First, total factor productivity (tfp) shocks and monetary policy shocks are
key drivers of the external finance premium and output fluctuations. Invest-
ment specific technology shock is not important.
Second, the fluctuations in the financial sector net worth are also critical
factor for the dynamics of external finance premium. In the absence of fun-
damental shocks, it is the exogenous innovations to financial sector net worth,
rather than firm net worth, that explain a large share of efp and business cycle
fluctuations.
In the next chapter I lay out a dsge model with two-sided financial frictions
that will shed light on the propagation of these fundamental shocks.
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A.1 Tables and Figures
Net Worth and volatility of EFP in US
Figure A.1: S-VAR: Impulse Responses (IR) of efpBA and efpB due to innovations on
firm net worth[=shock 1], bank net worth[=shock.2] and own (efp) [=shock.3]
(US).
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Figure A.2: Cholesky VAR: Impulse Responses (IR) of efpBA and efpB due to innova-
tions on firm net worth[=shock 1], bank net worth[=shock.2] and own (efp)
[=shock.3] (US).
Figure A.3: Reverse order Cholesky VAR: Impulse Responses (IR) of efpBA and efpB
due to innovations on bank net worth[=shock 1], firm net worth[=shock.2]
and own (efp) [=shock.3] (US).
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Figure A.4: S-VAR, Cholesky VAR & reverse order Cholesky VAR: Impulse Re-
sponses (IR) of Y due to innovations on firm net worth[=shock 1], bank
net worth[=shock.2] and own (Y) [=shock.3] (US).
Figure A.5: S-VAR: Impulse Responses (IR) of efp due to innovations on firm net
worth[=shock 1] and bank net worth[=shock.2] and own (efp) [=shock.3]
(UK).
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Figure A.6: S-VAR: Impulse Responses (IR) of Y due to innovations on firm net
worth[=shock 1], bank net worth[=shock.2] and own (efp) [=shock.3] (UK).
Table A.1: Correlation with output (%ρxi,y) data (*)
[a]’50-2014 [b]’80-2014 [c]’05-2014
Y 1 1 1
C 0.85 0.86 0.92
I 0.90 0.88 0.95
H 0.88 0.88 0.91
W 0.85 0.25 -0.08
Π 0.20 0.32 0.42
Q – – –
Rn 0.37 0.42 0.77
Moody’s BAA yield -0.30 -0.35 -0.61
Firm Net Worth (FoF) 0.33 0.34 0.93
Bank Net Worth (FoF) 0.46 0.45 0.73
Firm Net Worth (DS) 0.41 0.61 0.81
Bank Net Worth (DS) 0.40 0.42 0.82
efpBA -0.54 -0.40 -0.44
efpA -0.54 -0.55 -0.78
efpB -0.60 -0.57 -0.79
(*) Correlations (ρxi,y) multiplied by 100 to express in % terms.
(**) All indicators are in real terms deflated by GDP deflator, except efp.
(***) (FoF): Flow of Funds Accounts; (DS) Datastream proxy series based on equity indices.
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A.2 Data
US Data
I use US data from NIPA-BEA, CPS-BLS, the FRED database, and the Flow
of Funds Accounts from the Federal Reserve Board. Though data for US are
available starting from 1947, the earliest, I use data for the period 1980-2015,
as the longest time span for which I can construct data for Euro area.
1. Non-financial sector net worth: Tangible Assets minus Credit Market
Liabilities. Tangible Assets obtained from the Flow of Funds Account
(FFA) of the Federal Reserve Board, sum of ‘Nonfinancial Assets of Non-
financial Corporate Business’, series ID FL102010005.Q from Table B.102
and ‘Nonfinancial Assets of Nonfinancial Corporate Business’, series ID
FL112010005.Q from Table B.103. Credit Market Liabilities obtained from
the Flow of Funds Account (FFA) of the Federal Reserve Board, sum of
’Credit Market Instruments of Nonfinancial Noncorporate Business’, se-
ries ID FL114104005.Q from Table B.102 and ‘Credit Market Instruments
of Nonfinancial Corporate Business’, series ID FL114102005.Q from Ta-
ble B.103; I deflate the nominal net worth series using the GDP deflator
provided by NIPA Table 1.1.4.
2. Financial sector net worth: Financial business; corporate equities; liabil-
ity.. I use the series from the Financial Account of the Unites States (table
Z1) of the Federal Reserve Board to get a market value for the net worth
of Financial Sector. I obtain the series ’Financial business; corporate equities
(liability)’, coded LM793164105.Q from table Z1/L108. (Before August
2015 the table was named Z1/L107 and the series name FL793164105.Q).
I deflate the nominal net worth series using the GDP deflator provided
by NIPA Table 1.1.4.
55
A.2. Data
3. External Finance Premium. Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield mi-
nus the Aaa-rated corporate bond yield. Alternatively, the spread is
calculated as primary lending rate minus 3 months T-bill rate. Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H15).
4. Total factor productivity (tfp). I obtain the total factor productivity se-
ries from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco website. The series is
provided in percent change at an annual rate (=400 * change in natural
log). To obtain the original series I convert the original series with base
1947Q1=100. (I use the reverse formula exp(dtfp/400) ∗ tfp(−1)).
5. Investment specific technology (ist). (i) I replicate Pakko (2002) file repli-
cated into quarterly; (ii) alternatively, I obtain the series for investment
specific technology as a ratio of Investment deflator to GDP deflator.
To deflate level series (net worth) I use the GDP price deflator (Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis).
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Chapter 3
Financial Frictions and Monetary
Policy
3.1 Introduction
My focus in this chapter is to evaluate the propagation of shocks in a general
equilibrium model with two-sided financial frictions. The two frictions arise
as credit constraints on the financial intermediary and on the entrepreneur.
The main contribution in this framework is the interaction of the two fric-
tions in propagating basic fundamental technology and monetary policy shocks.
There are two questions I address in this chapter. First, what are the determinants
of the external finance premium in an economy with credit constraint borrower and
lender? Second, when do the dynamics of their net worth become so volatile that
amplified fundamental technology and policy shocks trigger large fluctuations in efp
and business cycles as observed in recent crisis?
The framework features two critical players, the entrepreneur who borrows
to finance wholesale production and the banker who collects deposits to fi-
nance the entrepreneur. Financial frictions in the framework arise due to con-
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straints on the capacity of both borrower and lender to expand their balance
sheets. To set up frictions at firm level I employ a financial accelerator (FA) as in
Bernanke et al. (1999). To introduce a bank friction mechanism I set up a moral
hazard problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) that gives rise to lender risk
premia.
An additional feature of the framework is that banks hold in their assets
both loans and equity securities of the borrowing entrepreneur. This feature
is consistent with the increasing trend across financial businesses to expand
their assets through purchase of corporate equity securities. The motivations
is that the price of these equity securities fluctuates procyclically with the state
of the economy and is reflected immediately in the net worth value of financial
intermediaries. The rest of the players, households, capital producers, retailers
and government behave as in a simple new Keynesian framework. In the
remaining part of this chapter I name this framework FAGK.
Two single friction models are derived as special cases of the proposed
double friction framework, a simple financial accelerator (FA) model and a
bank friction model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) (hereby GK). I calibrate the
parameters in the three models to match first moments of data during pre-
crisis period. The three models are driven by primary technology and policy
shocks of the same size.
To assess the propagation of technology and monetary policy shocks by
the two frictions, the impulse responses and second moments from the base-
line FAGK model are compared to those from FA and GK models. I also assess
how the severity of frictions and changes in monetary policy rule can exacer-
bate amplification of fundamental technology and monetary shocks. The last
section concludes.
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3.2 Model
The model in this section is a standard new Keynesian (NK) framework in
which I incorporate a financial accelerator block and a moral hazard problem
defining the relationship between the financial intermediary and the saving
household. In the framework there are two key players, banks and whole-
sale firms (entrepreneurs). The bank signs a financing contract with the en-
trepreneur whereby he issues standard debt loans to the entrepreneur and
purchases equity stakes of the firm for the same price the firm buys the phys-
ical capital. The wholesale entrepreneur endowed with his own net worth
obtains financing from the bank to finances the purchase of physical capital
and engage in wholesale production.
The above financial contract distinguishes my framework from the simple
financial accelerator FA model or from a simple GK model with bank friction.
To make this distinction clear I construct a simple stylized balance sheet of the
borrowing entrepreneur in table 3.1. The framework differs from the simple
FA model which has no role for equity securities, where QtSt = 0.
Table 3.1: Borrowing Entrepreneur’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
QtKt Lt
QtSt
NEt
The other difference from the FA framework is the presence of a credit con-
straint financial intermediary. The banker is a lender to the entrepreneur and
a borrower from the household. The credit constraint arises from the moral
hazard problem that the banker may abscond with some of the borrowed de-
posits. The household requires the banker first to maintain the value of the
bank above a certain threshold as a proportion of total funds (assets), and sec-
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ond to contribute his own net worth on total funds. In this regard the terms of
the relationship between household and the banker are borrowed from Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010). The balance sheet of the financial intermediary in table
3.2 indicates that entrepreneurs liabilities become the banker’s assets.
Table 3.2: Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Lt Bt
QtSt
NBt
The key difference from the GK model is that the bank finances the firm
project by issuing standard debt loans and by buying equity securities. In
the simple GK model the banker buys the physical capital QtKt by issuing
equity securities St for the same price of capital Qt. The banker in a GK model
literally owns the firm undertaking the investment project.
The remaining agents, households, capital producers, monopolistic retail-
ers and government are borrowed from a standard new Keynesian framework.
A simplified structure of the relationships between the agents is shown in fig-
ure 3.1. Note that the first financial friction arises in the relationship between
the banker and household, and the second in the relationship between banker
and entrepreneur.
Figure 3.1: A flowchart of agents.
Next follows a detailed description of each agent’s problem.
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3.2.1 Households
Household (i) chooses between working and spending leisure time. Let Hi,t
be the proportion of time the household spends at work. Household’s single-
period utility is given by the equation:
U(Ci,t,Hi,t) =
(Ci,t − χC¯t−1)1−σc
1− σc
− δht
H
1+ρh
i,t
1+ ρh
bUt (3.1)
where, β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount parameter, 0 < σC is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion of households (the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution) and χ ∈ (0, 1) is a coefficient of external consumption habit
formation. 0 6 ρh is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor (the inverse of
the elasticity of work effort with respect to the real wage). δht is a labor supply
shifter and bUt is a preference parameter as in Smets and Wooters (2007) that
enriches the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor1.
The household utility is an increasing function of consumption Ci,t rela-
tive to external habit, χC¯t−1, and a decreasing function of hours worked, Hi,t.
C¯t−1 is average household consumption of previous period. Both internal (see
Christiano et al. (2005)) and external habit (Smets and Wooters (2003)) forma-
tion models are used in literature. Dennis (2009) shows that to a log-linear
approximation those differences make little difference for business cycle be-
havior. The utility function satisfies:
U ′Ct > 0, U
′′
CtCt
< 0, U ′Ht < 0, U
′′
HtHt
< 0, (3.2)
1 I allow also for a shock in labor supply affecting the intratemporal trade-off between consump-
tion and leisure to enrich the dynamics of the model in the absence of wage stickiness. In this
chapter I lay out the general form of the framework. As will be clear later, some of these
shocks will only be relevant for chapter 4. The processes for non-zero shocks relevant to this
chapter are summarized in section 3.2.8.
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At any time t, the working household saves on real deposits, Bi,t, that are
expected to pay ex-post inflation-adjusted return, Rt+1 =
Rnt
Πt+1
2. He also pays
taxes, Ti,t. The household earns a competitive wage wt =
Wi,t
Pt
from his labour,
Hi,t, supplied in flexible labour market. He also earns profits, Πmi,t, due to
ownership interests in banking business (B), wholesale production (E), capital
production (CP) and retail business (R) respectively (m ∈ (B,E,CP,R)). His
budget constraint follows:
Ci,t +Bi,t − RtBi,t−1 + Ti,t = wtHi,t +Π
B
i,t +Π
E
i,t +Π
CP
i,t +Π
R
i,t (3.3)
The household will optimize his consumption and savings in deposits to
maximize his utility U. The optimal path of consumption and optimal labor
supply are determined by equations (3.4) and (3.5).
1 = EtRt+1
(
β
UCi,t+1
Ui,Ct
)
(3.4)
wt = −
UHi,t
UCi,t
(3.5)
where, β
UCi,t+1
UCi,t
= Λit,t+1 is the real stochastic discount factor. The Eu-
ler equation (3.4) describes household’s optimal consumption-saving decision.
Labor supply equation (3.5) implies that household will supply labor up to a
point where his real wage equates the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor.
2 Government bonds paying risk free rate can be considered an alternative instrument, though
they make no difference here.
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3.2.2 Retailer
A continuum measure of retailing firms indexed by m operate in a monopo-
listic retail market. Retailer m purchases wholesale goods from entrepreneurs
at the nominal price Pwt . Each retailer differentiates them into retail goods
Ym,t and resells them at its own retail price Pm,t. Individual retail goods are
transformed into aggregate output by means of a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) ag-
gregator.
Yt =
(∫1
0
Y
1
1+λm
m,t dm
)1+λm
(3.6)
where, 1+ λm = −1 is the retailer’s steady state price mark-up and  denotes
the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods.
Retailers face a two stage problem. In the first stage the representative
retailer chooses Ym,t to maximize revenues
∫1
0 Pm,tYm,td(m). The maximization
problem of the representative retailing firm thus delivers the demand function
of the mth good
Ym,t =
(
Pm,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
Yt (3.7)
where Pt is the average price in the economy. By substituting the demand
function equation in the composite goods aggregator (equation 3.6), I obtain
the aggregate price index, Pt.
Pt =
(∫1
0
P
−1
λm
m,tdm
)−λm
(3.8)
Retailers face a pricing problem in a sticky price framework as in Calvo
(1983). Every period the retailer is allowed to re-optimize his price to P∗m,t
with a constant probability 1− ξp, where ξp ∈ (0, 1). This price remains for τ
periods with probability ξτp. Retailers who do not re-optimize, instead adjust
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their prices for next period based on past inflation according to an indexation
rule, Pm,t = Pt−1pi
γp
t−1. The parameter γp captures the degree of partial price
indexation to past inflation for those retailers that adjust prices. This set up is
a general formulation that nests the less stringent case when no indexation to
past inflation takes place (γp = 0, and prices adjust to current inflation only)3.
The nominal marginal cost to retailer is MCt = Pwt = Ptmct, where I define
the real marginal cost, mct, as relative price of wholesale good to average
retail price mct =
Pwt
Pt
. When re-optimization is possible retailer m will choose
to re-set the price P∗m,t so that he maximizes his discounted stream of profits:
maxP∗m,tEt
∫∞
τ=0
ξτpDt,t+τ
[(
P∗m,t −MCt+τ
)
Ym,t+τ
]
(3.9)
subject to the demand function equation (3.7). Dt,t+τ is households nominal
stochastic discount factor over the interval (t, t+ τ). The solution delivers an
equation for the relative re-setting price of all retailers that re-optimize.
p∗t =
P∗t
Pt
= (1+ λm)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k (mct+kZt,t+kYm,t+k)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
(
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1Ym,t+k
) (3.10)
where mct+k =
Pwt
Pt
and Zt,t+k = Πki=1pit+i. Given the portion of firms that
re-set the price and those that index it following the same indexation rule, the
aggregate price index is a weighted average of the re-set price P∗t and of the
indexed price.
Pt =
[
(1− ξp)P
∗ −1
λm
t + ξp
(
Pt−1pi
γp
t−1
) −1
λm
]−λm
(3.11)
where Pt−1pi
γp
t−1 stands for the price of the retailers who are not re-optimizing,
but indexing instead. γp ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter of price indexation to previous
period inflation. Non-zero steady-state inflation and indexing of prices to cur-
3 It nests the case with zero steady-state inflation.
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rent and past inflation gives rise to price dispersion ∆t+1 across all the price
setting retailing firms.
∆t+1 = pi

t+1ξp∆t + (1− ξp)p
∗−
t+1 (3.12)
where, pit = pit
pi
γp
t−1
.
3.2.3 Capital Producer
Capital producers are perfectly competitive firms. I borrow the framework
from Christiano et al. (2005). The nth capital producer purchases final goods,
In,t, and used capital (1− δ)Kn,t from wholesale entrepreneurs to produce new
capital. In,t is the gross investment of the nth capital producer. The existing
(partially depreciated) capital is an input for the production of new capital,
Kn,t+1. Capital producer transforms the used capital into new capital for a
negligible rent, so that the marginal rate of transformation is one. Transfor-
mation of final good is subject to an adjustment cost that takes the functional
form S
(
It
It−1
)
= Φx
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
. The representative capital producer chooses
the level of investment such that he maximizes the sum of the stream of dis-
counted future profits ΠCPn,t. At any time t capital producers profits Π
CP
n,t are
defined as:
ΠCPn,t =
Pkt
Pt
Υt [1− S (In,t/In,t−1)] In,t − In,t (3.13)
Profit equation of capital producer assumes that one unit of time t invest-
ment delivers Υt(1 − S(.))In,t units of physical capital. Υt is the investment-
specific technology shock as defined by Greenwood et al. (1997). IST shock
introduces exogenous time variation in the price of capital through an AR(1)
process as in 3.834. A positive IST shock is an exogenous boost to the marginal
4 In section 3.2.8 I list the evolution of shocks that drive the model in this chapter.
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efficiency of investment (Justiniano et al. (2011)). Alternatively, an endogenous
source of time variation is introduced through investment adjustment costs
(IAC) in the production of capital. IAC has the advantage that it disciplines the
behaviour of investment in line with that observed in data independent of any
alternative shocks. Time variation contributes to the volatility of asset prices,
and through that transmitted into fluctuations in the net worth of banks and
entrepreneurs. A convenient property of this convex functional form of IAC is
that in the deterministic steady state they disappear (S(1) = S ′(1) = 0).
The relative price of capital in terms of final good (retail) prices is Qt =
Pkt
Pt
. The solution to capital producer’s problem delivers an equation for the
evolution of the price of capital Qt.
1 = QtΥt
(
1− S(Xn,t) −Xn,tS
′(Xn,t)
)
+ Et
[
Λnt,t+1Qt+1Υt+1X
2
n,t+1S
′(Xn,t+1)
]
(3.14)
where Xn,t =
In,t
In,t−1
and Λnt,t+1 is the household’s stochastic discount factor
in real terms. Equation 3.14 determines a supply schedule for capital. The
demand for capital is determined by the entrepreneur’s problem (eq. 3.18).
The new capital, Kn,t, is sold back to entrepreneurs at the same price, Qt that
the used capital was bought for to be used in the next production cycle. The
total capital employed in the following period is the partly depreciated capital
from the previous period, (1− δ)Kn,t−1, plus the newly produced investment
In,t. The newly produced investment is subject to adjustment costs and to an
exogenously evolving investment specific shock, Υt.
Kn,t = (1− δ)Kn,t−1 +
[
1− S
(
In,t
In,t−1
)]
In,tΥt (3.15)
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3.2.4 Wholesale Firms (Entrepreneurs)
At any time t only a small fraction of the households are entrepreneurs who
are involved in wholesale production. Entrepreneurs outsource the capital pro-
duction and accumulation process to a capital producer. At the end of period
t and beginning of period t+1 the jth entrepreneur buys new physical capital
Kj,t from capital producer for price Qt. He hires labour Hj,t+1 from house-
holds and employs a constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology
subject to economy-wide productivity factor At+1 to produce the wholesale
good Ywj,t+1.
Ywj,t+1 = (At+1Hj,t+1)
αK1−αj,t (3.16)
At the end of period t+1 the entrepreneur sells the wholesale good to retail-
ers for a competitive price Pwt+1. He also sells the depleted capital (1− δ)Kj,t
back to capital producer at a new price Qt+1. He therefore derives two kinds
of revenues:
1. income from sale of produced wholesale goods
Pwt+1
Pt+1
Ywj,t+1 to retailer, and
2. income from resale of depleted capital Qt+1(1− δ)Kj,t to capital producer.
Pwt+1 is the nominal sale price of wholesale output to retailer. Therefore,
Pwt+1
Pt+1
is the sale price in real terms.
The entrepreneur takes the evolution of technology At+1 as an exogenous
process. Given the price of capital, Qt, the entrepreneur will demand factors
of production, labour Hj,t+1 and capital Kj,t, up to the point where,
• the marginal return on labor will equal the real wage, or the household’s
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor (3.5 of sec-
tion 3.2.1), and
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• the marginal return on capital is equal to the expected required return,
EtR
k
t+1, determined in his financial contract.
wt+1 = α
Pwt+1
Pt+1
Ywj,t+1
Hj,t+1
(3.17)
EtR
k
t+1 =
(1−α)
Pwt+1
Pt+1
Ywj,t+1
Kj,t
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
(3.18)
Next, I will elaborate in detail the financial contract that determines the
return on capital, EtRkt+1, that the entrepreneur is expected to earn in order to
remain in business. As it will be clear, the commitments of the entrepreneur
to his lender and the commitments of the banker to his depositors will drive,
EtR
k
t+1, to be greater than the risk free return, Rt+1, of the household.
3.2.5 Financial Contract
In this section I will refer to the firm producing wholesale good with the terms
entrepreneur and firm interchangeably. For the firm to engage in wholesale
production a total amount of financial capital QtKj,t is required, where Kj,t is
total physical capital investment and Qt is its price.
I assume there are banks in this stylized environment that can provide
financing. Upon the request of the entrepreneur for additional financial en-
dowments the bank proposes a financing contract to the entrepreneur5.
1. The bank will offer a standard debt loan for the amount Lt. The design
of debt contract will be detailed in a separate subsection.
2. The bank will also purchase equity securities St that are equivalent to the
units of physical capital the firm (or entrepreneur) is going to buy with
5 The details how banks obtain funds and how they operate is delayed until the next section.
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this extra financing. As a result of arbitrage the price the banker pays
to purchase firm’s equity securities is Qt. This is the same price that the
firm pays to purchase physical capital6.
With this financing contract the jth entrepreneur’s own endowment at the
end of period t is net worth NEj,t and his balance sheet looks as in equation
3.19.
QtKj,t = N
E
j,t + Lj,t +QtSj,t = N
E
j,t +A
B
j,t (3.19)
where ABj,t = Lj,t +QtSj,t is the total amount of financing the bank invests
which make up for 100% of total bank assets (equation 3.38 in the next section).
I have assumed for simplicity that the shares of each instrument in the total
assets of the bank are kept constant, κ = QtSj,t
ABj,t
and 1 − κ = Lj,t
ABj,t
, and are
exogenously determined. In aggregate this assumption would be equivalent
to the case where the bank finances a constant κ fraction of firms with equity
securities and the remaining 1− κ fraction of firms with standard debt loans.
Similar assumptions are made in other papers like Kühl (2017) and Verona
et al. (2017).
For the sake of comparison, this framework would be equivalent to a simple
FA model in case Sj,t = 0 and the financial intermediary would not be credit
constraint, hence accumulate no net worth. Next I detail the design of the debt
contract between the bank and the firm.
The Debt Contract
Typical literature related to debt financing and agency costs build on the work
of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). The most relevant to this
6 There is no frictions to drive the price of securities above or below Qt.
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study are the papers by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
I follow the financial accelerator proposed by the former to set up a debt con-
tract between the bank and the entrepreneur.
The design of the standard debt contract assumes that the expected return
from the project investment, EtRkt+1, is subject to an aggregate productivity
shock (equation 3.18) and an i.i.d idiosyncratic shock ψjt+1. The idiosyncratic
shock is drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean −0.5A2
ψ
and stan-
dard deviation Aψ and expected value of one
7.
Etψ
j
t+1 = 1 (3.20)
The i.i.d property of the idiosyncratic shock ψjt+1 (zero covariance with
Rkt+1) guarantees that the expected gross capital return Etψ
j
t+1R
k
t+1 of any j
th
entrepreneur is the same and equal to EtRkt+1 (equation 3.18) for any level of
total project cost,QtKj,t. It is the actual ex-post return ψ
j
t+1R
k
t+1 that is different
across entrepreneurs.
Next, I summarize the timing of the events as follows:
• End of period t
1. The jth entrepreneur obtains loan amount Lj,t to lever up the purchase of
physical capital Kj,t for production in the following period. In addition
to issuing a loan, the banker purchases firms’ equity securities St at the
price Qt.
• Beginning of period t+1
1. The idiosyncratic shock ψt+1 realizes.
2. Aggregate shock to productivity realizes.
7 These values guarantee that expected value is unity.
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3. The entrepreneur either pays off the loan or declares default.
4. In case of no default, the firm’s net worth,NEj,t, for the next period realizes
after paying all the financial obligations.
5. In case of default, the bank verifies the state of the gross capital invest-
ment, ψj,t+1Rkt+1QtKj,t of defaulting entrepreneurs. To do so the bank
incurs monitoring cost which amounts a percentage µ of the gross capi-
tal investment and seizes them.
The terms of the debt contract assume the entrepreneur is required to pay
a contractual loan rate ZLj,t to the bank. A threshold value ψ
j
t+1 of the idiosyn-
cratic shock exists such that actual income from production is just sufficient to
pay the loan amount, Lt, and its interest ZLj,t.
ψ
j
t+1R
k
t+1QtKj,t = Z
L
j,tLj,t (3.21)
The entrepreneur declares default if the realized value is below threshold
ψ
j
t+1 < ψ
j
t+1. The realized ψ
j
t+1 can only be observed by the entrepreneur. The
bank will incur monitoring costs µ, in percent of the seized gross assets, to
truly evaluate the state of the assets. The banks seizes the remaining assets
(1− µ)ψjt+1R
k
t+1QtKj,t net of monitoring costs
8. When the entrepreneur does
not claim default, he pays the loan and delivers the remaining revenues to
himself and to the owner of equity securities, which happen to be the bank.
When defaulting, the entrepreneur does not deliver any profits to the holder
of the securities Sj,t and the payoff to the firm is zero. I summarize the payoffs
of the entrepreneur and lender in table 3.3 followed by detailed description for
each outcome of this payoff table.
8 Knowing the bank will make verification, there is zero probability that entrepreneur will lie
about the state of his assets being lower than ZLj,tLj,t when it is not. The reason is that the
banker will be seizing assets of value greater than ZLj,tLj,t.
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Table 3.3: Payoff Table
State No Default:
(
ψ
j
t+1>ψ
j
t+1
)
Default:
(
ψ
j
t+1<ψ
j
t+1
)
Firm Payoff
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQt(1−X
eq
j,t ) 0 (zero)
Bank Payoff
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQtX
eq
j,t +ψ
j
t+1QtKj,tR
k
t+1 (1− µ)ψ
j
t+1QtKj,tR
k
t+1
where, I denote by Xeqj,t the ratio of equity securities bought by the bank to
the sum of firm net worth and equity securities.
X
eq
j,t =
QtSj,t
QtSj,t +N
E
j,t
=
κ(φEj,t − 1)
κ(φEj,t − 1) + 1
(3.22)
φEj,t =
QtKj,t
NEj,t
is the ratio of total physical capital purchased by entrepreneur
to his own net worth.
The payoff structure implies that gross payoffs to the bank and the firm
both depend on the distribution of idiosyncratic shock
[
ψ
j
t+1
]
.
• In case of no default, (ψjt+1 > ψ
j
t+1) the entrepreneur pays first the loan
and its interest, ψjt+1Rkt+1QtKj,t = Z
L
j,tLj,t. He then delivers the share
[1 − Xeqt ] of the remaining gross revenues,
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQt, to
the equity security holding bank. Xeqt is defined in equation 3.22.
• In case of no default, gross payoff to the entrepreneurs is the share [Xeqt ]
times the remaining gross profits,
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQt, after paying
the loan.
• In case of default, the debt-holding bank seizes all the assets following
the realization of idiosyncratic shock. The entrepreneur earns zero payoff.
So does the bank owning equity securities.
For comparison, note that for Xeqj,t = 0 this payoff table becomes identical
to that in a simple financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999). The
opportunity cost of funds to the lender would be different from risk free rate
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even in the case when Xeqj,t = 0. The latter, the lender’s opportunity cost, is
determined by whether the lender is credit constrained or not. If banker were
not credit constraint he would not need to accumulate net worth and hence
his opportunity cost would be the household’s deposit rate (risk free rate).
The payoffs refer to payments following one particular realization of ψjt+1.
I define the expected net payoff to the entrepreneur and bank across all states
of nature of idiosyncratic shock ψjt+1.
1. Based on payoff table 3.3 on the previous page, the value of the firm,
VEj,t+1 across all states nature of ψ
j
t+1 is:
VEj,t+1 = EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQt
(∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
dFψj
)(
1−Xeqj,t
)
(3.23)
2. Summing across all states of ψjt+1 the total payoff on equity portfolio will
deliver RSt+1QtSj,t, which is equivalent to the proportion, X
eq
t , of total payoff
from project after paying the loan. RSt+1 is the average return on the portfolio of
equity securities held by bank.
EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQt
(∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
dFψj
)
X
eq
j,t = R
S
t+1QtSt (3.24)
3. The total payoff on the loan portfolio will deliver RLt+1Lt equivalent to the
fixed payoff from non-defaulting firms plus the payoff from sale of assets of
defaulting firms across all states of nature of ψjt+1. R
L
t+1 is the average return
on loan portfolio held by bank.
Et
QtKj,tRkt+1 ∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
ψ
j
t+1dFψj + (1− µ)QtKj,tR
k
t+1
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj
 = RLt+1Lt
(3.25)
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The returns RLt+1 and R
S
t+1 are endogenously determined as will be made
clear in the bank’s problem. Finally for reference in the following sections I
define three terms.
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
is the payoff in percent of gross return Rkt+1QtKj,t that goes to the debt
holder across all states of ψjt+1, but before the accrual of the monitoring costs.
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
= ψ
j
t+1
∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
dFψj +
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj (3.26)
G
ψ
j
t+1
is the payoff in percent of gross return Rkt+1QtKj,t that is seized from
defaulting firms, before monitoring costs are subtracted.
G
ψ
j
t+1
=
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj (3.27)
p
ψ
j
t+1
is the probability of firm default.
p
(ψ
j
t+1)
=
∫ψjt+1
0
dFψj (3.28)
The three are related among them according the the following equation:
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
=
(
1− p
ψ
j
t+1
)
ψ
j
t+1 +Gψjt+1
(3.29)
Finally, I make use of definitions 3.26 through 3.28 to write the expected
total return on bank assets, which are equity securities and loan portfolios.
The expected total income on bank assets at the end of time t+1 is the sum of
income in equations 3.24 and 3.25.
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
X
eq
j,t = EtR
L
t+1Lj,t+R
S
t+1QtSj,t
(3.30)
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A. Lender’s One-Period Participation Constraint
In a simple financial accelerator model the bank’s required return would
be equivalent to risk free rate. In this set up the required return on total assets
RBt+1 is determined by the requirement on the bank to generate a minimum
value for the bank VBi,t. For a risk averse banker to agree to sign a contract to
finance the entrepreneur the value of the bank from participating in financing
the firm, VBi,t, should be greater than the alternative from not participating
in financing, but rather investing the funds in risk-free assets, denoted VB0i,t .
Therefore, I define a Minimum Bank Value Constraint,
VBi,t > V
B0
i,t (3.31)
where,
• VBi,t is the discounted stream of future gross returns when (i) bank total
assets are invested in loans and equity securities earning a gross return
(payoff) shown in equation 3.30, and (ii) deposits pays risk free rates on
deposits to households.
• VB0i,t is the discounted stream of future returns when bank total assets are
invested in risk free instruments, earning a gross return ABi,tRt+1 in any
t+1, less the payments made to depositor
Proposition I.
For the Minimum Bank Value Constraint in equation 3.31 to hold the
following Lender One-Period Participation Constraint:
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
X
eq
j,t>EtR
B
t+1A
B
j,t
(3.32)
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is an equivalent sufficient condition when these minimal restrictions are
satisfied:
• the bank Incentive Constraint VBi,t>ΘBABi,t,
• the bank is endowed with a fixed initial net worth that does not depend
on whether he invests in risk free assets or finances the firm.
• the constraint ΘBABi,t > NBi,t holds for the value of ΘB,
where RBt+1 is the required return on bank assets, or alternatively, the op-
portunity cost of funds for the bank.
The full proof of Proposition I is postponed in section B.1.8 in appendix
B.1. A critical condition to the proof is that constraint ΘBABi,t > N
B
i,t holds, as
the first two are satisfied by construction. This last condition is equivalent to
saying that the amount of assets the banker can abscond with should be greater
than the value of his own net worth ΘBABi,t > N
B
i,t. Such a constraint holds
intuitively as there is no benefit for the banker to abscond with an amount
which is less than the value of net worth he already owns. Therefore such an
assumption is quite reasonable and easily satisfied.
Eventually, as will be shown later in section 3.2.6, RBt+1 will be greater then
the risk free rate, due to the moral hazard problem between the banker and de-
positors. Therefore, as long as RBt+1 > Rt+1 the minimum bank value constraint
in equation 3.31 will always hold.
B. Entrepreneur’s Value Function
The lay out of the financial contract (payoff table 3.3) allows me to write the
Firm Value Function obtained in equation (3.23) in terms of Γ
ψ
j
t+1
(equation
3.26).
VEj,t+1 = EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQt
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(1−Xeqj,t ) (3.33)
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Unlike in a financial accelerator model the entrepreneur shares the net
payoff (after the loan payment) with the holder of equity securities. The en-
trepreneur will choose the optimal level of physical capital, Kj,t that he em-
ploys into the project and the threshold level of idiosyncratic shock, ψjt+1, be-
low which he will declare default so that he optimizes his value function:
max(
ψ
j
t+1,Kj,t
)VEj,t+1
subject to the lender’s one period participation constraint given by equa-
tion 3.32.
where Xeqj,t is the share of revenues going to the bank after the firm pays
the the loan and depends critically on the parameter κ = QtSj,tQtSj,t+Lj,t . Compared
to a simple BGG model the value function of the firm includes the extra term
(1− Xeqj,t ). Also, the one period participation constraint (eq. 3.30) includes the
extra term capturing the return on securities Rkt+1Kj,tQt(1− Γψjt+1
)Xeqj,t which is
linearly related to Xeqj,t , and therefore to the contract instrument parameter κ.
For Xeqj,t = 0 all the equations and the following optimal conditions converge
to BGG.
An increase in κ lowers the share 1− Xeqj,t of net profits (after the loan re-
payment) going to entrepreneur, while it raises the share of profits going to
the holder of equity securities (bank). The latter effect makes the participation
constraint of the bank (equation 3.30) less binding. The result is a weaker finan-
cial accelerator effect and a smaller feedback of borrower premium to adverse
shocks.
The first order condition with respect to ψjt+1 delivers an equation relating
the Lagrange multiplier, λEj,t+1, to a schedule of threshold values ψ
j
t+1, for any
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combination of shares of equity securities and loans the bank issues to the
entrepreneur.
Etλ
E
j,t+1 = Et
Γ
′
ψ
j
t+1
(
1−Xeqj,t
)
Γ
′
ψ
j
t+1
(
1−Xeqj,t
)
− µG ′
ψ
j
t+1
(3.34)
When there is no equity purchase by banks, κ = 0 but only loan financing
(Xeqj,t = 0) equation 3.34 becomes identical to the one in a simple financial
accelerator model.
The optimal condition with respect to the entrepreneur’s choice of the
amount of physical capital, Kj,t, maps a relationship between the borrower’s
premium, Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
and the Lagrange multiplier, for any combination of shares
of equity securities and loans (κ) put into the project.
Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
= Et
λEj,t+1
(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
1−Xeqj,t −φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)
+λEj,t+1
[
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
−µG
ψ
j
t+1
+(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
X
eq
j,t +φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)]
(3.35)
where λEj,t+1 is the Lagrange multiplier linked to the participation constraint
and Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
is the premium the borrowing firm is charged on his financing.
While the first order condition above is more difficult to interpret than in the
FA model, it is useful to think along two lines. The easiest way to interpret
the impact of Xeqj,t in this equation is to start from the case when X
eq
j,t = 0. The
above expression collapses to the same first order condition as in the simple
FA model (see section 3.3.1 for a detailed representation of FA model). As one
starts to raise κ the share of net profits, after paying the loan, that goes to the
lender, Xeqj,t , increases. This increase in X
eq
j,t makes the Lagrange multiplier less
binding and therefore weakens the financial accelerator mechanism9.
9 Higher Xeqj,t raises the share of equity stake portfolio in bank balance sheet. By construction
the average return on equity stake portfolio that the bank will earn will be greater than the
average return on loan portfolio.
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Equation (3.35) relates the threshold level ψjt+1 to the borrower’s premium
Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
. In the simple FA model this first order condition holds with κ = 0 and
X
eq
j,t = 0.
Finally, the first order condition with respect to the Lagrange multiplier
delivers an equation that maps borrower’s premium Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
on firm leverage
φEj,t.
EtR
B
t+1 = EtR
k
t+1
φEj,t
φEj,t − 1
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
+ (1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)Xeqj,t
)
(3.36)
φEj,t =
QtKj,t
NEj,t
is the ratio of total physical capital purchased by entrepreneur
to his own net worth. The equation sets a (positive) relationship between the
leverage of the entrepreneur, φEj,t, and the premium on external borrowing,
Rkt+1
RBt+1
, he is going to face everything else remaining the same. A higher ratio of
financial capital to borrower’s own net worth, QtKt
NEt
, drives up the borrower’s
(firm) external finance premium. Also a higher share of equity financing rel-
ative to debt financing the bank decides to hold on its balance sheet lowers
the borrower’s premium in equilibrium (in steady state). The latter feature is
relevant to firms that are able to raise equity financing.
C. Aggregation of Entrepreneurs Value Function
To ensure entrepreneurs do not accumulate sufficient net worth to become
self-financed I assume each survives with a probability σE < 1 and exits with
probability 1− σE. At the end of t a fraction 1− σE of enrepreneurs exit. The
end of period aggergate value of those not exiting is σEVEt+1. The end of period
aggregate value of exiting entrepreneurs is (1− σE)VEt+1.
To keep the number of entrepreneurs constant I assume the same number of
entrepreneurs 1−σE enter the market every period. The exiting entrepreneurs
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transfer a fraction ξE
1−σE
of their own aggregate wealth (1 − σE)VEt+1 to new
entrants. ξE ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous parameter. The aggregate value (or
net worth) of new entrepreneurs is now the transfer percentage ξE
1−σE
times
the aggregate net worth of the exiting entrepreneurs, (1 − σE)VEt+1, which is
equivalent to ξEVEt+1.
The total aggregate net worth held by all the entrepreneurs that will operate
in the following period is the sum of new entrepreneurs’ net worth, ξEVEt+1,
plus that of existing entrepreneurs, σEVEt+1.
NEt+1 = (σ
E + ξE)EtV
E
t+1 (3.37)
where the aggregate value of entrepreneurs before exiting, VEt+1, is given by
equation 3.3310. The exiting entrepreneurs retire and consume the remaining
part of their wealth, ΠEt+1 = (1− σ
E)
(
1− ξE
1−σE
)
.
3.2.6 Banks
Banks intermediate savings of households into production activity. In this
framework I adopt the framework of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) to introduce a
moral hazard problem between bankers and households. The key implication
is that the opportunity cost of financing the wholesale firm will be RBt > Rt as
will be shown in this section. I summarize the banker’s problem and provide
the details in appendix B.1.
A small fraction of households are bankers who remain banker next period
with an exogenous probability σB < 1. The banker i is endowed with net
worth NBi,t and collects deposits Bi,t from other households. He can invest
these funds into standard debt loan Li,t to wholesale producer. In addition, he
can purchase equity securities, Si,t, of the wholesale firm for the price of the
10Equation 3.33 after dropping the subscript j.
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same price Qt that the firm buys physical capital Kt. The bank balance sheet
equation in real terms is:
NBi,t +Bi,t = A
B
i,t = Li,t +QtSi,t (3.38)
where ABi,t stands for the total assets of the banker. As a follow up, when
bank issues no loans (Li,t = 0) the bank balance sheet is identical to the one
in bank model with moral hazard of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The banker
accrues income and expenses from his balance sheet. At the end of time t+1
the banker:
• earns average return Rst+1 on his portfolio of equity securities;
• earns average return RLt+1 on loan portfolio net of any costs associated
with potential entrepreneurial bankruptcy;
• pays risk free rate Rt+1 to households’ deposits from previous period.
I define the required return RBt+1 on bank assets is a weighted average of
the returns on the portfolio of loans and securities.
RBt+1 = R
L
t+1
Li,t
ABi,t
+ Rst+1
QtSi,t
ABi,t
(3.39)
The household makes deposits only if the banker has no incentive to divert
assets. That ensures the bank never defaults and hence the deposits become
a risk free instrument paying only risk-free rate in equilibrium. Banker’s net
worth at the end of t+1 is gross return on his assets less the interest paid on
deposits to the households.
NBi,t+1 = R
L
t+1Li,t + R
s
t+1QtSi,t − Rt+1Bi,t (3.40)
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The banker’s value function is the expected discounted terminal wealth
from financing activity:
VBi,t = Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt,t+τN
B
i,t+τ (3.41)
where, Λt,t+τ is the real stochastic discount factor (SDF) of household, and
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B is the probability of surviving until the τ
th − 1 period therefore
exiting in τ−th period.
The critical role of financial intermediary net worth arises from the agency
problem between the bankers and households (as borrowed by Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010)). The banker can transfer a fraction ΘB of funds, ABi,t supplied
by depositors to his own account. If he absconds the bank defaults. The banker
loses future stream of positive bank net worth while the households claim
the remaining share of assets (1−ΘB)ABi,t. Households will limit the amount
of deposits they supply, and the expansion of banker’s assets, to ensure the
banker maintains the value of the bank, VBi,t, above the threshold value Θ
BABi,t.
This relationship determines the incentive constraint (IC) of the banker.
VBi,t > ΘBABi,t (3.42)
As long as bank value is greater than this threshold value, the banker has the
incentive to keep the bank running rather than abscond with a fraction ΘB
of funds. The constraint provides a one-to-one mapping of bank asset size
and the average excess return on assets, RBt+1 − Rt+1 that the banker should
generate, for any ΘB. The banker will aim to maximize his value function (eq.
3.41) subject to the above constraint (eq. 3.42).
To solve the problem I conjecture that the value of the bank is homogenous
to degree one in net worth. Given the linear relationship in the balance sheet
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equation 3.38, then VBi,t should be homogenous of degree one in N
B
i,t and also
in Li,t and Si,t. Then I can write the bank value function as:
VBi,t(Li,t,Ni,t,Si,t) = µ
L
i,tLi,t + µ
s
i,tQtSi,t + ν
B
i,tN
B
i,t (3.43)
where µLi,t, µ
s
i,t and ν
B
i,t are the marginal values of holding each asset
11. The
banker’s problem is now to maximize the value function of the bank, VBi,t, in
equation 3.43 subject to the bank incentive equation VBi,t > ΘBABi,t (equation
3.42).
The solution to the banker’s problem delivers an equation relating the bank
leverage, φBi,t =
ABi,t
NBi,t
, to the weighted average of the two excess returns on assets
µLi,t and µ
s
i,t.
φBi,t =
νBi,t
ΘB − ((1− κ)µLi,t + κµ
s
i,t)
(3.44)
where, νBi,t is the discounted value of marginal (risk free) return on banker’s
net worth, and µLi,t and µ
s
i,t are the discounted future excess returns on banker’s
assets relative to deposit rate, which after some derivation take the form given
in the next three equations12.
νBi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1Rt+1 (3.45)
µsi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1
(
Rst+1 − Rt+1
)
(3.46)
µLi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1
(
RLt+1 − Rt+1
)
(3.47)
11Less the cost of financing them. Their functional form will be derived should the conjecture
be right.
12κ =
QtSi,t
QtSi,t+Li,t
is the ratio of equity securities on total bank assets.
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where, Ωi,t+1 = (1− σB) + σBΘBφBi,t+1 is positively related to leverage and
inversely related to net worth. As banker’s constraint is tighter during reces-
sions, then a unit value of net worth is more valuable in bad times. Hence
Ωi,t+1 is countercyclical. As household’s Λt,t+1 is also countercyclical, the
banker’s excess returns are discounted by an augmented discount factor which is
households stochastic discount factor, Λt,t+1, multiplied by Ωi,t+1. Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) coin the terms ’stochastic shadow marginal value’ of net worth in
order to highlight the highly valued net worth by a highly leveraged banker.
The increased volatility of stochastic discount factor reduces the excess value
of the banker’s assets.
Why does the lender premium arise in this framework? The banker’s choice
of leverage is a choice made regarding the expected average required excess
return on his assets Et(RBt+1 − Rt+1). The latter is a weighted average of excess
returns on each particular financing instrument, Et(RLt+1−Rt+1) and Et(R
S
t+1−
Rt+1). Equation 3.44 leads to two critical relationships.
• the critical threshold parameter ΘB set by households is inversely related
to the banker’s leverage, φBi,t.
• The banker’s leverage, φBi,t, is positively related to a weighted average of
the discounted future excess returns on banker’s assets, µLi,t and µ
s
i,t, as
shown in equations 3.46 and 3.47. Adverse shocks in the economy lower
bank’s net worth. Pro-cyclical bank leverage then drives the premiums
Et(R
L
t+1 − Rt+1) and Et(R
S
t+1 − Rt+1) up.
For a certain level of threshold parameter set by households, the banker
will have to deliver excess returns on his assets such that he maintains the
value of the bank, VBt , above that threshold.
Equations 3.44 and 3.45, 3.46, 3.47 determine φBi,t and µ
L
i,t, µ
s
i,t, ν
B
i,t as a
function of ΘB, RLt+1 − Rt+1, R
s
t+1 − Rt+1 and Rt+1.
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• Aggregation of Bank Value Function
As stated at the beginning of this section, a banker lives with probability
σB < 1. The aggregate net worth of surviving bankers to be carried next period
is σBNBi,t.
Each period the fraction 1− σB of entrepreneurs exit the banking market
to eventually become households. To keep the number of bankers constant I
assume the same number of new bankers enter the market, which make up for
a fraction 1− σB of bankers that exited.
Exiting bankers (1− σB) transfer an amount of net wealth to the new en-
trants which is equal to an exogenous fraction ξB1−σB of the aggregate gross
return before paying depositors, (1− σB)RBt+1A
B
i,t
13. Therefore, the net wealth
transferred to the new entrepreneurs is now ξBRBt+1A
B
i,t. The fraction 1−
ξ
1−σB
times their aggregate end-of-period gross return (1− σB)RBt+1A
B
i,t is consumed.
Evolution of aggregate bank net worth at the beginning of next period t+1
is the sum of the net worth of surviving bankers plus that of new bankers.
NBt+1 = σB
(
RLt+1Lt + R
s
t+1QtSt − Rt+1Bt
)
+ ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t (3.48)
where, I have substituted equation 3.40 for NBi,t.
3.2.7 Government and Monetary Policy Rule
The government has a minimal role of collecting taxes Tt and spending them
on public goods. It maintains a balanced budget.
Gt = Tt (3.49)
13Any assumption about the transfer to the new bankers that helps pinpoint the steady state
banker leverage ratio would work.
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The process for government spending Gt is given by Gt = gyYt with gov-
ernment spending-to-output ratio, gy, being constant. In addition, government
delegates to a monetary authority the task of running the monetary policy.
The latter does so following a Taylor type interest rate rule with the short-term
nominal interest rate responding to deviations of inflation and output from
steady state values.
Rn,t
Rn
=
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)ρR [(Yt
Y
)θy (pit+1
pi
)θpi]1−ρR
e
R
t (3.50)
with ρR ∈ (0, 1), 0 < θpi, θy.
3.2.8 Aggregate Resource Constraint and Market Clearing Con-
dition
The goods market clearing condition gives an aggregate resource constraint
for the whole economy.
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + µGψtR
k
tQt−1Kt−1 (3.51)
where µGψt+1R
k
t+1Qt−1Kt−1 is the amount of agency costs incurred by banks
monitoring the entrepreneur.
Similarly, the consolidated credit market clearing condition implies that
the total physical capital purchased by the entrepreneur is financed by the
net worth of entrepreneur NEt , net worth of the bank N
B
t and total deposits of
household Bt.
QtKt = Bt +N
B
t +N
E
t (3.52)
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To derive the economy-wide resource constraint equation 3.51 for the whole
economy I aggregate the budget constraint of household, the government bal-
anced budget as well as the profit equations of wholesale producer, bank, cap-
ital producer and retailer. I refer to section B.1.9 of appendix for a detailed
derivation the economy-wide resource constraint equation 3.51.
The credit market clearing equation 3.52 follows by the consolidation of the
balance sheet equations of entrepreneur (eq. 3.19) and the banker (eq.3.38).
3.2.9 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy consists of sequences of allo-
cations{
Ht,ψt, λEt ,N
E
t , Y
w
t ,Kt,ν
B
t ,µ
L
t ,µ
s
t ,Ωt,N
B
t ,Lt,St, It,∆t,pit, JJt, Jt, Yt,Ct,Bt
}∞
t=0
of
market prices
{
Rt+1,Rkt+1,wt,R
B
t+1,R
L
t ,R
S
t ,Qt
}∞
t=0
and of exogenous processes{
At,Gt, Rt ,Υt
}∞
t=0
such that the allocation solves the problem of household,
entrepreneur, banker, capital producer and of retailer at equilibrium prices
and that markets clear. The equilibrium conditions that must satisfy are:
1 = Et
(
β
UCt+1
UCt
)
Rt+1 (3.53)
wt = −
UHt
UCt
(3.54)
Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
= Et
λEj,t+1
(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
1−Xeqj,t −φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)
+λEj,t+1
[
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
−µG
ψ
j
t+1
+(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
X
eq
j,t +φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)]
(3.55)
EtR
B
t+1 = EtR
k
t+1
φEt
φEt − 1
(
Γψt+1 − µGψt+1 + (1− Γψt+1)X
eq
t
)
(3.56)
Etλ
E
t+1 = Et
Γ
′
ψt+1
(
1−Xeqt
)
Γ
′
ψt+1
(1−Xeqt ) − µG
′
ψt+1
(3.57)
NEt = (σ
E + ξE)EtR
k
tQt−1Kt−1
(
1− Γψt
)
(1−Xeqt−1) (3.58)
Ywt = (AtHt)
αK1−αt−1 (3.59)
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wt = α
Pwt
Pt
Ywt
Ht
(3.60)
Rkt =
(1−α)
Pwt
Pt
Ywt
Kt−1
+Qt(1− δ)
Qt−1
(3.61)
φBt =
νBt
ΘB − µ
L
t (1− κt) − µ
s
tκt
(3.62)
νBt = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1Rt+1 (3.63)
µLt = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1
(
RLt+1 − Rt+1
)
(3.64)
µst = EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1
(
Rst+1 − Rt+1
)
(3.65)
Ωt+1 = 1− σB + σBΘBφ
B
t+1 (3.66)
NBt+1 = σB
(
RLt+1Lt + R
s
t+1QtSt − Rt+1Bt
)
+ ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t (3.67)
RBt = R
L
t (1− κ) + R
s
tκ (3.68)
RSt+1 = EtR
k
t+1
QtKt
QtSt
(
1− Γψt+1
)
X
eq
t (3.69)
Lt = (1− κ)(QtKt −N
E
t ) (3.70)
St = κ(QtKt −N
E
t )/Qt (3.71)
1 = QtΥt
(
1− S(It/It−1) −
It
It−1
S ′(It/It−1)
)
+Et
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1Υt+1(It+1/It)
2S ′(It+1/It)
]
(3.72)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− S(It/It−1))ItΥt (3.73)
Jt =
1
1− 1/
mctUCtYt + ξpβEt
(
pit+1
pi
γp
t
)
Jt+1 (3.74)
JJt = UCtYt + ξpβEtpi
−1
t+1 JJt+1 (3.75)
1 = ξp
(
pit
pi
γp
t−1
)−1
+ (1− ξp)
(
Jt
JJt
)1−
(3.76)
Yt = (1− c)
Ywt
∆t
(3.77)
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∆t =
(
pit
pi
γp
t−1
)
ξp∆t−1 + (1− ξp)
(
Jt
JJt
)−
(3.78)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + µGψtR
k
tQt−1Kt−1 (3.79)
QtKt = Bt +N
B
t +N
E
t (3.80)
The model is driven by four fundamental shocks:
lnAt = (1− ρA)ln(A) + ρAlnAt−1 + σ
AAt (3.81)
lnGt = (1− ρG)ln(G) + ρGlnGt−1 + σ
mGt (3.82)
lnRt = ρmln
R
t−1 + σ
mmt (3.83)
lnΥt = (1− ρΥ)ln(Υ) + ρΥlnΥt−1 + σ
mΥt (3.84)
At is total factor productivity, Gt is government expenditures and Υt is
investment specific technology and where σi is the size of exogenous shock
i, it N(0, 1) and ρ
i ∈ (0, 1) for i = A,G,m,Υ. I allow for the persistence of
monetary shock parameter to be greater or equal to zero, 0 6 ρm < 1.
The system has 13 macroeconomic variables, 15 financial variables and 4 ex-
ogenous shocks following an AR(1) process.
The set of macroeconomic variables, hours of work Ht, wholesale output Ywt ,
capital stock Kt, investment It, price dispersion ∆t, inflation pit, two auxiliary
variables JJt and Jt determining the price set by retailers p∗t =
Jt
JJt
, final output
Yt, consumption Ct, risk free rate Rt, real wage wt and asset prices Qt is
determined by the 13 equations (3.53, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60 , 3.61, 3.72, 3.73, 3.74,
3.75, 3.76, 3.77, 3.78, 3.79).
The set of financial variables, the threshold level of idiosyncratic shock ψt,
return on firm project Rkt+1, Lagrangean multiplier λ
E
t , firm net worth N
E
t ,
required return on bank assets RBt+1, the discounted value of marginal (risk
free) return on banker’s net worth νBt , the discounted future excess returns
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on banker’s assets relative to deposit rate µLt and µ
s
t, shadow marginal value
of net worth Ωt, bank net worth NBt , bank loans Lt, equity securities held on
bank balance sheets St, bank deposits Bt, average return on securities portfo-
lio RSt and average return on loan portfolio R
L
t is determined by the other 15
equations (3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58 , 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.65, 3.66, 3.67, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70,
3.71 and 3.80).
The evolution of the exogenous shocks is shown by the last 4 equations (3.81,
3.82, 3.83 and 3.84)
3.3 Two special cases of FAGK Model
In this section, I lay out two special cases of my baseline FAGK model, a bank
friction (GK) model as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and a simple financial
accelerator (FA) model as in Bernanke et al. (1999).
The bank friction, GK, model is a special case of my baseline framework,
FAGK. The key difference GK model from my baseline framework (FAGK) is
the absence of standard debt loans. In the absence of the debt loan, banks
finance the purchase of physical capital QtKt via his own net worth and the
households deposits by purchasing of 100 % of firm equity stakes. The en-
trepreneur does not accumulate any net worth.
In the FA model, I rule out moral hazard risk on the side of banks and let
firms obtain only loans besides their own net worth. The standard debt loans
allow for introduction of the financial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999).
In the absence of both, the financial accelerator mechanism and the banker
moral hazard, neither bank nor firm accumulate net worth. The purchase
of physical capital, QtKt, is financed 100% by household deposits. There is
no financial constraint on any agent to drive the premium Rkt+1 − Rt+1 above
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zero. The expected return from investing in production of wholesale goods is
equivalent to risk free rate, hence the new Keynesian arbitrage condition.
1 = EtR
k
t+1
(
β
UCt+1
UCt
)
(3.85)
In the next section, I describe the two special cases of my framework, the
financial accelerator (FA) model and the bank friction (GK) model and provide
relevant key equations.
3.3.1 Financial Accelerator Model
In this model, the banker offers short term deposit opportunities to households
and pools them into loans to firm. There is no moral hazard problem between
him and depositors. The banker does not need to accumulate any net worth
and does not purchase any firm equity stakes. The model simplifies into a
financial accelerator model identical to that of Bernanke et al. (1999).
The banker monitors the entrepreneurs that declare default and seizes their
assets upon default. The entrepreneur finances the purchase of physical capital
QtKt through his net worth and the loan.
QtKj,t = N
E
j,t + Lj,t (3.86)
The firm value function is simply the return from investment less the payoff
portion (Γψt+1) paid to the bank to cover the cost of standard debt loan.
VEj,t+1 = EtR
k
t+1
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
QtKj,t (3.87)
The banker earns payoff share from the loan contract (Γψt+1) less the cost
of monitoring (µGψt+1). The contract he signs with the entrepreneurs requires
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only that the opportunity cost of funds lent to entrepreneurs is equal no less
than risk free rate.
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
>EtLj,tRt+1 (3.88)
In the simple financial accelerator model, there is no equity securities pur-
chased by the banker. The total assets are now equal to Lt = ABt . In addition, as
bankers are not credit constrained, they accumulate no equity hence deposits,
Dt, are equal to total assets, Lt. Second, the opportunity cost of funds is not
a required return on bank assets, EtRBt+1 but instead the households risk free
interest rate, Rt+1.
The only external finance premium relevant in this framework is the bor-
rower premium, Et(Rkt+1 − Rt+1), that banker will charge on loans to cover
the agency costs. Entrepreneur optimizes the employed capital, hence loan
amount, and obtains a one-to-one relationship between borrower premium
and threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock.
Et
Rkt+1
Rt+1
= Et
λEj,t+1
(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
) + λEj,t+1
[
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
] (3.89)
where, λEj,t+1(ψ
j
t+1) is a one-to-one mapping of ψ
j
t+1. Equation 3.89 relates
the financing premium with the level of idiosyncratic shock ψjt+1. An adverse
shock pushes up the threshold level of ψjt+1 that borrowers choose to default.
As a result more borrowers default for everything else the same.
Optimizing with respect to the multiplier delivers an inverse relationship
between the premium and firm leverage.
1 = Et
Rkt+1
Rt+1
φEj,t
φEj,t − 1
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
(3.90)
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In this equation the borrower budget constraint sets up a critical relation-
ship between the procyclical firm leverage and the borrowing premium over
the risk free rate. Firm leverage is φEj,t =
QtKj,t
QtKj,t−Lj,t
. An adverse shock will
lower bank net worth, QtKj,t − Lj,t and therefore drive up leverage. Higher
leverage, hence a lower ratio
φEj,t
φEj,t−1
, will drive up the borrower premium
Et
Rkt+1
Rt+1
14. Equations 3.90 and 3.89 are identical to the first order conditions
3.36 and 3.35 in baseline model with Xeqj,t = 0, Lj,t = A
B
j,t and EtR
B
t+1 = Rt+1
Finally the aggregate resource constraint is the same as in the baseline
model, FAGK.
3.3.2 Bank Friction (GK) Model
In the special case with only a bank friction (GK), banks own the firms by
financing 100 % of entrepreneurs project with equity securities, St = Kt. This
model is the same as the Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) model. The banker invests
his net worth and deposits into the project (equivalent of equation 3.38).
NBi,t +Bi,t = QtSi,t = QtKi,t (3.91)
The banker still has the incentive to accumulate net worth and keep the
value of bank above a certain threshold. Doing so, he alleviates the moral
hazard problem by ensuring depositors he has no incentive to run away with
their money. The bank’s net income is return from project less cost of deposits
on which the bank pays a risk free rate. The analogue of equation 3.40 from
baseline FAGK model is now:
NBi,t+1 = R
k
t+1QtSi,t − Rt+1Bi,t (3.92)
14The decline of the ratio
φEj,t
φEj,t−1
dominates the dynamics of the right hand in equation 3.90.
93
3.4. Parameter Calibration
The banks value function is the same discounted stream of future bank net
worths.
VBi,t = Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λit,t+τN
B
i,t+τ (3.93)
where, Λit,t+τ is the real stochastic discount factor (SDF) of household, and
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B is the probability of surviving until the τ
th − 1 period therefore
exiting in τ−th period. The banker is under pressure from depositors to keep
the value of the bank above a similar threshold ratio in terms of its assets as in
equation 3.42.
VBi,t > ΘBABi,t (3.94)
Given the investment opportunity by owning 100 % of firm’s securities, the
banker’s strategy is to maximize the value of his bank subject to incentive
constraint set by the depositors.
3.4 Parameter Calibration
3.4.1 Data Set
I use US data from NIPA-BEA, the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) for real
sector and from Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board15. I
construct the seven key macroeconomic variables used in Smets and Wooters
(2007) following their guidelines. Construction of these key macroeconomic
variables is similar across the literature. I provide the details in appendix. My
particular interest is on measures of external finance premium and net worth
of bank and of entrepreneur. I focus only on these variables here.
15NIPA-BEA are the National Income and Product Accounts of Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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In my theoretical framework I define two measures of external finance pre-
mium and their total sum as follows.
• The lender premium is the difference RBt − Rt where RBt is the average re-
quired return on bank assets and Rt is risk free rate.
• The borrower premium is the difference Rkt − RBt where Rkt is return on
capital.
• The total premium is the sum of the two spreads above, that is Rkt − Rt .
Proxy for external finance premium
To get empirical counterparts to total external finance premium and its two
components I look at Moody’s corporate bond yields relative to risk free rate.
Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds provide measures of return to
two types of borrowers.
AAA rated borrowers are the ones with very low or no borrower risk.
The spread they are charged relative to risk free rate takes into account the
lenders cost of transforming its liabilities into longer term assets. I interpret
that spread as the lender premium required by lenders to meet their net worth
targets.
The additional spread charged to BAA-rated corporate borrowers on top
of AAA yield is only due to higher borrower risk, hence borrower premium.
The rationale for such a definition is that any premium that is due to other
factors, not related to the borrower ability to repay, would raise the yield of
the AAA rated borrowers as well 16. The definition for the three premiums is
summarized.
16A natural question would then arise whether the the additional higher effect on BAA borrow-
ers is due to liquidity or due to borrower quality. One can still reconcile the greater effect
of absence of liquidity in interbank market on BAA rated borrowers with their lower ability
to pay. I abstract from those considerations as I do not have an interbank market in this
framework.
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1. efpB, the difference between Moody’s BAA rated corporate bond yield
and Fed rate as a proxy for the total premium (or total spread Rkt −Rt in the
model).
2. efpA, the difference between Moody’s AAA rated corporate bond yield
and Fed rate, a proxy for the lender risk premium (lender spread RBt − Rt in
the model).
3. efpBA, the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA rated corporate
bond yields as a proxy for the borrower risk premium (borrower spread Rkt −
RBt in the model).
Finally a statistical motivation for the definition of efpBA as the borrower
premium is that the standard deviation of this spread and of firm net worth
(based on Flow of Funds data) during the last recession jump up by a similar
magnitude when compared to the more tranquil period before the recession17.
One particular concern with these measures is that their difference relative
to Fed rate may contain noise due to other risks. Liquidity risk premium re-
lated to short term instruments is a particular concern raised in the literature.
To address such concern, I consider the spreads of Moody’s BAA and AAA
rated bond yields relative to Government 10 year constant maturity bond yield,
named efpBG total and efpAG respectively. The latter two series are alterna-
tive proxy variables for the total premium and lender premium, respectively. I list
the second moments of both sets of measures when comparing with second
moments.
Net Worth
Data for the net worth of entrepreneur can be found in the Flow of Funds
account of Federal Reserve. I define non-financial sector net worth as tangible
17I show in table B.10 on page 171 of appendix B that the ratio of standard deviation for both
these two indicators during the recession period jumps by 2.8 times (column[d] of the table).
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assets minus credit market liabilities of non-farm corporate and non-corporate
businesses in US. This measure matches the definition of firm net worth in the
theoretical model. I exclude non-tangible assets from calculating net worth as
they are not accounted for in the model.
To obtain a series for bank net worth I use the market value of corporate eq-
uities on liability side of financial businesses from the the US financial account
(table Z1) of the FRB 18.
An alternative measure of financial and non-financial sector wealth is pro-
vided by the stock index measure for each sector. Christiano et al. (2010) in-
clude stock market index as a proxy for net worth of banks. Datastream pro-
vides stock index measures of financial sector and non-financial sector. Volatil-
ity of these series is of a similar scale as the volatility of the series obtained
from the Flow of Funds tables. For comparative purposes, I report moments
from both sets of data, the Flow of Funds and Datastream. For the sake of space
I describe all the series in detail in Appendix B.1.11.
3.4.2 Baseline FAGK Model
I calibrate the baseline model to match first moments of key US data variables
for the period 1985-2005. The second moments of key indicators for the sam-
ples 1970-2005 and the sample 1955-2005, nesting the first one, are significantly
higher than in 1985-2005. I focus on the latter period of low macroeconomic
volatility, named the Great Moderation. I split the parameters in two groups.
I refer to all the parameters that are relevant only to a simple new Keynesian
framework without any financial frictions with the term NK parameters. I refer
18I do not use the data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) balance sheets of
commercial banks in US. They are a small fraction of the financial sector that was hit by the
recent crisis in US. In addition, the model definition of a bank takes into account that bank
also buy firm securities, which commercial banks do not.
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with the term financial friction parameters to all those parameters that are only
in the financial accelerator model and in the bank friction model, but not in a
simple NK model.
New Keynesian Parameters
The first group is the set of parameters typical to standard New Keynesian
(NK) features of the model, namely β, δ, α, gy and ξp, , γp. I report the NK
parameters in table B.5 in appendix B.
< Table B.5 here >
Some of the remaining parameters are set to match data first moments.
The value for the household discount parameter, β, is set at 0.9966 so that
nominal risk free interest rate in annual terms matches the observed average
after the 1980s. The real yield is in the range 1.4-1.7 %. I pick a value close
to the lower end of this range as this is more relevant for the most recent
recession I am focusing on. Depreciation rate, δ, is set at 0.025 implying an
annual depreciation rate of 10 %. The exogenous government spending to
gross output ratio is set close to historical average of gy = 0.2. The steady state
inflation rate is set to match 2.4 percent on annual basis.
I set the values for the remaining NK parameters following the works of
Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wooters (2007), with minor changes to
match some of the second moments of the data. Share of capital stock on
output 1−α is set at 0.3, considering a steady state share of capital income of
roughly 1/3. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1/σc is set at 1/1.4,
similar to the mode estimate of 1.39 reported by Smets and Wooters (2007).
I have to set two parameters, labor supply shifter δht and the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor ρh, to obtain a target for steady state hours of work.
I set the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor ρh at 0.5. Smets and Wooters
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(2007) estimate of inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor at 1.92 when wages
are sticky, but at 0.25 when he allows for flexible wage.Then I set the steady
state hours of work, H¯ to 0.35 and let the labor supply shifter set to match this
target. I obtain a value for the labor supply shifter δht equal to 36.65
19.
The Calvo parameter, ξp, and the coefficient on price indexation, γp are set
at 0.75 and 0.5 respectively. The Calvo parameter implies an average contract
duration of 3.3 quarters (Smets and Wooters (2007) and Levine et al. (2005)) 20.
This is the average of the interval in literature and is close to the estimate of
Smets and Wooters (2007)21. The parameter for the elasticity of substitution
among varieties, , is set at 7.
I have added two standard frictions to the NK set up. Both the invest-
ment adjustment cost (IAC), S ′′ = φx, and the consumption habit formation
parameter, χ, introduce hump-shaped response functions to investment and
consumption respectively. I choose a value of 0.65 for the habit parameter and
a value of 2 for the IAC parameter. These values are in the range of those
estimates reported by Smets and Wooters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005) 22.
The latter suggests a slow response of investment to changes in the value of
capital.
I set the parameters of the Taylor rule close to values initially proposed by
Taylor (1999) and generally applied in this literature. The smoothing parame-
ter, ρR, is set at 0.8. Inflation and output feedback parameters, θΠ and θY are
set at 1.5 and 0.5/4 respectively, given the quarterly frequency of the model.
19Model results are not sensitive to small changes in the value of inverse of Frisch elasticity of
labor ρh.
20Relevant cited studies that make empirical estimates are Bils and Klenow (2004) and Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2008). The former finds a low value based on evidence on micro data,
while the more recent study reports a value closer to the estimate of the macro econometric
models referred to in this study.
21The literature offers a wide range of values for the parameter for price indexation going as
low as 0.11 (see Levine et al. (2005)).
22Smets and Wooters (2007) report a slightly higher estimated mean of 5.7 for the investment
adjustment costs parameter
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These values are very close to estimates ρR = 0.80, θY = 0.1, and θP = 1.5 by
Clarida et al. (1998) for the post-1979 period.
Finally, I calibrate the standard errors of the shocks. Initially I set the size
of neutral technology shock, public expenditure shock and investment specific
shock plainly at 1%. The size of monetary shock relative to technology shock
is set at around 0.15% based on estimated (approximate) relative values from
several papers papers (Smets and Wooters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2010)).
Then I slightly adjusted the size of neutral technology shock so that, with
minor changes of its ratio to the size of monetary shock, it leads to a standard
deviation of output similar to that observed in the data during the period of
interest (1985-2005).
I set the persistence of all shocks at 0.9 except for the persistence of exoge-
nous monetary shock, ρm set at 0. Taylor rule persistence parameter, ρR, set at
0.8 introduces persistence of monetary.
The set of parameters relevant to the New Keynesian block of the frame-
work are kept the same in the simple NK, in GK, in FA and in this baseline
framework FAGK with both frictions (table B.5 on page 168).
Financial Friction Parameters
The remaining parameters are related to financial frictions. I first set firm
and bank survival probabilities, σE and σB, at 0.985 and 0.977 implying average
tenure of 16.6 years and 10.8 years respectively. The former is similar to values
used by Bernanke et al. (1999) and implies survival of firms similar to the
median tenure of 16 years reported by Levin et al. (2004). The lower bank
survival rate is similar the tenure of around 10.8 years in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). I report in table B.6 of appendix the steady state values of financial
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variables that I use as a target to calibrate financial friction parameters. For each
financial variable I report the respective calibrated parameter23.
< Table B.6 here >
Remaining financial friction parameters are calibrated so that I match as
close as possible the premium and leverage targets of the firm and banks.
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is calibrated at 0.306 and is
slightly higher than the value 0.28 set by Bernanke et al. (1999). This value was
conditioned by the target for the firm leverage. I targeted the ratio of total firm
assets to total assets less loans at 1.84, matching the respective ratio of tangible
assets over tangible assets less credit market liabilities (hereby CML) of non-
financial businesses from Flow of Funds table of FRB. I report the calibrated
values of financial friction parameters in table B.7 in appendix B.
< Table B.7 here >
The bank friction parameter, that is the fraction of bank assets that can
be diverted, ΘB, is set at 0.76, which is a higher value than the calibrated
value of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The parameters ΘB and the bank exit
rate ξB = 0.00023 were calibrated to meet specific equilibrium targets for bank
leverage and lender premium, that is steady state values of φB and RB − R.
Equilibrium level for bank leverage, which is steady state value of φB is set
at 6.4. This is the ratio of total bank assets to net worth. Potential measure
of this ratio for financial businesses comes from the Financial Accounts of
Federal Reserve Board (Tables Z.1). Total assets over equity liabilities ratio for
financial businesses is above 20. Such a measure includes liabilities other than
credit market debt which are not accounted for in the model. An alternative
measure is the ratio of the sum of ’credit market liabilities’ and ’equity liabilities’
23In some cases two parameters may be involved simultaneously in setting two parameters.
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to the latter which is around 4.4 for the period 1985-201424.Given different
results, I tend to set a target of 6.4 which is above 4 as considered by Gertler
and Karadi (2011). I settle with this target as the results are not sensitive to
different values of steady state leverage in a similar interval25.
To set a target for lender premium RB − R at equilibrium I target the differ-
ence between Moody’s AAA corporate bond yields relative to Government 10
year Treasury bond yield of 1.2 % (table 3.4) 26. I motivate the use of Moody’s
AAA rated corporate bond yield to obtain lender risk premium since this yield
has very low borrower risk.
Table 3.4: Actual external finance premium measures based on US data.
1985 -’06 1985-’14
Total premium BAA yield (less) Fed rate 3.5 % 3.9 %
Lender premium AAA yield (less) Fed rate 2.6 % 2.9 %
Total premium BAA yield (less) 10-y Gov.B rate 2.1 % 2.3 %
Lender premium AAA yield (less) 10-y Gov.B rate 1.2 % 1.3 %
Borrower premium BAA yield (less) AAA yield 0.9 % 1.0 %
I target a steady state of 0.81 % for the borrower premium to proxy the aver-
age difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond yields. I calibrate the
monitoring cost at 0.11 to achieve that target. The monitoring cost parameter
is close to value in Bernanke et al. (1999) and well within the mid-range of
calibration values suggested in literature. Empirical estimates are in the range
0-0.45 (Alderson and Betker (1995), Levin et al. (2004) ).
The value for the average quarterly rate of firm default is set 0.75% as in
Bernanke et al. (1999) and in line with empirical evidence for default rates of
24Asset to net worth ratio of commercial bank balance sheet data of Federal Deposit and Insurance
Scheme (FDIC) is around 10. Such a measure may not correspond to the leverage measured in
the model since the latter includes all financial institutions that are able to purchase securities
of the corporate business.
25The bank leverage steady state value of 6.4 allows me some flexibility to also achieve the other
targets.
26Spreads of BAA and AAA corporate bond yields relative to Fed rate for the period 1985-2006
are 3.5 % and 2.6 % respectively. I choose a total premium of around 2% commonly chosen in
literature. I check that my results are not sensitive to the steady state premium.
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US bonds that claim an average of 3 % for the period 1971 - 2005(Altman and
Pasternack (2006)). Following this calibration, the implied fraction of aggregate
output lost in monitoring costs is 0.23% 27.
To get a rough measure of the share of equity finance on banks assets,
QtSt
QtSt+Lt
, I look at the ratio of corporate equities plus debt securities over debt
securities held on the asset side of the balance sheet of financial businesses.
share of equitiy finance by banks = corporate.equities(+)debt.securitiesdebt.securities
The data are collected from the Financial Account of the US (Z.1, table
L108). The share of firm equity security purchases on financial businesses
assets is on an upward trend in US (see figure B.1 in appendix).
< Figure B.1 here >
The ratio fluctuates in the range of 30-45 % during the period 1985-2005,
with an average of 34% (table 3.5). I consider an average of 0.33 as a baseline
measure, which fits better in the financial businesses balance sheet.
Table 3.5: Financing Structure of non financial businesses based on data from Finan-
cial Accounts in US(*).
Firm or Bank Ratio 1970 -1985 1986-2014
Financial equity / (equity + debt (A) ) 23% 34%
Nonfinancial equity / (equity + debt (L) ) 22% 48%
(*) Source: Federal Reserve Board Financial Accounts, Table Z1.L108, Domestic Financial Sectors.
Equity stands for corporate equity on the asset side of financial businesses balance sheet,
while (A) and (L) show from which side of the balance sheet of that entity it comes from.
Following this calibration, the steady state ratios of consumption and in-
vestment to output are 0.55 and 0.25 respectively.The great ratios are different
for the new Keynesian model. The reason is that capital to wholesale output
27A table relating financial targets and the relevant parameters is provided in table B.6 of ap-
pendix B.
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ratio, KYw , that is consistent with zero external finance premium at equilibrium
is higher compared to the same ratio when total premium is 2%. This ratio
further determines the ratio of investment, consumption and capital stock to
final output. Across models with steady state total efp = 2% these ratios are
the same. They are different in NK model.
Table 3.6: Steady States of Macro variables.
Variable Description NK 1.GK 2.FA 3.FA-GK
C
Y Average Consumption to GDP ratio 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.57
I
Y Average Investment to GDP ratio 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.22
K
Y Average Capital Stock to GDP ratio 11.8 9.00 9.00 9.00
pi Average inflation rate 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
R Average real interest rate 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Ht Working hours 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
3.4.3 Financial Accelerator (FA) Model
I keep most of the parameters from my baseline FAGK model. I report only
the ones I have changed in the FA model. By construction this model has no
equity finance, hence κ = 0. The focus of re-calibrating parameters relevant
to firm problem is the external finance premium and firm leverage (asset to
net worth ratio). The firm ratio of physical capital to net worth is targeted at
1.83, very close to the ratio in baseline model. The total efp is targeted at 2.0%
which is very close to the target for the total spread in baseline FAGK model.
To obtain these targets I calibrate monitoring cost, µ = 0.12 compared to 0.11 in
FAGK. I also recalibrate ξE = 0.0033 to a slightly different value (see table B.7
in appendix for a comparison of calibrated parameters in different models).
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3.4.4 Bank Friction (GK) Model
I keep the bank incentive parameter, ΘB, at 0.75, very close to the value of 0.76
set in the baseline FAGK framework (table B.7 in appendix). This is the share
of assets the banker can run away with. The main change is to raise the lender
premium to 2% in equilibrium, similar to the target for the overall premium
in my baseline FAGK model. For that I set the bank survival probability, σB
to 0.971. I also adjust the share of wealth transferred to new bankers, ξB, to
0.0016 so that banker leverage in equilibrium is in a reasonable interval. With
these changes bank leverage is around 4.1 and matches the same leverage that
is common to the value as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). Bank tenure is around
8.6 years, slightly less than the tenure of 10.8 years assumed in my baseline
model. The equilibrium targets of leverage and tenure of bank are the closest
values I can get after having to raise the lender premium 28.
The dynamics of the models are driven by the same four shocks, neutral
technology shock (tfp), monetary shock (MP), public expenditures shock (G)
and investment specific technology shock (IST). The magnitude of exogenous
shocks and the persistence are the same across the models.
3.5 Moment Comparison
In this section I study the quantitative predictions of the baseline model by
examining the results obtained from a numerical simulation of the model econ-
omy calibrated to US data. I evaluate the propagation of shocks in the baseline
model FAGK with double moral hazard and compare them to the two one-
28Gertler and Karadi (2011) set a steady state a target of 1% (annualized) for the total efp while
I set a target of 2% in order to keep it at the same value as in the FAGK model.
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sided financial friction models, FA and GK. The second moments are obtained
from the three calibrated models following stochastic simulation at order 129.
3.5.1 The Propagation of Shocks in a Double Friction Frame-
work
To assess the propagation power of the models I compare the impulse response
functions (IRFs) following the tfp and the monetary shock for the three friction
models in graph 3.2 (page 107). Impulse responses are obtained from the
nonlinear (exact) model and show the deviation of any variable Xˆt following
a tfp or monetary policy shock. Xˆt is calculated as percentage changes of
that variable from the steady state Xˆt = Xt−XX where X is the steady state of
variable Xt. Compared to FA or GK, FAGK model with both frictions yields
a stronger response of price of capital, Q, following a negative tfp shock or a
positive monetary shock (panels (a) and (b) of figure 3.2 respectively). As a
result both, firm and bank net worth, and hence leverage, respond by a greater
magnitude30.
I motivate the stronger response in FAGK model with the tightening of both
constraints at the same time upon a decline in price of capital. Total spread
(efp) responds much stronger following either a tfp or a monetary shock. The
greater response of total spread and of Tobin’s Q trigger a stronger response
of investment and output.
A second observation is that impulse response of total spread efp is dom-
inated by the response of lender spread in FAGK model. Upon a 1.1 % tfp
29Up to order 1, the exact model and the log-linearized one yield the same second moments and
impulse responses.
30IRFs of firm related variables, like firm leverage and borrower spread are zero in the GK model.
Similarly, IRFs of bank related variables, like bank leverage and lender spread are zero in the FA
model. Monetary policy rule reacts to deviations of output from flexible price output.
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Figure 3.2: IRFs due to (-1.1%) TFP and to (+0.15%) MP shock: GK, FA and FAGK
models.
(a) IRFs upon neutral productivity (tfp) shock.
(b) IRFs upon monetary (mp) shock.
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shock the lender’s premium goes up by around 0.1 percentage points, while
borrower’s premium only by a negligible 0.01 percentage points. Total spread
goes up by a similar magnitude of 0.1%. Similarly, the response of lender pre-
mium dominates the behavior of total premium following a (+0.15%) monetary
shock.
Fluctuations in financial variables are driven by neutral technology (tfp)
and monetary policy (MP). Variations in real variables are mainly driven by
tfp shock. Both shocks explain 90% of fluctuations in the baseline FAGK model
(table B.9, page 170). This result is also consistent with empirical results that
monetary policy had some effect on financial variable but not on real ones31.
< Table B.9 here >
To quantify the differences in propagation power of each model I com-
pare the business cycle properties of model-implied variables generated by
stochastic simulation to the moments of data. I compare moments of Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtered model-implied variables to the moments of one-sided
HP filtered data series for the period 1985-200432. Moments from the new Key-
nesian framework with no financial friction are listed as a benchmark for key
macroeconomic variables (tables B.10 and B.11, page 172).
< Table B.10 here >
< Table B.11 here >
Comparison of second moment and of impulse responses leads to similar
conclusions. First, the model with both frictions FAGK is able to produce
31Public expenditure and investment specific technology (IST) shock account for less than 10 %
of fluctuations. Impulse responses shown in graph B.2 of appendix.
32Moments of two-sided HP filtered and one-sided HP filtered data series are almost the same.
For estimation purposes later, one-sided filtered data are preferable so I use the same series
throughout the thesis.
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significantly greater volatility of model-implied variables relative to models
with single financial friction, FA and GK. The standard deviations 1.74 and
3.69 of price of capital, Qt, and of investment, It, respectively, are significantly
higher in FAGK model than the 3.10 and 1.43 obtained in GK model. The
FA model delivers even lower standard deviations for most variables. The
standard deviations of firm and bank net worth and of total spread (EFP) are
also higher in the FAGK model.
Second, lender’s constraint leads to larger fluctuations on his own premium
(spread EPFa), relative to that of borrower (spread EFPba). The standard devi-
ation of borrower and lender spreads are 0.01 and 0.18, respectively, compared
to standard deviation of 0.19 for total spread (table B.10). The bank friction
is clearly dominating the effect of the financial accelerator in the model with
both frictions, FAGK.
I can motivate the greater volatility of efp in the baseline FAGK model with
the procyclical behaviour of the two net worth variables. Positive correlation
of constraints delivers positive covariance of borrower and lender spread. The
second round effects are stronger as a result, propagating the initial shocks by
a greater magnitude as seen in impulse responses in figure 3.2.
To illustrate the positive correlation of the two constraints I check the
variance-covariance matrix of total spread with the borrower and lender spread
(table B.12). It shows covariance between borrower and lender spreads is
0.12/106 compared to the variance of total spread around 3.51/106.
< Tables B.12 here >
For convenience I normalize these numbers by the variance of total efp (ta-
ble B.13). Around 92% of the volatility of total spread EFP is due to variance
of lender’s spread. The remaining volatility of total spread is due to the covari-
ance between the spreads of the two agents, firm and bank. This observation
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supports also the second result that bank constraint dominates the behaviour
of total premium.
< Tables B.13 here >
Finally, all the three models with friction deliver correlations with output
consistent with the data. While difficult to compare the magnitudes, the only
observation is that FAGK model with two leverage constraints and the GK
model mimic much better the positive correlation of net worth with output.
They replicate better the counter-cyclical behavior of the total spread.
3.5.2 Simulating the Financial Crisis
In this section I assess how shifts in certain parameters have the potential to
propagate shocks to an extent that I can mimic the increases in volatility of efp
and other key variables during the recent recession. To this end I select few
model parameters that are best related to characteristic features that marked
the recent financial episode. In addition, I assess the implications of shifts in
policy rule parameters.
Motivation for Shifts in Parameters
Two typical features of recent crisis are the large spike in external finance
premium and the drastic fall in asset prices. I analyze the propagation of
shocks subject to shifts in parameters that define the model-implied dynamics
of efp and of asset prices, Qt. The candidate parameters for this exercise are
the financial friction parameters, µ and ΘB, and investment adjustment cost
parameter (IAC). These parameters are related to the dynamics of variables that
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jumped during the recession. It is not unusual to think that these parameters
may change overtime, as I will briefly motivate.
The second set of parameters I investigate are the ones in the policy rule.
Analyzing the change in the dynamics of efp and of key macro variables subject
to shifts in policy parameters is of interest to any policymaker.
The motivation for an upward shift in monitoring costs, µ, is that several
studies rely on shocks on monitoring cost to explain the variation in the ex-
ternal financing premium (Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) and Fuentes-Albero
(2014)). There is also some empirical evidence for time varying monitoring
costs (Levin et al. (2004)).
I motivate the reduction in ΘB with a more deregulated financial activ-
ity and less stringent regulatory framework on banking in US. Deregulation
implies that banks have lower criteria to satisfy in terms of their capital re-
quirements. The immediate implication of lower bank incentive constraint is
that banks increase their leverage, which is consistent with lower ΘB.
A shift in IAC parameter can be motivated by the unusual circumstances
of the failure of a banks in August 200733. Following the crash of major invest-
ment banks in US, firms may review their practices of doing business. That
may include how quickly they respond to adverse shocks by adjusting the
decision-making process of cutting down or delaying investments. The IAC
parameter is one of the few parameters added in an ad-hoc manner to obtain
hump-shaped impulse responses of investment to monetary policy shocks that
fit with impulse responses based on empirical analysis. The rationale is that
firms take time to make decisions whether to invest or not and to implement
the decision. I motivate the change in IAC parameter by assuming that these
time lags may change in unusual circumstances.
33The failure of two Bear Stearns hedge funds.
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The motivation for an upward shift in the policy response to inflation, θP,
is the increased trend by Fed emphasizing the focus on inflation. A stronger
response to inflation or a weaker response to output, θY , follows when pol-
icy maker becomes more inflation-target oriented. This scenario would corre-
spond to a case when newly appointed board members care more for infla-
tion. Decision making process would be tilted to reflect their positions. The
weaker feedback to output is consistent with market concerns towards the end
of Greenspan term. I assume increased persistence of policy rate at the same
time that I lower the response to output.
Episodes of Fed changing the way it reacts to inflation and to output gap
not unheard. The most well-known case is the looser reaction to inflation in
the 1970s (Burns-Miller) and the tightening in the response to inflation after
1985 (Volcker’s era). In more recent case, there has been a concern regarding
the Fed’s less aggressive stance on (positive) output gaps prior to the crisis and
towards the end of Greenspan era (Taylor (2007)).
Shift in Friction parameters
I raise the monitoring cost parameter µ by 50% in FAGK and FA models34. The
upward shift raises the volatility of the borrower’s premium in the FA and
FAGK models by 1.62 and 1.64 respectively (table B.14). In either model there
is no significant increase in standard deviation of macroeconomic variables.
IRFs also show that upon an increase in monitoring cost, there is little differ-
ence in the behavior of other indicators, except for a greater response by the
borrower’s premium (figure B.3). In the baseline FAGK model, the impulse
response of total spread is dominated by the response of lender’s spread as
shown earlier. The latter does not change, so the impact on other macro vari-
34In FAGK model monitoring cost goes up from µ ′ = 0.113 to µ ′ = 0.17. In FA model it goes up
from µ ′ = 0.12 to µ ′ = 0.18.
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ables is not significant as well. In FA model only with firm friction, shift in µ
has a significant impact on efp but no implications for key macro variables.
I can infer that shift in the size of monitoring costs alone can hardly explain
the jump in fluctuations observed recently in the data across most indicators.
< Table B.14 here >
< Figure B.3 here >
Next, I evaluate the impact of a decline in ΘB by 50%35. Volatility of lender
net worth goes up by 13% and 14% in the FAGK and GK models, respectively
(table B.15 in appendix). Similarly, volatility of lender’s spread goes up by
around 26 % and 38% in FAGK and GK models, respectively. IRFs in figure
B.4 in appendix show that the increase in volatility is due to the stronger re-
sponse of bank leverage following an exogenous monetary shock. The stronger
response of the total spread triggers slightly stronger responses of investment
and output. Comparison of standard deviations with the new parameter value
shows the change in volatility of macro variables is negligible (table B.15). Im-
pulse responses following a tfp shock are not different with the new ΘB param-
eter.
I conclude that I can reproduce the increase in volatility of total spread efp
by lowering the bank friction parameter. Impulse responses of investment and
output also decline further. There is no change in the response of asset prices
and on the volatility of other macroeconomic variables, which is a feature of
the recent financial crisis.
35In FAGK ΘB = 0.76 goes does to Θ ′B = 0.38. In the GK model ΘB = 0.75 goes down to
Θ ′B = 0.375. I re-calibrate the model so that no change in bank leverage takes place in steady
state. In the case when bank leverage is allowed to go up, the results are similar. The difference
is the size of change in volatility of lender and borrower spread is twice as high. But there is no
significant change in the volatility of other key variables. The shift in leverage implies that for
the same one unit of net worth, banker incurs more liabilities and levers up his balance sheet.
The downside of high leverage is that a unit decline of asset value bites a larger amount of
banker net worth. For the same elasticity of the external finance premium to leverage, greater
steady state leverage implies stronger reaction by efp upon the same shock size.
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< Table B.15 here >
< Figure B.4 here >
I assess the impact of lowering investment adjustment cost (IAC) from
φX = 2 to φ ′X = 1 on efp and output. By construction, the investment adjust-
ment cost function is introduced to get hump shaped responses of investment
to monetary and neutral productivity shocks. For the same decline in asset
prices, Qt, upon a positive monetary shock or a negative neutral productivity
shock the response of investment, and consequently of output, will be stronger
(figure B.5). As a result, the standard deviation of investment and output will
go up in the FAGK model by 32% and 22% respectively (table B.16). I obtain
similar values in the GK and FA models. The total spread and other financial
and macroeconomic variables do not seem to change their response upon such
a shift.
< Table B.16 here >
< Figure B.5 here >
Impact of Weaker Policy
I assume a stronger feedback to inflation by changing θP = 1.5 to θ ′P = 1.8. The
change in volatility of all variables is negligible (table B.17). Impulse responses
of all variables are the same with the new parameter value (figure B.6)36.
< Table B.17 here >
< Figure B.6 here >
36The shift in feedback to inflation and a greater interest rate persistence has a small upward
impact on the volatility of key variables.
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I analyze how the volatility of efp and other variables changes upon a shift
in policy feedback to output gap from θY = 0.125 to θ ′Y = 0.025. Volatility of all
measures of external finance premium and most key variables goes up by by
around 5-10% in the FAGK model (table B.18). In all three other models, GK,
FA and NK models, the impact of weaker policy feedback to output alone is
negligible for most variables, except for inflation.
< Table B.18 here >
I assess the impact of the same shift in feedback to output and a slightly
more persistent policy rule at the same time. I choose to slightly raise the
persistence parameter from ρR = 0.8 to ρ ′R = 0.88 with θY = 0.025. The sim-
ulation corresponds to a situation when monetary policy makers care about
over-reactive policy and target only inflation. In the baseline FAGK model,
standard deviation of efp goes up by around 35% (table B.19). The surge in the
volatility of other financial and macroeconomic indicators is on average in the
range of 20-70%37. The propagation effect comes from the bank friction. The
GK model delivers higher volatility following a monetary shock. The ratios of
volatility to the baseline GK parametrization are slightly smaller.
< Table B.19 here >
When policy feedback to output gap is low there is slightly greater fall in
price of capital, Qt, following an exogenous monetary shock (figures B.7 and
B.8). Decline in Qt erodes some of the net worth of lenders and borrowers,
which exercises further effect on investment and asset prices. The propagation
that both constraints set on borrower’s capacity to purchase capital exercises
greater second round effects on price of capital and on investment. The miss-
ing countercyclical policy response to output gap, due to low θY , allows second
37Except standard deviation of inflation which increases by 127 %.
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round effect to take place. Again lender friction dominates the behaviour of
total efp.
< Figure B.7 and B.8 here >
Volatility of financial and macroeconomic variables in single friction models
does increase as well. The magnitude is on average about half of that delivered
by the double moral hazard framework FAGK. In the absence of counter cycli-
cal policy, financial health of lenders and borrowers deteriorates (improves)
faster upon an adverse (positive) shock. In the FAGK, the demand as well as
supply for funds shrink at the same time. This eventually limits the amount
of capital the entrepreneur can purchase. The second round effects that kick
in are amplified by a greater magnitude. Each constraint amplifies further the
already propagated shock by the constraint of the other agent.
These results are robust for any reasonable change in friction parameters
leading to different steady state values of the external finance premium.
There is some anecdotal evidence that might lend support to these simu-
lations. Several economists have argued that Fed might have contributed to
the recent housing bubble by keeping the interest rates too low for a long time
before the financial crisis (Taylor (2007), Kahn (2008)). This period would cor-
respond to the end of Greenspan era, 2000-2006, when there was a boom in
housing market associated with mild consumer price inflation. The criticism
referred to Feds unwillingness to respond to output gaps driven by housing
bubble. With low feedback to output, absence of high inflation would corre-
spond to more persistent monetary policy instrument. In such an environment
the presence of frictions would propagate immediately any exogenous policy
shocks on both macro and financial variables.
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3.6 Conclusions
A key indicator of the recent crisis has been the sharp increase in yields of
most credit instruments, raising the cost of external finance. To assess the
propagation effect of the borrower and lender financial health I employed a
financial accelerator mechanism and a moral hazard problem between bank
and depositor in the new Keynesian framework. The aim was to evaluate the
propagation strength of financial frictions when both lender and borrower are
constrained following technology and monetary shocks.
Two main results emerged from calibration exercise. First, relative to fi-
nancial accelerator and bank friction models, the model with double frictions
delivers significantly greater fluctuations of external finance premium. As both
constraints tighten at the same time, both supply and demand for funds face
constraints during a downturn. For the same magnitude of shocks, fluctua-
tions of total external finance premium (efp) are significantly larger than in
either FA or GK model. The stronger impact that the two constraints have
on the price of capital delivers significantly greater fluctuations on investment
and output.
Second, in the model with both frictions it is the bank friction that domi-
nates in driving the external finance premium. It is the lender’s constraint that
has a greater impact on propagating fundamental technology and monetary
policy shocks. The additional effect of the borrower constraint amplifies the re-
sponse of asset prices leading to stronger second round effects on both agents’
financial health.
In a framework with both firm and bank constraints binding, simulation re-
sults showed that shifts in monitoring cost or bank friction parameter, do lead
to slightly greater volatility of borrower or lender risk premia, respectively.
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Also, shifts in investment adjustment costs parameter may raise the volatility
of investment and output only. Reasonable changes in the magnitudes of each
friction parameter can deliver higher volatility only on a few variables. Indi-
vidual friction parameters have limited impact on the dynamics of the model
as a whole.
Finally, I find that evolution in the conduct of monetary policy can con-
tribute to greater volatility of external financing premium and of other finan-
cial and real variables. Absence of countercyclical monetary policy can rein-
force the propagation of exogenous monetary shocks at a much greater scale
when policy maker is sluggish to respond. The same shocks lead to signifi-
cantly larger fluctuations in financial and real variables.
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B.1 Model Derivation
B.1.1 Households
The household maximizes the utility function 1:
U(Ct,Ht) =
[
(Ct−χCt−1)
1−σc
1−σc
− δh
H
1+ρh
t
1+ρh
]
bUt
subject to his budget constraint:
wtHt +Π
B
t +Π
E
t +Π
CP
t +Π
R
t = Ct +Bt − Rt−1Bt−1 + Tt
where 1−Ht is the amount of labour he supplies in labour market.
The shock bUt represents a general shock to preferences that affects the
intertemporal rate substitution of households (preference shock) (Smets and
Wooters (2003)).
In this current chapter bUt = 1.
The Lagrange is:
max
Ct, lt,Bt Et
∑∞
s=0β
s
[
U(Ct+s, lt+s)+λht+s(wt+sHt+s+Π
own
t+s −Ct+s−(Bt+s−Rt+sBt+s−1)− Tt+s)
]
where Πownt+s = Π
R
t+s+Π
B
t+s+Π
E
Ct
+ΠCPt is revenue from ownership on respective firms.
The FOCs of the household problem are:
1 In the next subsections, the subscript ’j’ refers to the agent in the respective section. This way
I save the usage of different subscripts which given the burden of different symbol can make
the reading difficult. In the description of the model in chapter 3 I use different subscripts for
each agent.
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Ct: 0 = U ′Ct + λ
h
t (−1)
Ht: 0 = U ′Ht + λ
h
twt
Bt: 0 = −λht +βEtλ
h
t+1Rt
Use the first two FOCs to get a labor supply equation (MRS equals the real
wage), and Euler equation:
Labor supply Equation:
wt = −
UHt
UCt
=
Ult
UCt
(B.1)
Consumption Euler Equation:
1 = Et (RtΛt,t+1) (B.2)
I am solving the household problem in real terms. It is straightforward to
see that budget constraint is the equivalent of the budget constraint expressed
in nominal terms:
PtCt +Bn,t = Rn,t−1Bn,t−1 + PtwtHt + PtΠ
R
t + PtΠ
B
t − PtTt
Ct +
Bn,t
Pt
=
Rn,t−1
Pt/Pt−1
Bn,t−1
Pt−1
+wtHt +Π
R
t +Π
B
t − Tt
Ct +Bt =
Rn,t−1
pit
Bt−1 +wtHt + prof
B
t + prof
R
n,t − Tt
Functional Forms
U(Ct,Ht) =
[
(Ct − χCt−1)
1−σc
1− σc
− δh
H
1+ρh
t
1+ ρh
]
bUt (B.3)
U ′Ct = b
U
t (Ct − χCt−1)
−σc −βoχEtb
U
t+1(Ct+1 − χCt)
−σc (B.4)
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U ′Ht = −U
′
Lt
= −
[
δhH
ρh
t
]
bUt (B.5)
where lht = 1−Ht
U ′Ht = −U
′
lht
= −
[
δhH
ρh
t
]
bUt (B.6)
The utility function satisfies :
U ′Ct > 0,UH ′t < 0,U
′′
CC < 0,U
′′
HH 6 0 (B.7)
B.1.2 Retailer’s Problem
Retailer faces a two stage problem. In the first stage, the jth retailer produces
the final retail good Yt, using wholesale good Yj,t, and the production technol-
ogy:
Yt =
(∫1
0
Y
1
1+λm
j,t dj
)1+λm
(B.8)
where, λm = 1−1 is the retailers mark up and  is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties.
The retailer buys inputs Yj,t and produces the final good in order to maxi-
mize profits subject to constraint B.8. Alternatively, the firm tries to minimize
expenditure given the production constraint. I can write the Lagrangean of the
retailer as:
L = Pt
(∫1
0
Y
1
1+λm
j,t dj
)1+λm
−
∫1
0
Pj,tYj,td(j) (B.9)
after making use of equation B.8. Optimal choice of Yj,t solves first order
condition ∂L∂Yj,t = 0, that is:
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Pj,t = Pt
∂Yt
∂Yj,t
Using
∂Yt
∂Yj,t
= (1+ λm)
(∫1
0 Y
1
1+λm
j,t dj
)1+λm−1
1
1+λmY
− λ
m
1+λm
j,t =
(
Yt
Yj,t
) λm
1+λm
Obtain the ratio Pj,tPi,t =
(
Yj,t
Yi,t
)− λm
1+λm
Pj,tYj,t =
(
Yj,t
) 1
1+λm Pi,tY
λm
1+λm
i,t
Integrate
∫1
0 Pj,tYj,tdj =
∫1
0
(
Yj,t
) 1
1+λm djPi,tY
λm
1+λm
i,t
Zero-profit condition
∫1
0 Pj,tYj,tdj = PtYt
PtYt = Y
1
1+λm
t PitY
λm
1+λm
it
Pt = Y
− λ
m
1+λm
t Pi,tY
λm
1+λm
i,t
Obtain a demand function for Yj,t. The retailer will produce:
Yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
Yt (B.10)
Plug the demand function for Yj,t (eq. B.10) into production technology
equation (eq. B.8)
Yt =
∫1
0
(Pj,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
Yt
 11+λm d(j)

1+λm
(B.11)
Yt = Yt
(∫1
0
[
Pj,t
Pt
] −1
λm
dj
)1+λm
(B.12)
to obtain an equation for aggregate price index Pt (Yt on both sides drops):
Pt =
(∫1
0
P
−1
λm
j,t dj
)−λm
(B.13)
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I. Price Setting
Following Calvo (1983) every firm faces a constant probability, 1− ξp, of
re-optimizing its price to P∗j,t any given period, whereas the non-reoptimizing
firms index their prices for next period to past inflation pit−1 according to
indexation rule Pj,t = Pt−1pi
γp
t−1. For zero steady state inflation, pi = 1 or no
indexation γp = 0 price are held fixed Pj,t = Pt−1. Aggregate price evolve as:
Pt =
[
(1− ξp)P
∗ −1
λm
t + ξp
(
Pt−1pi
γp
t−1
) −1
λm
]−λm
(B.14)
where Pj,t = Pt−1pi
γp
t−1 stands for the price of the retailers who are not re-
optimizing, but indexing instead.
A share 1− ξp of retailers choose their price P∗t at time t that maximizes
the present value of future expected nominal profits while the rest of retailers
index their price. After re-optimization with probability 1− ξp the retailer will
not re-optimize next period and with probability (1− ξp)τ the retailer will not
re-optimize for τ period from now. The real marginal cost to retailer is the
price of wholesale good relative to retail price mct =
Pwt
Pt
while the nominal
marginal cost is MCt = Ptmct = Pwt . For each retailer j the objective is to
choose the re-set price P∗j,t that maximizes his discounted stream of profits:
maxP∗j,tEt
∫∞
k=0
ξkpDt,t+k
[(
P∗j,t −MCt+k
)
Yj,t+k
]
(B.15)
subject to demand function eq.B.10: Yj,t+k =
(
P∗j,t
Pt+k
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k,
where MCt+k = Pt+kmct+k is the nominal marginal cost and Dt,t+k =
βk
Λt,t+k
Pt+k/Pt
is the marginal value of a dollar to the household, i.e. the nominal
stochastic discount factor over the interval (t, t+ k).
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With prices being indexed thereafter the demand function at any time t+ k
becomes:
Yj,t+k =
(
P∗j,t
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp)−1+λmλm
Yt+k
or otherwise
Yj,t+k =
(
P∗j,t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k
where I denote
Zt−1,t+k−1 =
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
= pitpit+1...pit+k−1 = Πki=1pit+i−1 (B.16)
All firms that re-optimize their price at time t choose the same price Pj,t = P∗t
to maximize (after substituting the demand function and re-arranging):
maxP∗tEt
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[(
P∗t
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp
−MCt+k
)(
P∗j,t
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp)−1+λmλm
Yt+k
]
maxP∗tEt
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[(
P∗tZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1 −MCt+k
)(
P∗j,t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k
]
maxP∗tEt
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[(
P∗tZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1 −MCt+k
)(
P∗t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k
]
maxP∗tEt
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[
Pt+k
(
P∗t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
) −1
λm
−MCt+k
(
P∗t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k
]
This is a result of the indexing of prices by Pnon,t+1 = Ptpi
γp
t each consec-
utive period where Pnon,t+1 is the price next period of those retailers who do
not re-optimize. Price re-optimized at time t and indexed for k period (at time
t+ k) becomes P∗t
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp
The FOC is:
0 =
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[(
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1 − (1+ λ
m) 1P∗t
MCt+k
)(
P∗t
Pt+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1
)−1+λm
λm
Yt+k
]
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0 = Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[(
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1 − (1+ λ
m) 1P∗t
mct+kPt+k
)
Yj,t+k
]
where small letter mct+k is marginal cost in real terms. It follows that:
P∗t = (1+ λm)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k(mct+kPt+kYj,t+k)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k(Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1Yj,t+k)
After dividing both sides by Pt.
p∗t =
P∗t
Pt
= (1+ λm)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
(
mct+k
Pt+k
Pt
Yj,t+k
)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k(Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1Yj,t+k)
Recall from B.16 that Pt+kPt =
Pt+k
Pt
= pit+1pit+2...pit+k = Πki=1pit+i = Zt,t+k
p∗t =
P∗t
Pt
= (1+ λm)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
(
mct+kZt,t+kYj,t+k
)
Et
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
(
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1Yj,t+k
) = (1+ λm) Jt
JJt
(B.17)
II. Recursive Derivation
Denote with Jt the numerator and JJt the denominator in equation B.17.
Denote: Zt,t+k = 1Xt,t+k =
Pt+k
Pt
= pit+1...pit+k = Πki=1pit+i ∀k > 0, &
Xt,t = 1.
(a) Recursive derivation for the numerator
Jt =
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+kYj,t+kmct+kZt,t+k
Plug: Yt+k(
P∗t/Pt
Pt,t+k/Pt
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
− instead of Yj,t+k
or otherwise: Yt+k(
p∗t
Zt,t+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
− instead of Yj,t+k
Jt =
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[
Yt+k(
p∗t
Zt,t+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
−mct+kZt,t+k
]
Jt = Yt(p
∗
t)
−mct +
∫∞
k=1 ξ
k
pDt,t+k
[
Yt+k(
p∗t
Zt,t+k
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
−mct+kZt,t+k
]
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where (p∗t)− = (
p∗t
Zt,t+0
Z
γp
t−1,t+0−1)
−
Jt = Yt(p
∗
t)
−mct + ξpDt,t+1
(
Z
γp
t−1,t
Zt,t+1
)−
Zt,t+1....
...
∫∞
k=1 ξ
k−1
p Dt+1,t+1+k−1
[
Yt+1+k−1(
p∗t
Zt+1,t+1+(k−1)
Z
γp
t,t+k−1)
−mct+1+(k−1)Zt+1,t+1+(k−1)
]
Plug s = k− 1 = 0, Zt−1,t = pit, or Zt,t+1 = pit+1, Dt,t+1 =
Λt,t+1
pit+1
.
Jt = Yt(p
∗
t)
−mct + ξp
Λt,t+1
pit+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)−
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pit+1
pit+1....
...
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)− ∫∞
s=0 ξ
s
pDt+1,t+1+s
Yt+1+s
(
p∗t+1
Zt+1,t+1+s
Z
γp
t,t+s
)−
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yj,t+1+s
mct+1+sZt+1,t+1+s

Jt = Yt(p
∗
t)
−mct +
ξpΛt,t+1pi

t+1
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)− ∫∞
s=0
ξspDt+1,t+1+s
[
Yj,t+1+smct+1+sZt+1,t+1+s
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jt+1
Replace β
UCt+1
UCt
= Λt,t+1
Jt = Yt(p
∗
t)
−mct + ξpβ
UCt+1
UCt
pit+1
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−
Jt+1
Jt(p
∗
t)
UCt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jt
= YtUCtmct + ξppi

t+1βUCt+1(p
∗
t+1)
Jt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Jt+1
Jt = mctUCtYt + ξpβEtpi

t+1Jt+1 (B.18)
Jt = mctUCtYt + ξpβEtpi
1+λm
λm
t+1 Jt+1 (B.19)
(b) Recursive derivation for the denominator
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JJt =
∫∞
k=0 ξ
k
pDt,t+kZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1Yj,t+k
Plug: Yt+k(
P∗t/Pt
Pt,t+k/Pt
Z
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
− instead of Yj,t+k
or otherwise: Yt+k(p∗t/Zt,t+kZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
− instead of Yj,t+k
Plug: Yt+k(p∗t/Zt,t+kZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
− instead of Yj,t+k
JJt = ξ
0
pDt,t+0︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Yj,t+0 +
∫∞
k=1 ξ
k
pDt,t+kZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1
[
Yt+k(p
∗
t/Zt,t+kZ
γp
t−1,t+k−1)
−
]
JJt = Yj,t + ξpDt,t+1Z
γp
t−1,t
(
Z
γp
t−1,t
Zt,t+1
)−
...
...
∫∞
k=1 ξ
k−1
p Dt+1,t+1+(k−1)Z
γp
t,t+k−1
[
Yt+1+k−1
(
p∗t
Z
γp
t,t+k−1
Zt+1,t+1+k−1
)−]
Plug:
Dt,t+1 =
Λt,t+1
pit+1
,
Zt−1,t = pit ()Zt,t+1 = pit+1,
s = k− 1 = 0.
Multiply and divide by : p∗t+1.
JJt = Yj,t +
ξp
Λt,t+1
pit+1
pi
γp
t
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− (
p∗t
p∗t+1
)− ∫∞
s=0 ξ
s
pDt+1,t+1+sZ
γp
t,t+s
[
Yt+1+s(
p∗t+1Z
γp
t,t+s
Zt+1,t+1+s
)−
]
Plug back: Yj,t+1+s = Yt+1+s(
p∗t+1
Zt+1,t+1+s
Z
γp
t,t+s)
−.
JJt = Yj,t + ξpΛt,t+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)1− (
p∗t
p∗t+1
)− ∫∞
s=0
ξspDt+1,t+1+sZ
γp
t,t+sYj,t+1+s︸ ︷︷ ︸
JJt+1
Replace: pit+1 =
pi
γp
t
pit+1
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β
UCt+1
UCt
= Λt,t+1 Yj,t = Yt
(
P∗t
Pt+0
Z
γp
t,t+0
)−
= Ytp∗−t .
JJt = Ytp ∗−t +ξpβ
UCt+1
UCt
(pit+1)
1−
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−
JJt+1
JJtUCtp∗t︸ ︷︷ ︸
JJt
= YtUCt + ξppi
1−
t+1βUCt+1
(
p∗t+1
)
JJt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
JJt+1
JJt = YtUCt + ξppi
1−
t+1βJJt+1
Finally, p∗i,t =
Jt
JJt
=
Jt/UCtp
∗
t
JJt/UCtp
∗
t
= JtJJt
since, JJt = JJtUCtp∗t
and Jt = JtUCtp∗t
JJt = YtUCt + ξpβpi
−1
t+1 JJt+1 (B.20)
JJt = YtUCt + ξpβpi
1
λm
t+1JJt+1 (B.21)
III. Evolution of Aggregate Prices
In a continuum of firms or goods the general aggregation for the price
index is :
Pt =
(∫1
0 P
− 1
λm
j,t dj
)−λm
Since the probability of re-optimizing is 1− ξp it implies that:
Pt =
(∫ξp
0
(
Pj,t
)− 1
λm dj+
∫1
ξp
(
P∗j,t
)− 1
λm
dj
)−λm
At any time period 1− ξp share of firms re-optimize their price Preset,t = P∗t
while ξp portion of firms index their price it to past inflation Pindex,t = Pt−1pi
γp
t−1.
The above equation can be further written as:
Pt =
[
(1− ξp)P
∗− 1
λm
t + ξp
(
Pt−1pi
γp
t−1
)− 1
λm
]−λm
(B.22)
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where Pindexer,t = Pt−1pi
γp
t−1 stands for the price of the retailers who are not
re-optimizing, but indexing instead. After dividing by Pt it is re-written as:
1 = ξp
(
pi
γp
t−1
pit
)− 1
λm
+ (1− ξp)p
∗− 1
λm
t (B.23)
Making use of equation ??, the above equation relates inflation rate to aggre-
gate variables only:
p∗t =
[
1− ξp(pit)
1
λm
1− ξp
]−λm
= (1+ λm)
Jt
JJt
(B.24)
where pit = pit
pi
γp
t−1
1 = ξp(pit)
1
λm + (1− ξp)p
∗ −1
λm
t (B.25)
IV. Inefficiency of Price Dispersion
Given three equations:
a) eq. B.10: Yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
Yt
b) eq. 3.16: Ywj,t = (AtHj,t)
αK1−αj,t−1 = AtHj,t
Kj,t−1
Ywj,t
1−α
α
c) eq. : Yj,t = (1− c)Ywj,t where c =
1

Show that : Yt = 1−c∆t Y
w
t
Proof:
Start by integrating eq. B.10 across all retailers:
a):
∫1
0 Yj,tdj = Yt
∫1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
denote:∆t
and integrate over j.
Plug c):
∫1
0(1− c)Y
w
j,tdj = Yt∆t
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Plug b): (1− c)At
∫1
0 Hj,t
Kj,t−1
Ywj,t
1−α
α
dj = Yt∆t
(1− c)At
Kt−1
Ywt
1−α
α
∫1
0 Hj,tdj = Yt∆t
Note that: Kj,t−1Ywj,t =
Kt−1
Ywt
∀j and ∫10 Hj,tdj = Ht
(1− c)At
Kt−1
Ywt
1−α
α Ht = Yt∆t
Yt =
1− c
∆t
Ywt (B.26)
V. Deriving Expression for Evolution of Price Dispersion ∆t+1
From integration over j of retailers demand equation eq. B.10 :
a):
∫1
0 Yj,tdj = Yt
∫1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
denote:∆t
I obtained (shifted now at time t+1):
∆t+1 =
∫1
0
(
Pt+1(m)
Pt+1
)−1+λm
λm
∆t+1 =
∫ξp
0
(
Pt+1(m)
Pt+1
)−1+λm
λm
+
∫1
ξp
(
P∗t+1(m)
Pt+1
)−1+λm
λm
∆t+1 =
∫ξp
0
(
Pt(m)pi
γp
t Pt
PtPt+1
)−1+λm
λm
+ (1− ξp)(p∗t+1)−1+λ
m
λm
∆t+1 =
(
Ptpi
γp
t
Pt+1
)− ∫ξp
0
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)−1+λm
λm
+ (1− ξp)(p∗t+1)−1+λ
m
λm
∆t+1 =
(
pit+1
pi
γp
t
)1+λm
λm
ξp∆t + (1− ξp)(p∗t+1)−1+λ
m
λm
∆t+1 = (pit+1)
1+λm
λm ξp∆t + (1− ξp)(p∗t+1)−1+λ
m
λm
Plug eq. B.17
∆t+1 = (pit+1)
1+λm
λm ξp∆t + (1− ξp)
(
(1+ λm)
Jt
JJtt
)−1+λm
λm
(B.27)
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This is the end of derivations related to Retailer’s Problem.
B.1.3 Capital Producer Problem
Capital producers are perfectly competitive firms. The capital producer en-
gages in two activities:
• produces new investment goods using retail consumption goods It as an
input and purchased at unit price. The new investment good is sold back
to wholesale producer for the relative price Qt,
• replenishes the depreciated capital stock of wholesale firms purchased at
price Qt and reselling it for Qt.
Production of investment good is subject to:
• IAC (Investment adjustment costs) as a function of the growth rate of
investment (1− S(Xt)). CEE emphasize that this functional form can gen-
erate a hump-shaped response of aggregate investment to MP shock con-
sistent with implications of a VAR.
• investment specific technology shock Υt.
Capital producers problem:
MaxIt
∞∑
τ=0
Λt,t+τ [Qt+τΥt+τ (1− S(It+τ/It−1+τ)) It+τ − It+τ] (B.28)
where Λt,t+τ is the real SDF. Profit maximizing conditions imply:
0 = QtΥt
(
1− S(Xt) + 0− It
∂S(Xt)
∂It
)
− 1+ Et
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1Υt+1
∂S(Xt+1)
∂It
− 0
]
(B.29)
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where Xt = ItIt−1 . The capital accumulation process is:
1 = QtΥt
(
1− S(Xt) −XtS
′(Xt)
)
+ Et
[
Λt,t+1Qt+1Υt+1X
2
t+1S
′(Xt+1)
]
(B.30)
Certain functional forms of adjustment costs allow for these costs to disappear
in the long run Smets and Wooters (2007). An adjustment cost function of the
form:
S(Xt) = φx(Xt − 1)
2 (B.31)
results in no adjustment costs along the balanced growth path implying Xt = 1,
S(1) = S ′(1) = 0. The property leaves the steady state of the model unchanged.
B.1.4 Wholesale Firm Problem
Representative wholesale firm will aim to maximize:
Et
∞∑
si=0
Λt,t+i
(
Pwt+i
Pt+i
Ywj,t+i +Qt+i(1− δ)Kj,t−1+i −wt+iHj,t+i −Qt−1+iR
k
t+iKj,t−1+i
)
(B.32)
s.t. production technology eq.(3.16): Ywj,t+1 = (Aj,t+1Hj,t+1)
αK1−αj,t
where wt and
Pwt
Pt
are real wage and the selling price of wholesale output
in real terms at time t respectively.
Labor demand:
wt+1 = α
Pwt+1
Pt+1
Ywj,t+1
Hj,t+1
(B.33)
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Capital demand:
Rkt+1 =
(1−α)
Pwt+1
Pt+1
Ywj,t+1
Kj,t
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
(B.34)
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B.1.5 Financial Contract
A. Borrower’s Financial Contract:
I have denoted by Xeqt the ratio of equity securities to the sum of firm net
worth and equity securities.
X
eq
j,t =
QtSj,t
QtSj,t +N
E
j,t
=
κt(φj,t − 1)
κt(φj,t − 1) + 1
(B.35)
where κt = κ =
QtSj,t
QtSj,t+Lt
since κt is assumed a fixed parameter.
The cut-off point of the idiosyncratic shock should satisfy equation: (3.21).
Following that the payoff matrix from the
ψ
j
t+1 =
ZLj,tLj,t
Rkt+1QtKj,t
(B.36)
Table B.1: Payoff Table
State No Default:
(
ψ
j
t+1>ψ
j
t+1
)
Default:
(
ψ
j
t+1<ψ
j
t+1
)
Firm Payoff
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQt(1−X
eq
t ) 0
Bank Payoff ψjt+1QtKj,tRkt+1 +
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
Rkt+1Kj,tQtX
eq
t (1− µ)ψ
j
t+1QtKj,tR
k
t+1
The payoff structure implies that
Following this pay-off table the gross payoffs to the bank and the firm both
depend on the distribution of idiosyncratic shock
[
ψ
j
t+1
]
.
• In case of no default, the firm pays first the loan and the remaining profit
is shared between the firm and the holder of equity securities based on
shares [1−Xeqj,t ] and [X
eq
j,t ] respectively.
• In case of no default, the bank earns a fixed payoff based on the loan
contract and the share of remaining profits as a security holder.
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• In case of default, the firm earns zero payoff while the debt-holding bank
seizes all the assets following the realization of idiosyncratic shock. Bank
as a security-holder earns zero payoff as well.
Now I define the payoffs to the entrepreneur, to security holder (bank) and
to debt-holder (bank again).
1. The bank payoff on equity securities will deliver an average return RSt+1
on equity portfolio QtSt:
EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQtX
eq
j,t
(∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
dFψj
)
= RSt+1QtSt (B.37)
2. The bank payoff on loan portfolio will deliver an average return RLt+1
on loan portfolio Lt :
Et
QtKj,tRkt+1 ∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
ψ
j
t+1dFψj + (1− µ)QtKj,tR
k
t+1
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj
 = RLt+1Lt
(B.38)
3. The entrepreneurs payoff from the contract (from table B.1 on the
preceding page) is:
VEj,t+1 = EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQt
(
1−Xeqj,t
)(∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
(
ψ
j
t+1 −ψ
j
t+1
)
dFψj
)
(B.39)
Given Et
(
ψ
j
t+1
)
= 1 =
∫ψjt+1
0 ψ
j
t+1dFψj +
∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
ψ
j
t+1dFψj
I define Γ
ψ
j
t+1
, G
ψ
j
t+1
and probability of default on loan p
ψ
j
t+1
:
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
= ψ
j
t+1
∫∞
ψ
j
t+1
dFψj +
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj (B.40)
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G
ψ
j
t+1
=
∫ψjt+1
0
ψ
j
t+1dFψj (B.41)
p
(ψ
j
t+1)
=
∫ψjt+1
0
dFψj (B.42)
The three are related as in following equation:
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
=
(
1− p
ψ
j
t+1
)
ψ
j
t+1 +Gψjt+1
(B.43)
B. Lender’s One-Period Participation Constraint
Making use of the notations above I rewrite equations B.37 and B.38 :
• The average return on loan portfolio RLt+1Lj,t will be equal to the payoff
to bank from loan contract (equation B.44);
• The average return on securities RSt+1QtSvt will be equal to the payoff
earned from securities for all possible realizations of ψjt+1 (equation B.45).
EtR
L
t+1Lj,t = Et
[
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
]
QtKj,tR
k
t+1 (B.44)
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
X
eq
j,t = R
S
t+1QtSj,t (B.45)
Bank payoff should satisfy the one period participation constraint (eq. ??
on page ??):
Et
[
RLt+1Lj,t + R
s
t+1QtSj,t
]
>EtABj,tRBt+1 (B.46)
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where RLt+1Lj,t and R
S
t+1QtSj,t are given by equations B.44 and B.45 respec-
tively. I plug the latter and obtain
Et
[
Rkt+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1Kj,tQtX
eq
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)]
>EtABj,tRBt+1
(B.47)
In terms of entrepreneurs leverage φEj,t the bank one period constraint con-
straint is:
Et
[
Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1φ
E
j,tX
eq
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)]
>EtRBt+1(φEj,t − 1)
(B.48)
where φEj,t =
QtKj,t
NEj,t
is firm leverage .
C. Firm’s Value Function
I re-write the Firm Value Function (equation B.39) in terms of definitions
in equations B.40 through B.43.
VEj,t+1 = EtR
k
t+1Kj,tQt
(
1−Xeqj,t
)(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(B.49)
In terms of firm leverage φEj,t the entrepreneur maximizes his value function
:
VEj,t+1
NEj,t
= Et
[
Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
1−Xeqj,t
)(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)]
(B.50)
subject to bank one period constraint constraint equation B.48 2.
2 Since NEj,t is the net worth from the previous period, maximization of V
E
j,t+1 and
VEj,t+1
NEj,t
is
equivalent. Alternatively I can write the Lagrangean in terms of QtKj,t and then divide both
the firm value function and the bank participation constraint by net worth of firm.
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The Lagrangean and FOC
I write the Lagrangian equation :
` = Et
[
Rkt+1Kj,tQt
(
1−Xeqj,t
)(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)]
+ ...
...+ λEj,t+1
[
Rkt+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1Kj,tQtX
eq
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
−ABj,tR
B
t+1
]
After dividing the value function and the bank one period constraint by NEt and
writing in terms of φEj,t I get:
` = Et
[
Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(1−Xeqj,t )
]
+ ...
...+ λEj,t+1
[
Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1φ
E
j,tX
eq
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
− (φEj,t − 1)R
B
t+1
]
The FOCs are:
foc 1: ψjt+1:
0 = Et(1−X
eq
t )
(
−Γ ′
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ λEj,t+1
[(
Γ ′
ψ
j
t+1
− µG ′
ψ
j
t+1
)
+
(
−Γ ′
ψ
j
t+1
)
X
eq
t
]
Etλ
E
j,t+1 = Et
Γ
′
ψ
j
t+1
(
1−Xeqj,t
)
Γ
′
ψ
j
t+1
(1−Xeqt ) − µG
′
ψ
j
t+1
(B.51)
foc 2: φEj,t+1:
0 = Et
[
Rkt+1
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)(
1−Xeqj,t −φ
E
j,tX
eq ′
φj,t
)]
+
+λEj,t+1
[
Rkt+1
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)(
X
eq
j,t +φ
E
j,tX
eq ′
φj,t
)
− RBt+1
]
Given the λEj,t+1 the second FOC gives a relationships between the premium
and the threshold level of idosyncratic shock.
Et
Rkt+1
RBt+1
= Et
λEj,t+1
(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
1−Xeqj,t −φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)
+λEj,t+1
[
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
−µG
ψ
j
t+1
+(1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
(
X
eq
j,t +φ
E
j,tX
eq′
φj,t
)]
(B.52)
foc3: λEt+1:
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0 =
[
Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
)
+ Rkt+1φ
E
j,t
(
1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)
X
eq
t − (φ
E
j,t − 1)R
B
t+1
]
and after rearranging I obtain:
EtR
B
t+1 = EtR
k
t+1
φEj,t
φEj,t − 1
(
Γ
ψ
j
t+1
− µG
ψ
j
t+1
+ (1− Γ
ψ
j
t+1
)Xeqt
)
(B.53)
Aggregation involves the assumption that entrepreneurs exit with proba-
bility 1 − σE3. They transfer a proportion ξE/(1 − σE) to new entrants and
consume the rest of their accumulated wealth. Aggregate net worth will be
net worth of surviving entrepreneurs σEVEt+1 plus the fraction ξ
E/(1− σE) of
the wealth of exiting ones (1− σE)VEt+1 transferred to new entrants.
NEt = (σ
E + ξE)V
E
t (B.54)
The remaining equity value of exiting firms is consumed:
ΠEt = (1− σ
E − ξE)V
E
t (B.55)
Aggregating across wholesale producers yields the output function:
Ywt = (AtHt)
α K1−αt−1 (B.56)
From foc3 I can obtain an expression for the average return RBt .
EtR
B
t+1 = EtR
k
t+1
φEt
φEt − 1
(
Γψt+1
− µGψt+1 + (1− Γψt+1)X
eq
t
)
(B.57)
3 Such assumption avoids accumulation of capital by firms so they become self financed.
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Finally, a small share of the rent on capital is lost on monitoring of the
wholesale firms business by the bank:
Monitoring Cost = EtµGψt+1R
k
t+1QtKt (B.58)
B.1.6 Bank Problem
This section is similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011) (hereby GK2011). Having
one more financing instrument makes up for few differences.In this Appendix
I will:
(a) set up a one-to-one relationship between leverage and excess return on
assets for any fixed moral hazard parameter ΘB,
(b) derive expression for these excess returns, and
(c) show that banks’ choice on leverage and excess returns does not depend
on bank sepcific factors, therefore allowing for aggregation.
The value of the bank is homogenous to degree one in net worth and given
the linear relationship in the balance sheet equation 3.40, then VBi,t should be
homogenous of degree one in Bi,t, ABi,t as well as Li,t and Si,t.
VBi,t (Li,t,Bi,t,Si,t) = ν
L
i,tLi,t + ν
s
i,tQtSi,t − ν
B
i,tBi,t (B.59)
where QtSi,t = κAi,t and Li,t = (1− κ)ABi,t. ν
L
t , ν
s
t and ν
B
t are the marginal
values of respective asset as of end of period. Using balance sheet equation
3.38 the value function is:
VBi,t(Li,t,Ni,t,Si,t) = µ
L
i,tLi,t + µ
s
i,tQtSi,t + ν
B
i,tN
B
i,t (B.60)
Banker maximizes VBi,t(Li,t,Bi,t,Si,t) subject to:
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- the incentive constraint eq. 3.42: VBi,t > ΘAi,t
- equation B.60: VBi,t = µ
L
i,tLi,t + µ
s
i,tQtSi,t + ν
B
i,tN
B
i,t
The Lagrangean ` = VBi,t + λ
B
t (V
B
i,t −ΘB(A
B
i,t)) becomes:
` =
(
µLi,tφ
B
i,t(1− κ) + µ
s
i,tφ
B
i,tκ+ ν
B
i,t
)
(1+ λBi,t) − λ
B
i,tΘBφ
B
i,t (B.61)
λBi,t > 0 if the constraint (IC) binds, or λ
B
i,t = 0 if it does not.
First order conditions with respect (φi,t, κ and λi,t KT1 and KT2) when IC
constraint binds are:
foc 1. φBi,t:
0 = (1+ λBi,t)(µ
L
i,t(1− κ) + (µ
L
i,tκ)) − λ
B
i,tΘB (B.62)
foc 2. λi,t:
0 = µLi,tφ
B
i,t(1− κ) + µ
s
i,tφ
B
i,tκ+ ν
B
i,t −ΘBφ
B
i,t (B.63)
KT2:
λBt>0 (B.64)
My interest is when the IC binds λBi,t > 0, the KT1 condition B.63 leads to
an expression relating leverage to bank premium:
φBi,t =
νBi,t
ΘB − µ
L
i,t(1− κ) − κµ
s
i,t
(B.65)
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where φBi,t =
ABi,t
NBi,t
. For non-binding IC, i.e. λBi,t = 0, then the 1
−st FOC
implies µLi,t = 0. Hence,
(1− κ)µLi,t = max
[
0,ΘB −
νBi,t
φBi,t
− κµsi,t
]
(B.66)
Now I need to relate the µLi,t and µ
S
i,t to respective returns of Li,t and Si,t
financing instruments. In terms of leverage equation B.60 is:
VBi,t =
(
µLi,t(1− κ)φ
B
i,t + κµ
s
i,tφ
B
i,t + ν
B
i,t
)
NBi,t (B.67)
where µLi,t = ν
L
i,t− ν
B
i,t is the excess value of all loans over cost of deposits Rt+1
µsi,t = ν
s
i,t−ν
B
i,t is the excess value of S-type financing above risk free return
Rt+1.
Rewrite equation 3.41:
VBi,t = Et
∑∞
τ=1 (1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt,t+τN
B
i,t+τ
in recursive form (shown in subsection B.1.7 )
VBi,t = EtΛt,t+1
(
(1− σB)N
B
i,t+1 + σBV
B
i,t+1
)
(B.68)
where NBi,t+1 is defined as in the income statement equation 3.40.
Plug equation B.67 shifted at t+1 into equation B.68 to get:
VBi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1N
B
i,t+1 (B.69)
where,
Ωi,t+1 = (1− σB) + σB
(
(1− κ)µLi,t+1φ
B
i,t+1 + κµ
s
i,t+1φ
B
i,t+1 + ν
B
i,t+1
)
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is the shadow value of a unit of net worth and can be re-written making
use of equation (B.65) (when IC binds):
Ωi,t+1 = (1− σB) + σBΘBφ
B
i,t+1 (B.70)
or equivalently :
VBi,t = EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− σB) + σB
(
(1− κ)µLi,t+1φ
B
i,t+1 + κµ
s
i,t+1φ
B
i,t+1 + ν
B
i,t+1
)]
NBi,t+1
Plug equation 3.40: NBi,t+1 = (R
L
t+1−Rt+1)Li,t+(R
s
t+1−Rt+1)QtSi,t+
Rt+1N
B
i,t into equation B.69 above yields:
VBi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1
[(
RLt+1 − Rt+1
)
Li,t +
(
Rst+1 − Rt+1
)
QtSi,t + Rt+1N
B
i,t
]
(B.71)
Finally, plugging Equation B.60; (VBi,t = µLi,tLi,t+µsi,tQtSi,t+νBi,tNBi,t)
into equation (B.71) leads to three expressions for µLi,t, µ
s
i,t and ν
B
i,t:
µLi,t = (ν
L
i,t − ν
B
i,t) = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1
(
RLt+1 − Rt+1
)
(B.72)
µsi,t = (ν
s
i,t − ν
B
i,t) = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1
(
Rst+1 − Rt+1
)
(B.73)
νBi,t = EtΛt,t+1Ωi,t+1Rt+1 (B.74)
Equations B.65 and B.72, B.73, B.74 complete the banker’s solution and de-
termine φBi,t and µ
L
i,t, µ
s
i,t, ν
B
i,t as a function of ΘB, R
B
t+1 − Rt+1, R
s
t+1 − Rt+1 and
Rt+1, which do not depend on bank specific factors. They are either exogenous
to banks or depend on economy wide variables. Therefore, they are common
across all banks.
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Since all banks chose the same leverage ratio and observe the same excess
returns on their assets φBt and µ
L
t , µ
s
t, ν
B
t , the bank balance sheet and leverage
can be aggregated across banks.
NBt +Bt = A
B
t = Lt +QtSt (B.75)
φBt =
At
NBt
=
QtKt −N
E
t
NBt
(B.76)
where NEt is firms’ net worth and QtKt total project cost. Aggregate bank net
worth NBt evolves as the sum of:
- net worth of old banks surviving from last period, NBo,t+1 = σBN
B
t+1,
- and the net worth of new ones NBnew,t+1 = ξBA
B
t R
B
t+1, since on aggregate new
banks receive a transfer of ξB1−σB from absconding ones
4.
Aggregate net worth of banks is:
NBt+1 = N
B
new,t+1 +N
B
o,t+1
where σB is the probability of the bank not absconding (surviving) next period.
Evolution of net worth of banks not absconding at time ’t+1’ is obtained using
equation B.88:
NBo,t+1 = σB
(
RLt+1Lt + R
s
t+1QtSt − Rt+1Bt
)
In addition a transfer ξb1−σb of those 1 − σb absconding transfer some net
worth to new banks:
4 After canceling out 1− σB portion of exiting banks
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NBnew,t+1 = ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t
Then aggregate net worth is:
NBt+1 = σB
(
RLt+1Lt + R
s
t+1QtSt − Rt+1Bt
)
+ ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t (B.77)
Intuitively, aggregate consumption of exiting banks is5:
ΠBt+1 = (1− σB)(R
B
t+1A
B
t − Rt+1Bt) − ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t (B.78)
For the sake of reference, the average return on securities Rst+1 is defined
as:
RSt+1QtSt = EtR
k
t+1QtKt
(
1− Γψt+1
)
X
eq
t (B.79)
For the sake of reference I define the average return RBt+1 on total bank
assets ABt as:
RBt+1 = R
L
t+1
Lt
ABt
+ Rst+1
QtSt
ABt
(B.80)
5 Since ξ1−σB portion of net worth is transferred by a fraction 1− σB of exiting bankers to new
ones, then 1− ξ1−σB of the fraction 1− σB of exiting bankers’ net worth is consumed.
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B.1.7 Banker’s Value Recursion
This subsection is the recursive derivation of equation B.68 starting with 3.41:
VBi,t = Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt,t+τN
B
i,t+τ (B.81)
VBi,t = (1− σB)
[
σ1−1B Λt,t+1N
B
i,t+1 +Λt,t+1
(
σ2−1B
Λt,t+2
Λt,t+1
NBi,t+2 + σ
3−1
B
Λt,t+3
Λt,t+1
NBi,t+3 + ...
)]
(B.82)
VBi,t = (1− σB)Λt,t+1N
B
i,t+1+σBΛt,t+1 (1− σB)
(
Λt+1,t+2N
B
i,t+2 + σ
1
BΛt+1,t+3N
B
i,t+3 + ...
)
(B.83)
VBi,t = (1− σB)Λt,t+1N
B
i,t+1 + σBΛt,t+1
(
Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt+1,t+1+τN
B
i,t+1+τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
VBi,t+1
(B.84)
VBi,t = (1− σB)Λt,t+1N
B
i,t+1 + σBΛt,t+1V
B
i,t+1 (B.85)
which is eq. B.68
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B.1.8 Bank Participation Constraint
For a risk averse banker to agree to sign a contract with the entrepreneur in
financing the wholesale firm as in section 3.2.4 the following Participation
Constraint should be satisfied.
VBi,t > V
B0
i,t (B.86)
where,
VBi,t : is the value of the bank when the bank finances the entrepreneur and
earn a gross return ABi,tR
B
t+1 defined by eq. 3.39:
RBt+1A
B
i,t = R
L
t+1Li,t + R
s
t+1QtSi,t
and
V
B0
i,t : is the value of the bank when bank total assets are invested in risk
free instruments and earn a gross return a gross return ABj,tRt+1.
The equation for the value of the bank is eq. 3.41:
VBi,t = Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt,t+τN
B
i,t+τ (B.87)
where NBi,t+1 is defined as:
NBi,t+1 = R
B
t+1A
B
i,t−Rt+1Bi,t = (R
L
t+1−Rt+1)Li,t+
(
Rst+1 − Rj,t+1
)
QtSj,t+Rt+1N
B
i,t
(B.88)
while
N
B0
i,t+1 = Rt+1A
B
i,t − Rt+1Bi,t = Rt+1N
B0
i,t (B.89)
Assumption 1.
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No matter what strategy the banker follows, whether
(a) issuing standard debt loans and buying equity stakes or (b) investing
assets into risk free instruments,
will not make any difference regarding the initial net worth the banker is
endowed with, that is:
NBi,t = N
B0
i,t (B.90)
where NB0i,t is the net worth when the banker invests all assets in risk free
instruments.
Proposition 1. Given that the the following constraints are satisfied:
• the bank Incentive Constraint VBi,t>ΘBABi,t in Bank’s problem (eq. 3.42, sub-
section 3.2.6),
• the constraint ΘB > 1φBi,t for the value of ΘB,
• the Assumption 1 about initial net worth,
then the one-period bank Participation Constraint in Wholesale Firms problem
(eq. ??, subsection 3.2.4)
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
(ψ
j
t+1)
− µG
(ψ
j
t+1)
)
+ Rkt+1(1−G(ψjt+1)
)QtSj,t>EtABj,tRBt+1
is an equivalent sufficient condition that guarantee that the constraint B.86 is fulfilled.
Proof :
V
B0
i,t is the value of the bank when all assets are invested in risk free assets,
therefore RLt+1 = Rt+1 and R
s
t+1 = Rt+1
Then eq. B.88 becomes:
N
B0
i,t+1 = Rt+1N
B0
i,t (B.91)
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Solving eq. B.91 forward
N
B0
i,t+τ =
τ∏
h=1
Rt+hN
B0
i,t (B.92)
Then to obtain the value of bank when all assets are invested in risk free in-
struments VB0i,t plug eq. B.92 into eq. B.87:
V
B0
i,t = Et
∞∑
τ=1
(1− σB)σ
τ−1
B Λt,t+τ
τ∏
h=1
Rt+hN
B0
i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
B0
i,t+τ
(B.93)
Note that once (1− σB) and N
B0
i,t come in front of the summation, eq. B.93 in
expanded form becomes:
V
B0
i,t = (1−σB)N
B0
i,t
[
σ0BΛt,t+1Rt+1 + σ
1
BΛt,t+2Rt+1Rt+2 + σ
2
BΛt,t+3Rt+1Rt+2Rt+3...
]
(B.94)
Noting that as Λt,t+j = Λt,t+1Λt+1,t+2...Λt+j−1,t+j, the above equation con-
denses into:
V
B0
i,t = (1− σB)N
B0
i,t
∞∑
τ=1
στ−1B︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/(1−σB)
(B.95)
which implies
V
B0
i,t = N
B0
i,t (B.96)
I have shown that the value of the bank i when assets are invested in risk free
instruments VB0i,t is the initial net worth N
B0
i,t .
Now, I discuss the value of the bank when banker finances the wholesale
firm VBi,t. Note that the Banks’ Problem in section 3.2 is built under the as-
sumption that the bank Incentive Constraint 3.42
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VBi,t > ΘBABi,t
imposed by the depositors binds with equality as shown in Appendix C.1.
That is
VBi,t = ΘBA
B
i,t (B.97)
where ABi,t = φ
B
i,tN
B
i,t with φ
B
i,t denoting bank leverage. By plugging B.97 and
the bank leverage definition into eq. B.86, the proof of the bank Participation
Constraint eq. B.86 boils down to showing that
ΘBφ
B
i,tN
B
i,t > N
B0
i,t (B.98)
Making use of Assumption 1 (eq. B.90) above that NBi,t = N
B0
i,t , simplifies the
participation constraint B.98 into:
ΘB >
1
φBi,t
(B.99)
or alternatively, plugging back the leverage definition ABi,t = φ
B
i,tN
B
i,t, I obtain
ΘBA
B
i,t > N
B
i,t (B.100)
which is quite a rational constraint. Such a constraint will already hold
under the bank Incentive Constraint in the Bank’s Problem that depositors
impose by setting a value for ΘB that already satisfies eq. B.99, since depositors
can NOT accept a value of ΘB that implies bank assets ΘBABi,t be less than the
value of net worth NBi,t at any time. Assume they do. Then some depositors
would be losing their deposits since the bank would not be able to pay back
some of the deposits given that bank value less than net worth is too small to
reimburse all deposits. The point behind such a bank Incentive Constraint is
to guaranteed that the value of the bank is kept above that minimal threshold.
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Hence that constraint in eq. B.99 holds is guaranteed by the Bank Incentive
Constraint already imposed by depositors in the Bank’s Problem, for values of
ΘB satisfying that particular constraint. The value of ΘB has to be calibrated
at a value greater than 1
φBi,t
should one expect to hit targets of positive external
finance premiums RLt+1 − Rt+1 and R
s
t+1 − Rt+1.
Finally, the value of the bank when it invests its assets into loans and equity
stake VBi,t is given by plugging equation B.88 into B.87, which say that the value
of the bank is a discounted stream of the sum of future of excess returns on assets
and marginal return on net worth. That each of these streams of future returns
is equal to the payoff the bank receives from participating in the financing
contract with the wholesale firm (under the Wholesale Firm’s Problem) in
each single period is guaranteed by: (i) the one-period bank Participation
Constraint in Wholesale Firms Problem (eq. ??, subsection 3.2.4):
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
(ψ
j
t+1)
− µG
(ψ
j
t+1)
)
+ Rkt+1(1−G(ψjt+1)
)QtSj,t>EtABj,tRBt+1
that already holds with equality under the wholesale producer’s optimal
conditions, where ABi,tR
B
t+1 is defined by eq. 3.39:
RBt+1A
B
i,t = R
L
t+1Li,t + R
s
t+1QtSi,t
Therefore, given that the three conditions (a,b,c) in Proposition 1 hold:
then the one-period bank Participation Constraint in equation ?? in Whole-
sale Firms problem (subsection 3.2.4)
EtR
k
t+1QtKj,t
(
Γ
(ψ
j
t+1)
− µG
(ψ
j
t+1)
)
+ Rkt+1(1−G(ψjt+1)
)QtSj,t>EtABj,tRBt+1
is an equivalent sufficient condition that guarantees that the constraint B.86
VBi,t > V
B0
i,t
is satisfied with strict inequality.
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B.1.9 Aggregate Resource Constraint
To aggregate the balance sheet of agents and their flow of funds into consoli-
dated national accounts I use the following equations:
Household budget constraint:
1. eq. 3.3: Ct +Bt − RtBt−1 + Tt = wtHt +ΠBt +Π
E
t +Π
CP
t +Π
R
t
Bank: The bank balance sheet is given by eq. 3.38: NBt + Bt = A
B
t =
Lt +QtSt, also provided in table B.2 below.
Table B.2: Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
Lt Bt
QtSt
NBt
To obtain the funds flow I make use of the following equations from the
section on banks.
eq. B.77: NBt+1 = σB
(
RBt+1A
B
t − Rt+1Bt
)
+ ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t
eq. B.78: ΠBt+1 = (1− σB)(R
B
t+1A
B
t − Rt+1Bt) − ξBR
B
t+1A
B
t
Adding up eq. B.77 and B.78 I obtain the the flow of funds equation for the
banker (shifted 1 period backwards):
ΠBt +N
B
t = R
B
tA
B
t−1 − RtBt−1 (B.101)
Wholesale Firm : The balance sheet of the wholesale firm is given by equa-
tion 3.19:
QtKj,t = N
E
j,t + Lj,t +QtSj,t (table B.3).
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Table B.3: Wholesale Firm Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
QtKt Lt
QtSt
NEt
I obtain an equation for the rental income of wholesale firm after paying
for wages from equations B.32, B.33 and B.34 in Appendix ?? :
RktQt−1Kt−1 =
Pwt
Pt
Ywt + (1− δ)QtKt−1 −wtHt (B.102)
Table B.1 in subsection B.1.4 shows how this income is split into payoffs to
agents involved in the contract and into deadweight monitoring costs.
The Entrepreneurs Flow of Funds
EtR
k
t+1QtKt = Et
Rkt+1QtKt (Γψt+1 −µGψt+1)+RSt+1QtSt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bank−share
+Rkt+1QtKt(1− Γψt+1
)Xeqt︸ ︷︷ ︸
VEt
+µG(ψt+1)
Rkt+1QtKt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Monitoring−Cost

I make use of (a) the binding bank participation constraint equation hold-
ing with equality B.46, (b) the wholesale firm net worth equation B.54 and
(c) consumption equation B.55 : (a) eq. B.46 EtRkt+1QtKt
(
Γψt+1
− µGψt+1
)
+
Rst+1QtSt = EtA
B
t R
B
t+1 where A
B
t R
B
t+1 = LtR
L
t+1 +QtStR
s
t+1
(b) eq. B.54: NEt = (σ
E + ξE)EtR
k
t+1
[
QtKt(1− Γψt+1)X
eq
t
]
(c) eq. B.55: ΠEt = (1− σ
E − ξE)EtR
k
t+1
[
QtKt(1− Γψt+1)X
eq
t
]
Equations (b) + (c) give the value function VEt = Π
E
t +N
E
t
I substitute the equation (a), (b),(c) above in the Flow of Funds. Shifting
one period backwards, the aggregate flow of funds equation of wholesale firm
becomes:
RktQt−1Kt−1 = R
B
tA
B
t−1 +Π
E
t +N
E
t + µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 (B.103)
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where Monitoring Cost = µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 is deadweight cost of eq. B.58.
Finally I re-write equation B.103 by plugging ABt−1 +N
E
t = Qt−1Kt−1:
ΠEt = R
k
t (A
B
t−1 +N
E
t ) − R
B
tA
B
t−1 −N
E
t − µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 (B.104)
Total revenues of the firm from sales of output and resale of capital (equa-
tion B.32) are equal to RktQtKt = R
k
t (A
B
t−1 +N
E
t−1):
Rkt (A
B
t−1 +N
E
t−1) =
Pwt
Pt
Ywt + (1− δ)QtKt−1 −wtHt (B.105)
Capital Producer: To obtain e cash flow for capital producer I make use of
equations:
eq. 3.13: ΠCPt = QtΥt (1− S(Xt)) It − It
eq. 3.15: Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− S(Xt))ItΥt
I subtract eq.3.15 multiplied with Qt from eq. 3.13, that is ΠCPt −QtKt
to obtain the resource equation for capital producer (after re-arranging the
terms):
ΠCPt = QtKt −Qt(1− δ)Kt−1 − It (B.106)
Retailer profits.: The retailer buys wholesale output Ywt for (nominal) whole-
sale price Pwt and sells final output Yt at selling price Pt. Net profits of retailer
in real terms are:
ΠRt = Yt −
Pwt
Pt
Ywt (B.107)
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Government Resource Constraint. eq. 3.49
0 = Tt −Gt
Aggregate Resource Constraint:
I aggregate the balance sheets of wholesale firms and banks to get a consol-
idated balance sheet equations of both agents as shown in table B.4.
Table B.4: Consolidated Balance Sheet of Bank and Wholesale Firm
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
QtKt Bt
NBt
NEt
Finally, I sum up across equations B.101, B.105, B.104, B.106, B.107, 3.49
and 3.3, and make use of consolidated balance sheet in table B.4 to obtain the
national accounting identity. For the sake of space I denote bank monitoring
costs with µMC:
µMC = µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 (B.108)
Given the
• household budget constraint (eq. 3.3) Ct = Yt − It −Gt − µGψtRktQt−1Kt−1,
• the entrepreneurs profit flow (eq. B.104) ΠEt = Rkt (ABt−1 +NEt ) − RBtABt−1 −
NEt − µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1,
• the balance sheet equation that return from project should equal the total
return shared between entrepreneur and the bank (eq. B.105) Rkt (A
B
t−1 +
NEt−1) =
Pwt
Pt
Ywt + (1− δ)QtKt−1 −wtHt,
• the bank profit flow (dividend to his household eq. B.101) ΠBt +NBt =
RBtA
B
t−1 − RtBt−1 = R
L
tLt−1 + R
S
tQt−1St−1 − RtBt−1
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• the capital producer profit flow (B.106) ΠCPt = QtKt −Qt(1− δ)Kt−1 − It,
• retailer real profit flow (B.107) ΠRt = Yt − P
w
t
Pt
Ywt ,
• government balanced budget (eq. 3.49) 0 = Gt − Tt,
the markets will clear to yield the aggregate resource constraint.
−−Agg.Uses−− = −−−−Agg.Resources−−−−
ΠBt = R
B
tA
B
t−1 − RtBt−1 −N
B
t
Rkt (A
B
t−1 +N
E
t−1) =
Pwt
Pt
Ywt + (1− δ)QtKt−1 −wtHt
ΠEt = R
k
t (A
B
t−1 +N
E
t ) − R
B
tA
B
t−1 −N
E
t − µMC
ΠCPt = QtKt −Qt(1− δ)Kt−1 − It
ΠRt = Yt −
Pwt
Pt
Ywt
0 = Tt −Gt
Ct = wtHt +Π
B
t +Π
E
t +Π
CP
t +Π
R
t −Bt + RtBt−1 − Tt
−−Agg.Uses−− = −−−−Agg.Resources−−−−
Ct = Yt − µMC − It −Gt+QtKt −N
B
t −N
E
t −Bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−−−−−−− = −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Ct = Yt − It −Gt − µGψtR
k
tQt−1Kt−1
where I have denoted µG(ψt)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 = µMC. To obtain the final na-
tional accounting identity line above I make use of bank balance sheet table
B.2 and the bank and wholesale firm consolidated balance sheet table B.4.
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Legend of Variables.
wt = Real wage
Ht = Hours worked
ΠRt = Retailer profits (real)
ΠBCt = Banker profit (consumption)
ΠECt = Entrepreneur profit (consumption)
Ct = Household consumption
Bt = Current period stock of deposits
Rt = Risk free real return
taxt = Household taxes paid to Government
Lt = Standard debt loan to wholesale firm
St = Equity stakes of wholesale firm bought by the bank
Qt = Price of one unit of equity or physical capital
Rkt = Expected return on wholesale producing firm investment
Rst = Expected return on equity stake
RLt = Average return on standard loans
RBt = Weighted average return on bank assets (L and S)
NBt = Accumulated Bank net worth
NEt = Accumulated Entrepreneur net worth
Kt = Physical capital invested in project by Entrepreneur
1− Γψt = Share of project return paid to owner of each unit of physical capital
Γψt − µGψt = Banker’s pay-off from loan contract net of monitoring cost
µGψt = Portion of project return spent for monitoring costs (deadweight cost)
It = Investment
Υt = Investment Specific Technology affecting investment production
S(Xt) = Investment Adjustment Costs, where Xt =
It
Xt−1
Gt = Government expenditure
κ = Share of equity stake finance on total assets of the bank.
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B.1.10 Steady State Equations
A. Steady State of LogNormal Distribution Equations
Fssψ = 0.75% (B.109)
Zψ = Ncdf
−1(Fssψ ) (B.110)
ψt = e
Zψσ−0.5σ2 (B.111)
Gψ = Ncdf(Zψ − σ) = 1−Ncdf(σ−Zψ) (B.112)
Γψ = ψ(1− Fψ) +Gψ (B.113)
G
′
ψ =
Npdf(Zψ)
σ
=
Npdf(Zψ − σ)
ψσ
= ψF
′
ψ (B.114)
since Npdf(Zψ−σ)ψ = Npdf(Zψ)
Γ
′
ψ = 1− Fψ (B.115)
B. Steady State of Model Equation
Steady State hours of work
H = 0.35;
Steady State total external finance premium
efpss = 2%
Steady State public expenditures to final output ratio
gY = 0.2;
1. Risk free discount rate
R =
1
β
=
1
Λ
(B.116)
2. Definition
pi = pi1−γp (B.117)
3. The price that retailing firms reset in next period
p∗ =
J
JJ
=
(
1− ξppi
(1−γp)(−1)
1− ξp
)1/(1−)
(B.118)
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4. Real marginal cost to Retailer
mc = (1− 1/)
1− ξpβpi
(1−γp)
1− ξpβpi(1−γp)(−1)
p∗ (B.119)
5. Wholesale price in real terms
Pw
P
= mc (B.120)
6. Price Dispersion
∆ =
1− ξp
1− ξppi(1−γp)
p∗− (B.121)
7. Return on Capital
Rk = (efpss + 1)1/4 ∗ R (B.122)
8. Capital to wholesale output Ratio
K
Yw
= (Rk − (1− δ))(1−α)
Pw
P
(B.123)
9. Investment to output ratio
I
Y
= δ
K
Yw
∆
1− 1/
(B.124)
10. Agency coasts to output ratio
µY = µGψR
k K
Yw
∆
1− 1/
(B.125)
10. Consumption to output ratio
CY =
C
Y
= 1−
I
Y
− gY − µY (B.126)
12. Wholesale Production
Yw = (AH)
(
K
Yw
) 1−α
α
(B.127)
13. Real wage
w = α
Pw
P
Yw
H
(B.128)
14. Final (retail) output
Y = (1− 1/)
Yw
∆
(B.129)
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15. Capital Stock
K =
K
Yw
∗ Yw (B.130)
16. Investment
I =
I
Y
∗ Y (B.131)
17. Government expenditure
G = gy ∗ Y (B.132)
18. Consumption
C =
C
Y
∗ Y (B.133)
19. Labor supply shifter
δh = α
Pw
P
∆
1− 1/
1−βxχ
(1− χ)σ
C
C1−σ
C
CY
H−1−σ
H
(B.134)
20 Household Utility Function
U(C,H) =
(C− χC¯)1−σc
1− σc
− δh
H1+ρ
h
1+ ρh
(B.135)
21. Marginal Utility w.r.t consumption
U ′C = (C− χC¯)
−σc (B.136)
22. Marginal Utility w.r.t hours worked
U ′H = −U
′
L = −δ
hHρ
h
(B.137)
23. Wholesale Firm Net Worth Evolution
NE =
(σE + ξE)R
kQK
(
1− Γψ
)
− κ ∗QK
1− κ
(B.138)
24. Wholesale Firm Asset to Net Worth Ratio
φE =
QK
NE
(B.139)
25. The Ratio of equity securities to total capital less loans
Xeq =
QS
QK− L
(B.140)
161
B.1. Model Derivation
26. Wholesale Firm: FOC w.r.t ψ
λE =
Γ
′
ψ
(1−Xeq)
Γ
′
ψ
(1−Xeq) − µG ′
ψ
(B.141)
27. Borrower premium: FOC w.r.t choice of Capital Stock K
ρψ =
λE(
1− Γψ
)(
1−Xeq−φEXeq
′
φ
)
+λE
[
Γψ−µGψ+
(
1− Γψ
)(
Xeq+φEXeq
′
φ
)] (B.142)
28. Return on equity securities to the bank
RS = Rk
QK
QS
(
1− Γψ
)
Xeq (B.143)
29. Opportunity cost of Bank Funds (Required return on Bank Assets)
RB =
Rk
ρψ
(B.144)
30. Contractual Loan Rate
ZL = ψRk
QK
(1− κ)(QK−NE)
(B.145)
31. Bank Assets
AB = QK−NE (B.146)
31. Bank Asset: Loans
L = (1− κ)(QK−NE) (B.147)
32. Bank Asset: Equity Securities
S = κAB/Q (B.148)
33. Average return on Loan Portfolio
RL =
RBAB − RsQS
L
(B.149)
34. Bank Net Worth Evolution
NB =
(σB + ξB)(R
L∗L+ RsQS) − σBR(QK−NE)
1− σBR
(B.150)
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35. Bank Asset to Net Worth Ratio
φB =
AB
NB
(B.151)
36. Shadow value of a unit of bank net worth
Ω = 1− σB + σBΘBφ
B (B.152)
37. Excess marginal value to bank of an extra unit of loan
µL = Ω(
RL
R
− 1) (B.153)
38. Excess marginal value to bank of an extra unit of equity security
µs = Ω(
Rs
R
− 1) (B.154)
39. Marginal value of a unit of bank net worth
νB = Ω (B.155)
40. Household deposits
B = AB −NB (B.156)
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B.1.11 Data
I use US data from NIPA-BEA, CPS-BLS, the FRED database, and the Flow
of Funds Accounts from the Federal Reserve Board. Though data for US are
available starting from 1947, the earliest, I use data for the period 1980-2015,
as the longest time span for which I can construct data for Euro area.
• Non-financial sector net worth: Tangible Assets minus Credit Market
Liabilities. Tangible Assets obtained from the Flow of Funds Account
(FFA) of the Federal Reserve Board, sum of ‘Nonfinancial Assets of Non-
financial Corporate Business’, series ID FL102010005.Q from Table B.102
and ‘Nonfinancial Assets of Nonfinancial NonCorporate Business’, series
ID FL112010005.Q from Table B.103. Credit Market Liabilities obtained
from the Flow of Funds Account (FFA) of the Federal Reserve Board,
sum of ’Credit Market Instruments of Nonfinancial Noncorporate Busi-
ness’, series ID FL114104005.Q from Table B.102 and ‘Credit Market In-
struments of Nonfinancial Corporate Business’, series ID FL114102005.Q
from Table B.103; I deflate the nominal net worth series using the GDP
deflator provided by NIPA Table 1.1.4.
• Financial sector net worth: Financial business; corporate equities; liabil-
ity.. I use the series from the Financial Account of the Unites States (table
Z1) of the Federal Reserve Board to get a market value for the net worth
of Financial Sector. I obtain the series ’Financial business; corporate equities
(liability)’, coded LM793164105.Q from table Z1/L108. (Before August
2015 the table was named Z1/L107 and the series name FL793164105.Q).
I deflate the nominal net worth series using the GDP deflator provided
by NIPA Table 1.1.4.
• External Finance Premium. Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield mi-
nus the Aaa-rated corporate bond yield. Alternatively, the spread is
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calculated as primary lending rate minus 3 months T-bill rate. Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H15).
• Real per capita GDP
• Real per capita consumption, defined as nondurable consumption and
services
• Real per capita gross private investment
• Hours worked. The (log of) average weekly hours worked (BLS series
PRS85006023) divided by 100 and multiplied by the ratio of civilian pop-
ulation over 16 (CE16OV) to a population index. As the hours worked is
an index with 1992=100, the population index is the ratio of population
each quarter divided by the population in the third quarter of 1992.
• Labor share. Labor share is defined as the ratio of total compensation of
employees (NIPA Table 2.1) corrected by the size of the non-farm busi-
ness sector to the gross value added by the non-farm business sector.
????? Inflation is defined as the log of the GDP deflator (the price index
for gross value added by the nonfarm business sector (NIPA Table 1.3.4)).
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External Finance Premium
To get an approximate measure of increase in volatility of external finance
premium I look at the following spreads.
1. External Finance Premium EFPb, the overall premium, as the difference
between Moody’s BAA rated corporate bond yield and Fed rate,
2. EFPa, the difference between Moody’s AAA rated corporate bond yield
and Fed rate,
3. EFPba, Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield minus the Aaa-rated cor-
porate bond yield. Alternatively, the spread is calculated as primary
lending rate minus 3 months T-bill rate.
The first one is an approximate for the overall external finance premium.
The second one is an approximate for the premium not related to the quality
of borrower, therefore pertaining to lenders moral hazard premium. The third
one, their difference is considered a proxy for borrower quality premium. Since
the difference relative to Fed rate may include, liquidity risk premium related
to short term instruments, I calculated the first and second spreads relative to
Government 10 year Treasury constant maturity bond return, and name them
EFPbg and EFPag.
1. EFPbg, the overall premium, as the difference between Moody’s BAA
rated corporate bond yield and Government 10 year Treasury constant
maturity bond yield,
2. EFPag, the difference between Moody’s AAA rated corporate bond yield
and Government 10 year Treasury constant maturity bond yield.
The borrower quality premium is the same. The ratios of volatilities during
crisis relative to before 2006 are similar whichever set of data I use.
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H15).
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B.2 Tables and Figures
Table B.5: Parameters relevant to NK equations in all Models, GK, FA and FAGK.
Variable Description Target Value
β Discount rate 0.9966
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
α Labor share on output 0.7
χ Degree of habit formation 0.65
φx Investment adjustment cost 2
ξp Calvo parameter (1 - prob of re-optimizing) 0.75
 Elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods 7
γp Degree of price indexation to past inflation 0.5
σc Inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1.4
ρh Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor 0.5
ρR Policy rate smoothing parameter 0.8
θpi MP reaction to inflation expectation 1.5
θY MP reaction to output gap 0.5/4
θ∆pi MP reaction to changes in inflation 0
Shocks
ρA Persistence of neutral productivity shock 0.90
ρG Persistence of public spending shock 0.90
ρm Persistence of MP shock 0
ρIS Persistence of IST shock 0.90
σA St.deviation of productivity shock 1.1 *10−2
σG St.deviation of public spending shock 1.0 *10−2
σm St.deviation of MP shock 1.0 *10−2
σIS St.deviation of IST shock 0.15*10−2
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Table B.6: Steady State Targets of non-financial and financial sector and the relevant
parameters calibrated to match the respective target
Target Variable GK FA FA-GK Parameter*
Firm tenure – 16.6 yrs 16.6 yrs σE
Firm Asset/(N.Worth+Equity) QK
NE+QS
– 1.843 1.841 Aψ
Bank tenure 8.6 yrs – 10.8 yrs σB
Bank Asset/N.Worth QS+L
NB
4.1 – 6.4 ξB
Borrower risk premia RK − RB 2.0 % – 0.81 % µ
Lender risk premia RB − R – 2.0% 1.18 % ΘB
Overall premium RK − R 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% ΘB, µ
RL − R, RS − R – – 0.0047 ξE
*Values of calibrated parameters are reported in the following table B.7
Table B.7: Calibrated values of firm and bank friction parameters.
Description GK FA FA-GK
σE Survival probability of entrepreneur – 0.985 0.985
Aψ Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock – 0.30 0.30
σB Survival probability of banks 0.971 – 0.977
ξB Wealth share transferred to new banks 0.0016 – 0.00023
µ Monitoring costs parameter – 0.12 0.11
ΘB Share of bank assets bankers can run away with 0.75 – 0.76
ξE Wealth share transferred to new entrepreneurs – 0.0033 0.0047
Fψ Probability of default in any quarter – 0.75% 0.75%
µY Deadweight cost due to monitoring in % of GDP – 0.25 % 0.23 %
Table B.8: Steady State Targets of Macro variables.
Variable Description NK 1.GK 2.FA 3.FA-GK
C
Y Average Consumption to GDP ratio 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.57
I
Y Average Investment to GDP ratio 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.22
K
Y Average Capital Stock to GDP ratio 11.8 9.00 9.00 9.00
pi Average inflation rate 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
R Average real interest rate 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Ht Working hours 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
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Table B.9: Variance Decomposition of FA-GK model: neutral technology (TFP), gov-
ernment expenditures (G), monetary policy (MP), investment-specific tech-
nology (IST) shocks.
Variance Decomposition
TFP G MP IST
Y 81 3 10 5
C 71 2 18 9
I 69 1 18 12
H 69 5 18 8
W 69 0 29 1
Π 44 0 53 3
Q 52 1 30 16
R 22 0 75 3
Rn 22 0 72 6
BAA[RKt+1] 28 2 68 2
NW 46 1 38 15
NB 36 1 50 13
NW (FoF) – – – –
NB (FoF) – – – –
efpBA [spreadKB] 29 1 48 15
efpA [spreadRB] 69 3 26 2
efpB [spread] 36 3 27 2
Figure B.1: Trend in share of corporate equities held by US banks on their assets.
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Table B.10: Standard deviation (%σxi) of key variables: data and calibrated models(*).
’75-2004 ’85-2004 ’05-2014 NK GK FA FA-GK
[a] [b] [c] [d]
%σdata
[c]
[b] %σcalibrated.model
Y 1.37 0.98 1.16 1.2 0.84 0.89 0.77 0.98
C 0.84 0.73 0.93 1.3 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.44
I 4.18 3.22 4.17 1.3 2.56 3.10 2.33 3.69
H 1.17 0.92 1.34 1.5 1.15 1.10 1.09 1.14
W 1.00 1.11 0.71 0.6 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.81
Π 0.21 0.12 0.17 1.4 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
Q – – – – 1.02 1.43 1.20 1.74
R 0.23 0.20 0.27 1.4 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29
Rn 0.29 0.24 0.28 1.2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
BAA[RKt+1] 0.77 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 0.33 0.29 0.38
NW (FoF) 2.21 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 1.96 2.81
NB (FoF) 10.8 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 5.25 – 10.4
NW (DS) 9.77 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – – –
NB (DS) 10.74 11.4 15.2 1.3 – – – –
efpBA 0.06 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – 0.01
efpA 0.23 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – 0.18
efpB 0.25 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 0.12 0.04 0.19
efpBA 0.06 0.04 0.10 2.8 – –
efpAG 0.05 0.05 0.17 3.4 – –
efpBG 0.09 0.07 0.22 3.1 – –
(*) Except for ratios, the values are standard deviations (σxi) multiplied by 100.
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Table B.11: Correlation with output (%ρxi,y) : data and calibrated models(*)
’75-2004 ’85-2004 ’05-2014 NK GK FA FA-GK
[a] [b] [c]
%ρdata %ρcalibrated.model
Y 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.59 0.70 0.77 0.64
I 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.95
H 0.93 0.86 0.91 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.42
W 0.21 0.24 -0.30 0.69 0.77 0.77 0.77
Π 0.27 0.29 0.59 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.20
Q – – – 0.16 0.31 0.20 0.35
R 0.22 0.25 0.50 -0.34 -0.34 -0.37 -0.32
Rn 0.36 0.42 0.77 -0.41 -0.32 -0.41 -0.22
BAA[RKt+1] -0.30 -0.35 -0.61 – -0.48 -0.36 -0.52
NW (FoF) 0.08 0.51 0.87 – – 0.23 0.47
NB (FoF) 0.38 0.38 0.58 – 0.33 – 0.39
NW (DS) 0.50 0.57 0.93 – – 0.23 0.47
NB (DS) 0.36 0.31 0.90 – 0.33 – 0.39
efpBA -0.74 -0.68 -0.47 – -0.48
efpA -0.55 -0.45 -0.76 – -0.68
efpB -0.68 -0.53 -0.76 – -0.63 -0.14 -0.67
efpBA -0.74 -0.68 -0.47 – – –
efpAG -0.45 -0.29 -0.39 – – –
efpBG -0.73 -0.54 -0.45 – – –
(*) Except for ratios, the values are correlations (ρxi,y) multiplied by 100 to express in % terms.
Table B.12: Variance-Covariance Matrix for External Finance Premium (x106).
Data Cov. matrix
efpB efpA efpBA
efpB [spread] 4.5 – –
efpA [spreadRB] 4.1 3.9 –
efpBA [spreadKB] 0.35 0.22 0.13
Model Cov. matrix
efpB efpA efpBA
efpB [spread] 3.51 – –
efpA [spreadRB] 3.38 3.26 –
efpBA [spreadKB] 0.13 0.12 0.01
(*) All numbers multiplied by 106.
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Table B.13: Variance-Covariance Matrix for External Finance Premium (x106).
Data Cov. matrix (in % of VAR(spread) )
efpB [spread] 100 – –
efpA [spreadRB] 92 76 –
efpBA [spreadKB] 8 5 3
Model Cov matrix (in % of VAR(spread) )
efpB [spread] 100 – –
efpA [spreadRB] 96 93 –
efpBA [spreadKB] 4 3 0.2
Table B.14: Change in volatility relative to the baseline model due to shift in monitor-
ing costs µ by 50 %.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 – – 0.99 1.02
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 – – 1.00 0.98
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 – – 0.98 1.05
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 – – 1.00 1.02
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 – – 1.00 0.98
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 – – 1.00 1.01
Q – – – – – 1.08 1.10
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 – – 1.00 1.01
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 – – 1.00 1.01
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – – 1.06 1.10
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 1.10 1.11
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – – – 1.64
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – 1.10 1.11
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – – – 1.64
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 1.64
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.16
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – – 1.62 1.18
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Table B.15: Change in volatility relative to the baseline model due to downward shift
in bank incentive constraint ΘB by 50 %.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 – 1.00 – 1.01
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 – 0.99 – 1.00
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 – 0.99 – 1.01
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 – 1.00 – 1.01
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 – 1.00 – 1.00
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 – 1.01 – 1.01
Q – – – – 1.11 – 1.11
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 – 1.01 – 1.01
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 – 0.99 – 1.00
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 1.06 – 1.14
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – – 1.13
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 1.14 – 1.12
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – – 1.13
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – 1.14 – 1.12
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 1.14
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.26
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 1.38 – 1.26
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Table B.16: Change in volatility relative to the baseline model due to a decline in
investment adjustment cost (IAC) from φX = 2 to φX = 1.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 1.13 1.21 1.17 1.22
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 1.07 0.93 0.94 0.93
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 1.09 1.34 1.32 1.32
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 1.08 1.03 0.99 1.06
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 1.09 1.03 1.02 1.04
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.99
Q – – – 0.73 0.96 0.99 0.93
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.96
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 1.02 0.99 1.03
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 0.99 0.93
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 0.97 – 0.95
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – 0.99 0.93
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – 0.97 – 0.95
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 0.95
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.07
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 1.06 1.00 1.06
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Table B.17: Change in volatility due to shift in policy feedback to inflation: the ratio
of standard deviation (STD) of variable Xi,t when θP = 1.80 to the STD
of the same Xi,t when θP = 1.5.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 0.95 1.01 1.01 1.01
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 1.12 0.99 1.00 0.98
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 0.83 1.00 1.01 1.00
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.98
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 1.03 0.97 0.98 0.98
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.91
Q – – – 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.03
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 0.96 0.95 0.98
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 1.00 1.00
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 0.98 – 0.99
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – 1.00 1.00
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – 0.98 – 0.99
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 1.00
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.01
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 1.00 0.98 1.01
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Table B.18: Change in volatility due to shift in policy feedback to output: The ratio of
standard deviation (STD) of variable Xi,t when θ ′Y = 0.025 to STD of the
same Xi,t when θY = 0.125.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 0.95 1.01 1.00 1.03
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 1.08 1.02 1.00 1.06
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 0.83 1.02 0.99 1.05
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.09
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 1.06 1.05 1.02 1.08
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 1.28 1.32 1.28 1.37
Q – – – 0.68 0.99 0.97 1.04
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 1.12 1.17 1.14 1.21
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 1.12 1.09 1.08 1.09
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 1.12 1.10 1.16
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 0.95 1.05
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 1.01 – 1.09
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – 0.95 1.05
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – 1.01 – 1.09
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 1.07
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.05
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 1.02 0.97 1.05
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Table B.19: Change in volatility relative to the baseline model due to shift in policy
feedback to output from θY = 0.125 to θ ′Y = 0.025 with higher persistence
up from ρR = 0.80 to ρ ′R = 0.88.
Standard Deviations
[b]’85-2005 [c]’06-2014 cb NK GK FA FA-GK
%σdata
%σ ′xi
%σxi
(model)
Y 0.98 1.16 1.2 1.00 1.12 1.05 1.18
C 0.73 0.93 1.3 1.17 1.17 1.09 1.29
I 3.22 4.17 1.3 0.86 1.16 1.07 1.28
H 0.92 1.34 1.5 1.19 1.29 1.18 1.39
W 1.11 0.71 0.6 1.39 1.40 1.34 1.46
Π 0.12 0.17 1.4 1.83 2.07 1.92 2.27
Q – – – 0.80 1.30 1.20 1.40
R 0.20 0.27 1.4 1.49 1.66 1.57 1.79
Rn 0.24 0.28 1.2 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.03
BAA[RKt+1] 0.49 0.84 1.7 – 1.63 1.57 1.69
NW (FoF) 2.48 6.92 2.8 – – 1.24 1.46
NB (FoF) 11.6 12.8 1.1 – 1.50 – 1.63
NW (DS) 10.3 11.4 1.1 – – 1.24 1.46
NB (DS) 11.4 15.2 1.3 – 1.50 – 1.63
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – 1.56
efpA 0.20 1.17 5.9 – – – 1.34
efpB 0.21 0.71 3.3 – 1.33 1.31 1.35
efpBA 0.04 0.10 2.8 – – – –
efpAG 0.05 0.17 3.4 – – – –
efpBG 0.07 0.22 3.1 – – – –
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Figure B.2: IRFs due to (-1.0%) IST and (+1.0%) G shock: GK, FA and FAGK models.
(a) IRFs upon Government Spending (G) shock.
(b) IRFs upon Investment Specific Technology (IST) shock.
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Figure B.3: IRFs after a shift in monitoring cost µ: Baseline µ = 0.11, higher µ ′ = 0.17.
FAGK model only.
(a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Figure B.4: IRFs after a shift in bank friction parameter ΘB: Baseline ΘB = 0.76, lower
Θ ′B = 0.54. FAGK model only.(a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Figure B.5: IRFs after a decline in investment adjustment cost (IAC) from φX = 2 to
φX = 1.
(a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Figure B.6: IRFs after a shift in policy feedback to inflation θP: Baseline θP = 1.5,
higher θ ′P = 1.8. (a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Figure B.7: IRFs after a shift in policy feedback to output θY : Baseline θY = 0.125,
lower θ ′Y = 0.025. (a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Figure B.8: IRFs after a shift in policy feedback to output θY : Baseline θY = 0.125 and
ρR = 0.80, lower θ ′Y = 0.025 and ρR = 0.88.(a) IRFs upon TFP shock.
(b) IRFs upon MP shock.
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Chapter 4
Assessing the Propagation Dynamics
during the US Recession
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I assess how the propagation of shocks changed during the
recent financial crisis in US. To highlight the recession I compare the business
cycle properties of actual financial and macroeconomic data during recession
relative to the properties of the sample data before the year 2005. Then, the
strategy is to estimate the deep parameters of the model during each subsam-
ple and assess the implications for the propagation of shocks. The objective is
to shed light on the underlying factors that might have changed and led to the
greater volatility of cost of external financing and of macro-financial indicators
during the last recession.
The chapter will proceed with a summary of business cycle properties of
each sample period, the Great Moderation and the Great Recession. In the fol-
lowing section, I describe the methodology of estimation, the data and the
exogenous shocks driving the competing models at hand. I make a horse race
of the financial accelerator model (FA), the bank friction model (GK) and of
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my two sided-friction baseline model (FAGK). My aim is to assess the busi-
ness cycle properties of the model-implied economy that each of three models
yields based on estimated parameters. I conclude that my baseline model can
outperform the other two models, FA and GK, in describing the economy for
the full period of available data, 1955-2014.
In the following section I evaluate the stability of parameters for the base-
line model FAGK in the two selected sub-samples of interest, 1985-2004 and
2005-2014. The Great Moderation period 1985-2004 is selected as a tranquil
period of reference. The results suggest that the posterior estimates of several
parameters change from the tranquil period to the recession period.
To quantitatively assess the implications of the change in posterior esti-
mates of parameters for the business cycle properties of the model-implied
economy I run counterfactual exercises. The exercises help identify the extent
to which changes in the parameters shape the business cycle properties of the
model variables.
From this assessment I conclude that the changes in two parameters, the
decline in investment adjustment costs IAC parameter and the increase in dis-
persion of returns across borrowing firms are critical for the propagation of
shocks during the Great Recession. I motivate why slight changes in estimates
of some of the parameters are not significant for the business cycle features of
the model economy during the recession. In the last section of the chapter I
conclude.
4.2 Stylized Facts
In this section I summarize the business cycle statistics for the recession period
and compare them to the preceding Great Moderation period.
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I select the sub-period 1985-2004 as the sample that represents the tran-
quil period for the business cycle properties of the US economy. I motivate
the choice of the starting point of the tranquil period based on reference from
Stock and Watson (2002). The tranquil period ends with the start of the recent
recession. This selection is also motivated by the higher volatility of macroeco-
nomic and financial variables for the US economy. Then I define the recession
period, 2005-2014, as the period when the volatility of key macroeconomic and
financial data spiked1.
The Great Moderation is the best time period for the post-war US economy
in terms of the stability of macroeconomic indicators. To emphasize the change
in business cycle statistics during the recession period I compare the standard
deviations of data series in the recession period to the second moments of
the Great Moderation period. In columns [1] and [2] of table C.1 I show the
standard deviations of macro-financial variables for the two respective sub-
samples. In column [3] I show the ratio of the standard deviation in recession
period relative to that in the tranquil period.
< Table C.1 here >
The volatility of most series went up significantly during recession. The
standard deviation of macroeconomic indicators like output, consumption, in-
flation and nominal interest rate (Y,C,Π,Rn) went up by around 20-25% higher
during the recession period. Investment, I, and of hours of work, H, became
even more volatile. Their standard deviation went up by 69% and 54% respec-
tively.
1 For the sake of business cycle statistics of data series the choice of the year 2005 as the start
of the recession sample period does not make much difference. Choosing the year 2006 I
obtain almost the same business cycle statistics (or slightly higher volatility). The motivation
for the longer sub-sample to define the recession period is that any shorter period makes the
observable series included in estimation less stationary. The large V-shape in macro variables
and the sharp spike in financial variables during the recession sub-sample makes these series
less stationary when the series are short.
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The increase in the volatility of financial variables is similar in magnitude
to the increase in volatility of investment. Standard deviations of Moody’s
BAA corporate bond yield deflated by GDP deflator, BAAreal, of total exter-
nal finance premium (hereby efpB) and of lender premium (hereby efpA), went
up by around 40-50%. An exception is the standard deviation of borrower pre-
mium (hereby efpBA). The standard deviation of this spread and that of firm
net worth spike by more than three times the standard deviation in tranquil pe-
riod. Such a high correlation in these two variables motivates why I relate the
observable efpBA spread to the ’borrower premium’ in the model framework.
In the same table C.1, in column [6], I show how the correlation with out-
put of each variable changed during the recession period2. The main picture
is that for those variables that already had a strong correlation with output,
mainly macro variables, the change (in correlation) is small. For those vari-
ables that had a weaker (positive or negative) correlation with output, mainly
financial variables, that correlation became much stronger during recession.
The countercyclical (procyclical) variables became more countercyclical (pro-
cyclical) during the recession3.
4.3 Bayesian Estimation
I use standard Bayesian estimation techniques to estimate the deep parameters
of the models. The estimation procedure for all the models went through two
steps. The first step is maximization of the posterior distribution in order to
maximize the posterior mode. The process combines the prior distribution of
structural parameters that I estimate with the likelihood of the data. To eval-
uate the likelihood function I employ the Kalman filter by assuming normally
2 Column [6] has the difference in correlation between the two periods.
3 One reason for the ”stronger correlation” during recession is also the short number of observa-
tions included in the recession period compared to the tranquil period.
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distributed i.i.d errors. To do so I employ at least two optimization algorithms
to compute the mode of the posterior4.
In the second step, I use random walk Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm
to obtain draws from the posterior distribution. I run two Markov chains of
300,000 replications each to obtain diagnostic statistics regarding the conver-
gence within and between chains (Brooks and Gelman (1998)). 25% of draws
are discarded in order to minimize dependence (of the chain) on starting val-
ues. The data series are filtered through a one-sided HP filter to obtain busi-
ness cycle properties (Pfeifer (2013)). I exclude the initial 16 data points of
each observable series from the estimation of the likelihood function. Ideally,
the likelihood function will not depend on the erratic behaviour of initial data
points of filtered series.
4.3.1 Data
In this subsection I discuss the observable series used in estimation. In all the
models I include the same seven macroeconomic time series which are similar
to the data set in Smets and Wooters (2007). In addition, I include 2 financial
time series in the baseline, FAGK, model but only 1 financial time series in
the one-sided friction models, FA and GK. The total number of time series
(and exogenous shocks) used in estimation of the FAGK model is 9. The total
number of time series used in FA and GK estimation is 8.
The set of 7 macroeconomic quarterly US time series I construct for the
time period 1955-2014 is listed below5:
4 Due to the large number of equations simple algorithms like the the Chris Sims algorithm can
not find the mode of the posterior. Instead I employ algorithms 8 and 9 of Dynare. These
algorithms are (informally) widely suggested by Dynare authors for models with potentially
more than one local mode.
5 While some data series can be observed for longer time periods, starting from 1947, the time
period for which I can observe all the time series used is 1955-2014. In addition it is a common
practice in literature to skip some of the data points at the beginning of the series as they are
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• log of real per capita GDP,
• log of real per capita consumption, defined as non-durable consumption
and services,
• log of real per capita gross private investment,
• log of weekly hours worked,
• log of labor share,
• log of GDP deflator,
• federal funds rate,
• borrower’s premium: Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield minus the
Aaa-rated corporate bond yield,
• lender’s premium: Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bond yield minus the
Fed rate.
The construction of these time series follows the same definitions as in
Smets and Wooters (2007) and are common across the literature. For a detailed
description I refer to appendix B.1.11 (appendix of chapter 3). I save the space
in this section to motivate the inclusion of financial variables that are the focus
of this work.
The rationale for the inclusion of two financial observables (and exogenous
shocks) in FAGK is twofold. First, I can track the dynamics of two external fi-
nance premiums, borrower and lender premium. I have two observable series,
one for each premium, and two model counterparts that match them. By in-
cluding the observable series for each premium I can identify the propagation
of shocks due to financial health of the borrowing firms and of the lending
bank.
Bayesian estimation requires that the number of shocks match at least the
number of observables. This brings me to the the second argument why I
include 2 additional observables and shocks in FAGK. In the baseline model I
not considered as good representatives of the full series (see for example Smets and Wooters
(2007) or Christiano et al. (2010)).
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bring two shocks on the financial friction parameters, monitoring cost (µ) and
bank incentive constraint (ΘB). By including two premiums, I can match the
shock on friction parameters with the respective observable premium.
As will be clear later in subsection 4.3.3, the 8th observable series included
in estimation of FA and GK models is the total premium efpB. By construction,
I have one friction parameter on which I can introduce the 8th shock in these
models, either µ or ΘB but not both. I dwell more on single-friction models in
subsection 4.3.3.
Next, I define the 8th and the 9th variables that I include in estimation of
FAGK. The two financial premiums are:
• efpBA, the spread between Moody’s BAA-rated corporate bond yields
relative to Aaa-rated yields, and
• efpA, the spread between Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bond yield and
the Fed’s risk free rate.
The first spread, efpBA, is assumed to vary only due to the financial health
of the firms with a lower rating, therefore with a worse financial health. In
the theoretical framework this spread captures the borrowing entrepreneur’s
premium.
The model counterpart of the series efpBA is the difference between the
expected return of entrepreneur’s project, EtRKt+1, less the expected required
return on bank assets, EtRBt+1. It is the extra return a bank will charge on
a borrower accounting for the agency costs on lender-borrower relationship
provided that the borrower may default with a certain nonzero probability.
This premium accounts only for the additional risk related to the quality of
the borrower to whom the lender agrees to lend.
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The second financial variable, efpA, is much closely related to the premium
charged by the lenders on firms with very good financial health and negligible
or no risk of default. AAA-rated firms have a sound financial health, hence
fluctuations of the premium firms pay to raise debt is closely related to turbu-
lence in the financial markets. That is a higher premium on firms rated AAA
could be due to a higher required return on assets of all the lenders across the
market. In practice this is the premium lenders require on top of what they
pay on liabilities in order to transform their short term liabilities into long term
assets. Therefore, in my theoretical framework, this spread can best capture
the minimum premium that the lenders require from a typical healthy firm
that has negligible or no risk of default.
The matching premium in the model that corresponds to the observable
series efpA is the spread between bank’s required return on assets, EtRBt+1, and
risk free rate, Rt. This spread is the average return a financial intermediary is
required to earn on its assets to keep the net worth at a certain level that it
convinces its depositors not to withdraw their funds (deposits). With higher
net worth the lender will build net worth to a level that it can address its moral
hazard problem. Intuitively, it is net of any extra returns it needs to generate
on its assets to cover for the losses due to borrower default or the monitoring
costs.
The premium efpA would be equivalent to the premium charged on a safe
government bond. Interestingly the premium on corporate bonds rated AAA
based on Moody’s rating system and long-term government bond is higly cor-
related (98 %).
Ultimately, no proxy for the unobservable external finance premium is per-
fect. Alternative measures through literature do not serve the scope of my
study. During the last recession the spread between prime lending rate and
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the 6-month Treasury bill rate used by Bernanke et al. (1999) did not show any
volatility. Constructing a corporate credit spread like in Gilchrist et al. (2009b)
goes beyond the scope of this thesis6. The advantage of using the spreads
based on Moody’s rating is that they match as closely as possible the borrower
and lender premium and are updated and can be replicated over time.
Finally, I track the business cycle properties of two net worth series, lender
and borrower net worth. I construct two sets of net worth series. The first
set of firm and bank net worth series is constructed based on Flow of Funds
data. The second set is constructed based on two stock price indices from
Datastream7. Net worth series are not included as observables in estimation, so
I refer these series in appendix C.2.
I use one-sided filtered Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered data as suggested by
Pfeifer (2013) to filter the series. I make use of the one-sided HP filter code
provided online by Meyer-Gohde (2010) to filter the series.
4.3.2 Exogenous Shocks
The number of exogenous shock processes that drive the models is the same
with the number of observable series I use in each model.
I have 9 observables in my estimation, of which 7 are macroeconomic vari-
ables and 2 are financial variables. Estimation requires that I have (at least) as
many shocks as the number of observables included in estimation. To match
the 7 macroeconomic observables I define shocks on the new Keynesian equa-
tions of the model that introduce exogenous process in the following variables:
1. total factor productivity, At,
2. government expenditures, Gt,
6 The authors construct a corporate credit spread index using security-level data for individual
firms.
7 Similar approach with stock price index is followed Christiano et al. (2010).
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3. monetary policy, Rt ,
4. investment specific technology, Υt,
5. retail price mark-up, ΛMt ,
6. labor supply shift, δht ,
7. household preferences, bUt ,
The two financial variables are related to two key financial frictions inherent
in the theoretical framework. The steady state values of the firm and bank
friction parameters, µ and ΘB, determine the steady state borrower and lender
premium, efpBA and efpA, respectively. I introduce two shocks on these two
friction parameters.
• A shock in the cost accrued by the banks in monitoring the borrowing
firms, µt, and
• a shock in the bank friction parameter determining the minimum bank
value relative to total assets that depositors impose on the banks, ΘBt .
I assume the fluctuations in the cost of monitoring can trigger fluctuations
of the borrower risk premium captured by the spread between Moody’s BAA
and AAA rated corporate bond yields as a proxy (efpBA). At times of distress
the cost banks incur to monitor firms may deteriorate and therefore drive up
the financial premium on lending.
In equilibrium, the premium banks will charge on any borrower with zero
probability of default is a function of steady state value of ΘB. An exogenous
shock on ΘBt drives up the lender premium. A clear motivation for varying
ΘBt is the varying attitude of depositors towards the lenders. Fluctuations in
bank friction, ΘBt , will imply higher volatility of the premium that the bank
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expects on its assets to accumulate sufficient net worth for the supplier of
funds (households) not to liquidate the bank.
Normalization of Shocks.
I follow Justiniano et al. (2011) to normalize some of the exogenous shocks.
I normalize the price mark-up shock ΛMt , the labor supply shock δ
h
t , the firm
friction (monitoring cost) shock µt and the bank friction shock ΘBt . Normaliza-
tion consists in writing the variables as a product of the steady state value of
that variable and a variable with mean unity in steady state but which follows
an autoregressive process AR(1). For any normalized variable X˜t I re-write:
X˜t = X ∗ X̂t (4.1)
In writing the exogenous process I only use the normalized variable with
unit steady state X̂t. This process simplifies the choice of priors for the size of
the shock σi for each exogenous process. I summarize the processes for the
exogenous shocks in a list of equations.
Ât = ρAÂt−1 + σ
AAt (4.2)
Ĝt = ρGĜt−1 + σ
GGt (4.3)
̂mt = ρm̂mt−1 + σ
m
m
t (4.4)
Υ̂t = ρΥΥ̂t−1 + σ
ΥΥt (4.5)
Λ̂Mt = ρΛΛ̂Mt−1 + σ
ΛMΛ
M
t (4.6)
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δ̂ht = ρHδ̂ht−1 + σ
δhδ
h
t (4.7)
b̂Ut = ρbb̂Ut−1 + σ
bUb
U
t (4.8)
µ̂t = ρµµ̂t−1 + σ
µ
µ
t (4.9)
Θ̂Bt = ρΘBΘ̂
B
t−1 + σ
ΘBΘ
B
t (4.10)
it is normally distributed i.i.d with N(0,1) while σ
i is the size of the exoge-
nous shock for i = A,G,M,Υ,ΛM, δh,bU,µ,ΘB. Here I assume ρm = 0. The
persistence of policy rate is captured by ρR 6= 0 in the Taylor rule in equation
3.50 in section 3.2.78.
4.3.3 Estimation of the FA and the GK Model
I estimate two single-friction models, the financial accelerator model (FA) and
the bank friction model (GK), separately in this section. For each model esti-
mation I use 8 observables and 8 shocks. The 7 macroeconomic time series and
the relevant 7 shock processes are the same as in the baseline model. Here I
define the 8th observable series.
The 8th observable in both single-friction models is the total spread between
Moody’s BAA-rated corporate bond yield and the Fed’s risk free rate (efpB). I use
the same set of 8 observables in each single-friction model. The only few
differences during the estimation of each single-friction model are listed below.
8 I allow a more general form with 1 > ρM>0. The odds ratio rejected 0 < ρM. Results are not
shown.
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• In the FA model there is no steady state of the bank friction parameter ΘB
as well as no persistence and standard deviation parameters of an exoge-
nous shock, ρΘB and σ
ΘB , on this friction. The exogenous processes are
the set of equations 4.2 through 4.8 (page 196) related to seven macroeco-
nomic observables, plus the 8th equation (eq. 4.9) which is an exogenous
process for the monitoring cost .
• Similarly, in the GK model the steady state of monitoring cost µ and the
relevant AR parameters ρµ and σµ are also absent. The shock processes
for the GK model are equations 4.2 through 4.8 (page 196) and the exoge-
nous process for the bank friction parameter, which is equation 4.10.
The quarterly observable time series have the same length as in the baseline
scenario, 1955q1-2014q4, in both models. The priors for the common parame-
ters are the same as in the baseline model (table C.2 in appendix C.1).
4.4 Parameter Estimates
For the sake of reference throughout this section I refer to my framework FAGK
model with both frictions as the baseline model. The two terms, FAGK and the
baseline model are used interchangeably. These terms distinguish my frame-
work from the two single friction models, FA and GK.
4.4.1 Prior distribution
In this section I discuss the choice of priors. I will refer with the term NK pa-
rameters to all the parameters that are relevant only to a simple new Keynesian
framework without any financial frictions. I refer with the term Financial Fric-
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tion parameters to all those parameters that are only in the financial accelerator
model and in the bank friction model, but not in a simple NK model.
I give more space to parameters on financial frictions block and the litera-
ture related to them and mention very briefly the priors of parameters related
to new Keynesian framework. The priors are the same for all the three mod-
els estimated, FA, GK and FAGK (with exceptions on FA and GK mentioned
in 4.3.3). I report the prior means and standard errors of all the estimated
parameters in table C.2 in appendix C.
< Table C.2 here >
Priors on Parameters relevant to new Keynesian block
• Fixed NK Parameters
It is common in literature to fix some parameters that are not identified
in the model (see for example Smets and Wooters (2007)). The argument is
that these parameters are either not identified in the model or they determine
the steady-state values of either macroeconomic or financial ratios. The pub-
lic spending ratio, GY , and weekly hours of work, H are not identified in the
model. I fix them at 0.20 and 0.35 respectively. The parameter Πssis fixed at
1.0084 which implies an average steady state inflation rate of 3.4% on annual
basis. This is the average inflation for the full period 1955-2014. The household
discount rate is fixed at 0.99 implying a risk free rate of 4% annually in real
terms. The public spending ratio, and the discount rate are common values
across the literature and consistent with the actual data for the US economy.
Inflation rate is calculated on basis of data for the period 1955-2014.
I fix the Calvo parameter at 0.75. This value implies a contract duration
of 3.3 quarters. This is a well documented parameter value across models of
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general equilibrium and empirical ones. For estimates in general equilibrium
models I refer to Smets and Wooters (2007) and Levine et al. (2005). For em-
pirical studies that estimate a Calvo parameter value based on empirical data
I refer to Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) re-
port a value closer to the estimate of the macro econometric models referred
to in this study based on evidence on micro data9.
• Priors for NK Parameters
To estimate the posterior mode, I draw on standard values from the existing
studies of Smets and Wooters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2010) as a rough
guide. In general, the priors were set slightly looser initially to allow for the
data to speak freely. Eventually, I modify most priors along the estimation
process until I get reasonable likelihood functions. The prior values that I
describe here (see table C.2) are the final prior values with which I ultimately
draw from the posterior distribution.
I assume a beta distribution for the prior mean of the labor share in the
production function and the habit formation of household. For both these
parameters, the prior mean is 0.7 with standard error 0.1. The prior for invest-
ment adjustment cost parameter follows a Gaussian distribution with mean
4 and standard error 1.5. I choose a gamma distribution for the elasticity of
substitution among goods with mean 7 and standard error 1. The prior mean
implies a price markup at the steady state of around 0.167. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution parameter is normally distributed with mean 1 and
standard deviation 0.375. The prior for the inverse of labor Frisch-elasticity is
set at 1 with standard deviation of 210.
9 For empirical studies who report lower values of Calvo parameter see Bils and Klenow (2004).
10Labor supply shifter is calculated as function of the inverse of labor Frisch-elasticity, ρh, and
the steady state hours of work.
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The degree of price indexation follow a beta distribution located at a mean
0.4 with standard errors of 0.2. This value is slightly lower than the value
of 0.5 with standard error 0.1 set in Smets and Wooters (2007) following the
findings of Bils and Klenow (2004). The values for price indexation in the
exiting studies vary in a wide range going as low as 0.11 (see Levine et al.
(2005)). The wide standard deviation of this prior in my estimation allows for
the data to determine the likelihood function within a reasonably wide range.
The response of monetary policy rate to inflation deviations, θpi, is nor-
mally distributed with mean 1.5 and standard error 0.15. I choose a gamma
distribution for the feedback to output gap, θY , to ensure that the estimated
mean is positive. I set a diffuse prior mean of 0.125 close to the zero boundary
with standard error of 0.10. This type of distribution avoids estimates below
zero. Christiano et al. (2010) set these priors at 1.75 and 0.25 respectively with
same standard error of 0.1. Smets and Wooters (2007) set prior means at 1.5
and 0.125, and standard errors 0.25 and 0.05 respectively. My priors are in
the same range with priors from these studies and close to values initially
proposed by Taylor (1999).
I set a Beta prior mean of 0.75 with standard error 0.2 for the persistence
of monetary policy, ρR. This is a looser prior compared to 0.75 with standard
error 0.10 in Smets and Wooters (2007).
Priors on Financial Friction Parameters
• Fixed Financial Friction Parameters
There are few parameters from the block of financial frictions that can not
be identified in estimation. I fix the survival probability of firms and banks,
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σE and σB at 0.985 and 0.97711. The firm survival probability parameter is
pinned down so that in steady state firms survive for a period of around 17
years. Firm survival time is in the same range of 15-17 years assumed in the
literature (Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2010)) and consistent with
empirical estimates of Levin et al. (2004)12. The tenure of 10.8 for banks is
similar to the tenure of around 10 years assumed in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
The parameter indicating the firms’ dispersion Aψ in the financial acceler-
ator block is fixed at 0.306 for both models, FAGK and FA. The prior mean
for this parameter is obtained from the calibration phase and is similar to the
value 0.28 assumed in Bernanke et al. (1999)13.
I also fix the average percentage of wealth that exiting firms and banks
transfer to the newly entering firms and bankers, ξE and ξB, at 0.003 and
0.00023 respectively. The primary role of these parameters is to ensure that the
firms do not accumulate enough net worth to grow out of debt. In addition, in
the baseline framework FAGK the transfer rate, ξE, helps calibrate the steady
state interest rates on debt loans above the risk free rate at a reasonable positive
value. These values are usually fixed during the calibration stage of the model
(with minor adjustments)14.
• Priors for Financial Friction Parameters
I assume a beta distribution for the firm default probability in the financial
accelerator block of the FAGK model (and in FA). I set the prior for the steady
state default probability of the firm, Fψ, at 0.75% on quarterly basis with a
11These values are similar to those in the calibrated model from chapter 3.
12Levin et al. (2004) report a similar tenure for the median firm based on data for the sample
period 1997-2003 coming from a panel of 900 firms.
13The value is calibrated to match a ratio of total assets to assets less loans of around 1.81 at
steady state.
14The average return on loan portfolio less risk free rate, RL− R, is set at a reasonably positive
value in steady state. I calibrate the amount of net worth that exiting firms transfer to newly
entering firms to ensure that this spread is positive.
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standard error of 0.2%. The prior mean at this value is standard in financial
accelerator model (Bernanke et al. (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)). There
is an empirical evidence by Altman and Pasternack (2006) for default rates of
US bonds that claim an average of 3 % for the period 1971 - 2005. It is the same
with the value calibrated initially by Bernanke et al. (1999), so allows for some
comparisons with earlier literature.
The prior on marginal bankruptcy cost, µ, is an informative one that has
to lie in the range 0-1. A prior mean of 0.15 and standard error of 0.10 is
chosen to allow for an 95% interval that captures most possible values from
micro evidence mentioned in Chapter 2 (Altman (1984), Alderson and Betker
(1995), Levin et al. (2004))15. Finally the bank friction parameter, ΘB follows a
beta distribution with prior mean 0.54 and standard error 0.15. This value is
higher than the value of 0.37 calibrated in the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model.
The prior mean in my framework is calibrated to get a reasonable leverage
ratio for the bank. The standard error allows for a wide range of values for
each respective parameter and let the data determine the degree of financial
friction.
Finally, following Smets and Wooters (2007) I assume the standard errors of
all the shocks follow inverse-gamma distribution with mean 0.10 and infinite
degrees of freedom. Following this study the persistence parameters of those
shocks follow a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2.
15Several studies shed light on the size of the bankruptcy costs for firms based on micro-
evidence. Altman (1984), finds out that bankruptcy costs are less than 20% of the firm’s value
prior to bankruptcy, in a small sample of only 26 firms. Similar findings by Alderson and
Betker (1995) analyze a larger sample of 201 firms that filed for bankruptcy during 1982-1993
and conclude that liquidation costs are on average 36.5 %. Levin et al. (2004) estimate a partial
equilibrium model with financial accelerator using panel data for the period 1997-2004. They
estimate a variable bankruptcy parameter which varies from close to zero to as high as 0.45.
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4.4.2 Posterior Estimates
I report the posterior mode, mean and the 90% credible intervals obtained by
Metropolis Algorithm for the three models, the FA, GK and the baseline model
with two frictions, in tables C.3 in appendix C.
< Table C.3 here >
I will refer to the values reported in table C.3 throughout this section.
Estimates of NK Parameters
The mean estimates of parameters relevant to the new Keynesian part of the
model are close to the estimates seen in the literature in all the three models,
the FA, GK and the baseline FAGK model. A quick observation is that the
persistence and the size of the exogenous shocks is similar across the three
models. The magnitude of total factor productivity (TFP) persistence shock is
0.8 while persistence of other shocks is lower. One exception is the size of the
persistence of labor supply shock which is close to 0.99. A potential reason for
such a high persistence of the labor supply shock may be the assumption of
flexible wages in the wage market. With flexible wages assumed in the model
the burden of generating persistence on the hours of work and on wages falls
on the exogenous labour supply shock. To replicate the behavior in real wage
series or in hours of work the model estimate for the peristence of labour
supply shock turns up very high.
For the remaining parameters, I will only refer to the posterior means of the
baseline model with two frictions, as the posterior estimates of all parameters
from the other two models, FA and GK, are in the same range.
There is a set of parameter estimates which are within the range of esti-
mates in most studies. The posterior mean estimate for labor share of 0.76, the
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posterior elasticity of substitution among goods of around 6.25, the posterior
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption of 1.9 and the poste-
rior mean for inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor of 0.84 are all very similar to
estimates in the literature16.
A second subset of parameters estimates are determined more by the likeli-
hood of the data. The posterior mean for the adjustment cost parameter (IAC)
of 1.14 is smaller than the prior mean of 4. The posterior mean of habit param-
eter in consumption at 0.40 is slightly lower than the prior 0.7 and lower than
reported means in DSGE estimation across the studies (Smets and Wooters
(2007), by Justiniano et al. (2011)). I can motivate the lower posterior estimate
IAC and habit formation parameters due to the presence of additional finan-
cial frictions which may induce extra persistence in the dynamics of the model.
As one introduces extra frictions in general equilibrium models, the burden of
generating extra persistence in the variables is split among many more param-
eters. In this line of argument it is reasonable to get lower posterior estimates
of the habit formation parameter.
The posterior mean estimates for monetary policy rule parameters are also
slightly different from those reported in prominent papers. The posterior mean
of the policy rate smoothing parameter, ρR = 0.62, and posterior of the re-
sponse to inflation, θp = 1.57 are closer to the calibrated values in literature.
There is a stream of papers, like Smets and Wooters (2007) and Justiniano et al.
(2011), that report posterior estimates for policy rate smoothing parameters
and inflation feedback parameter around values of 0.8 and 2.0 respectively.
Yet my estimated means are within the range of values seen in other studies
(Christensen and Dib (2008), Christiano et al. (2010)).
16I compare my estimates to those reported in at least three articles, by Smets and Wooters
(2007), by Justiniano et al. (2011) and the more recent one by Fuentes-Albero (2014). The latter
also includes financial accelerator block.
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The more interesting posterior estimate I get is the feedback to output
which is very high. The posterior mean estimate for the policy feedback to
output of θy = 0.24 is higher than the estimates reported by Smets and Woot-
ers (2007) and Justiniano et al. (2011), which vary around 0.15. This feature of
stronger feedback to output and weaker reaction to inflation could be seen in
estimated general equilibrium models with financial frictions (Fuentes-Albero
(2014), Christensen and Dib (2008), Christiano et al. (2010)).
Christensen and Dib (2008) estimate a new Keynesian model with and with-
out financial accelerator block via maximum likelihood method. They obtain
a higher posterior estimate of 0.295 (0.0690) for the output response parameter
in the model with financial accelerator compared to a posterior estimate of
0.138 (0.065) in the basic new Keynesian model.
Similarly, Christiano et al. (2010) estimate a model with financial acceler-
ator and a liquidity (or banking) friction, though they include feedback to
change in inflation and to credit growth in their Taylor rule. They obtain pos-
terior estimates of 0.307 and 0.321 for the output feedback parameter in Euro
area and US, respectively. The higher estimate of output response in models
with financial frictions seems a common feature, though not in all of them
(see Gilchrist et al. (2009b), or De Graeve (2008) for estimates lower than the
calibrated values in the literature).
To reconcile this stronger feedback to output in models with financial fric-
tions and lower estimate in simple new Keynesian models I can appeal to the
extra propagation of shocks that is introduced by the added financial frictions
in the model. As the financial friction may propagate shocks by a greater mag-
nitude or more persistently than other frictions there is a greater burden on
the policy rate to stabilize output. The greater burden on policy drives the
posterior estimate of policy response to output up.
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That the financial frictions, and their respective propagation role, are su-
perior to other frictions in the basic new Keynesian models has been well es-
tablished in the DSGE literature and supported by data (Christensen and Dib
(2008), Gilchrist et al. (2009b), De Graeve (2008), Queijo von Heidiken (2009)).
There is a challenging argument that arises due to the fact that not all finan-
cial friction models come up with such high estimates, as mentioned in this
paragraph, but that is beyond the scope of this study.
Estimates of Financial Friction Parameters
The second set of estimates at the focus of this chapter are the posterior esti-
mates of the financial friction parameters. These parameters are model specific
(see table C.3 on page 226). In particular, in the FAGK and FA models I obtain
estimates for:
• monitoring cost µ,
• the default rate of firms Fψ.
The above parameter estimates are not relevant to the GK model. The
posterior mean estimate of the monitoring cost parameter in FA and FAGK
models are similar, at µ = 0.07 and µ = 0.04, respectively. The upper and
lower bounds of the credible interval obtained via MH algorithm for the FAGK
model are [0.06, 0.02]. For the FA the 90% credible interval is [0.10, 0.04]. These
estimates indicate to a certain extent the financial accelerator friction is slightly
less important in the FAGK model with both frictions. A potential explanation
is that the presence of a bank friction in the baseline FAGK model downgrades
the role of monitoring costs in generating any extra friction.
The posterior mean estimates for the quarterly default rate of firms si very
similar in the two models, Fψ = 0.61% and Fψ = 0.59% in FAGK and FA models,
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respectively. This value is close to the prior mean and the data confirm the
empirical finding mentioned earlier (Altman and Pasternack (2006)) and close
to the 0.75% assumed in calibrated models.
In the FAGK and GK models I obtain estimates for:
• bank friction parameter ΘB.
The posterior mean for the bank friction parameter is the same, ΘB = 0.78,
in both GK and FAGK models. It is similar to the calibrated value of 0.75 in
previous chapter 3 although I set a lower prior of 0.54.
4.4.3 Matching Business Cycle Facts
In this section I evaluate the model fit by comparing business cycle properties
of the model with those from the data. The estimation of baseline model FAGK
maximizes the likelihood function for 9 observable series while the FA and GK
are estimated with 8 observables.
One implications of the estimation with different number of observations
is that I can not compare the three models using Bayesian model comparison.
Instead, I study the absolute model fit by using the posterior distribution. I
compare the second moments from the actual data to the model-implied em-
pirical statistics.
To obtain these empirical statistics, I set the model framework to gener-
ate samples of the same length as the data, after a burn-in of 100 observation
points. I summarize the standard deviations and correlations for key macroeco-
nomic and financial variables relative to those of output in tables C.4 through
C.9 of appendix C17.
17Tables C.4, C.5 for moments from FAGK model; tables C.6, C.7 for moments from GK model;
tables C.8, C.9 for moments from FA model.
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< Tables C.4, through C.9 here >
The business cycle properties of the model-implied real sector variables
are broadly consistent with the data according to all three models. I first
summarize these dimensions of the business cycle properties along which the
three models could have done better.
• Model-implied correlations of inflation and nominal interest rate with all
external finance premium measures are all in the neighborhood of zero or
positive. Data statistics show strong negative correlation for these pairs (I
refer to columns [Π] and [Rn] in tables C.5, C.7 and C.9). Similarly model-
implied correlations of inflation and nominal interest rate with agents’ net
worth series are not consistent with the data (the same columns and same
tables).
• To a similar extent FAGK and GK fail to capture the strong negative corre-
lation of real wage and hours of work with the financial variables (columns
[H] and [W] in tables C.5 and C.7).
• The models FAGK and FA fail to replicate the strong positive correlation
of nominal interest rate with real consumption (column [C] in tables C.5 and
C.9).
• Finally, a less problematic issue is that all models slightly over-predict
the volatility of working hours but under-predict that of wages (columns
[W] and [H] in tables C.4, C.6 and C.8). A potential reason could be the
assumption of flexible wages in the model, but that is beyond the scope
of this work.
Next I evaluate where the baseline model, FAGK, outperforms the single
friction models.
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• The baseline FAGK model does better in capturing the strong positive cor-
relation of lender net worth with three key macro indicators, Yt, Ct and It (row
[NB (FoF)] in table C.5).
The GK model yields correlations of lender net worth with these three
macro indicators in the neighborhood of zero (row [NB (FoF)] in table
C.7). The FA model is silent about lender net worth (same row in table
C.9).
• As a result of the above point, the baseline FAGK model does better in
replicating the strong negative correlation of total premium efpB with Yt, Ct
and It (row [efpB total] in table C.5).
Single friction models, FA and GK, replicate a weak (negative) correlation
of total efpB with Yt and It, but an almost zero or positive correlation with
Ct (row [efpB total] in tables C.7 and C.9).
Do the FA or GK perform better in any dimension? Compared to the other
two models, the GK model replicates well the positive correlation of nominal
interest with consumption but at the cost of failing the positive correlation
with real wages. The FA model does perform better in capturing the negative
correlation of the financial variables, efpB and firm net worth with real wage.
The model economy incorporating both financial frictions, FAGK, does per-
form as good as the single friction models in replicating the business cycle
properties of key macro variables. It does perform much better in terms of
replicating the strong negative correlation of the external finance premium(s) with out-
put, consumption and investment. In addition, it is by construction more infor-
mative in terms of the properties of each agent, borrower and lender, financial
premium. In the following sections I will proceed with my baseline model,
FAGK, that incorporates two financial frictions.
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4.5 A Quantitative Analysis: Assessing the main
Drivers of efp Fluctuations
In this section I study the dynamics of the cost of external finance during two
sub-periods, before and during the crisis. I first define the sub-samples and
report estimates from each estimation. I evaluate how the model replicates the
business cycle properties of actual data series for the relevant sub-period.
Next, I summarize the estimated parameters that remain stable and put my
emphasis on those parameters that change from one sub-sample estimation
to another. The ultimate objective of this section is to evaluate the potential
candidates that have driven the sharp shift in business cycle properties of the
model-implied economy during the recession sub-period.
The critical time period in which I focus is the recent crisis. I define the cut-
off observation that splits the recession sub-sample from the previous period
by setting the observation in quarter 2005:01 as the start of the most recent
sub-sample. The time frame includes the onset of the recession followed by
the unfolding of financial meltdown. I coin the term recession sub-sample to
refer to this period.
To identify the magnitude of the financial turmoil I compare the data statis-
tics during the financial crisis relative to the sub-period 1985-2004 when the
volatility of the macroeconomic and financial data is relatively stable. I coin
the term tranquil period of macroeconomic performance in the United States
for this sub-period. It is popularly known in the literature as the ”Great Mod-
eration”. The empirical evidence of relatively low volatility of macroeconomic
variables after the mid 1980s has been documented in several papers like Kim
and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson
(2002).
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I estimate the same baseline FAGK model with the same priors over the
sub-periods 1985-2004 and 2005-201418.
4.5.1 Posterior Estimates from Sub-sample Estimation
I summarize the estimated parameters that do not differ from one sub-period
to the other. I report the posterior mode and mean estimates of parameters for
the tranquil and the recession sub-samples in table C.10 in appendix.
< Tables C.10 here >
Labor share in the wholesaler’s production function, habit formation pa-
rameter, risk aversion parameter of household, the elasticity of substitution
among goods (determining the steady state mark up on prices) and the degree
of price indexation of the monopolistic retailer are the parameters that change
very little during the recession sub-sample.
Similarly, the posterior estimates for most persistence parameters change
very little from one sub-sample to the other. An eyeball view of the 90%
credible interval from the posterior distribution for most shock persistence
parameters indicates that they remain very stable during the recession. Sizes
of estimated posterior means of exogenous shocks are also very similar in the
two sub-sample estimations as well. There are few exceptions to this general
evaluation.
First, persistence of neutral technology shock, ρA is slightly lower, but the
magnitude of the shock, σΥ, is higher during recession period. Second, invest-
ment specific technology shock ρΥ, is slightly more persistent, but the magni-
tude of the shock, σΥ, is lower during recession. Simulation of the model with
18I re-estimate the models by defining the cut-off quarter to be 2004:01 and in a separate esti-
mation I set the cut-off observation in 2006:01. The posterior estimates of the means of the
parameters are similar across the three sets of estimation hence I conclude that the choice of
sub-samples at least within this range is not critical for the results.
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these two different sets of estimated values shows that the net effect on the
standard deviation of most variables of interest is negligible.
Third, the magnitude of labor supply shock, σH, is slightly higher during
the recession sub-sample. I will return to this parameter in the following para-
graphs.
Next, I identify the changes in the posterior estimates of deep parame-
ters whose posterior estimates see significant shifts from one estimation to the
other. I motivate why the shift in some of these parameter values from one
sub-sample to another are not critical for the business cycle properties of the
model-implied variables during recession period.
• The posterior estimate of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor, ρh,
and of the labor supply shock, σH, are higher in the magnitude during
the recession period.
I can motivate the increase of the inverse of labor Frisch elasticity, ρh, with
the fact that the upward shift in the magnitude of the labor supply shock,
σH, has an offsetting impact for the dynamics of the households labor supply.
As it will be illustrated later, the joint impact of greater magnitude of these
two parameters, labor supply shock σH and the inverse of Frisch elasticity ρh,
is almost zero for the business cycle properties of model-implied macro and
financial variables. I will elaborate this issue in detail in subsection 4.5.2 on
page 217.
• The posterior mean of the policy feedback to output, θy, is slightly lower
during the recession sample estimation.
The posterior mode, mean and the credible interval of the feedback policy
to output gap, θY , indicates that the policy reaction to output gaps could have
213
4.5. A Quantitative Analysis: Assessing the main Drivers of efp Fluctuations
been weaker at the onset of and during the recession. A weak policy response
to output gaps and high persistence of policy may lead to large volatility in
economy as seen in chapter two. On this occasion, it is difficult to attribute
large impact on the shift on this parameter as the Fed took additional non-
conventional measures during this period. As the Fed’s policy rate hit the
lower zero bound during the recession, it switched to non-conventional liquid-
ity and monetary targeting. These policies undermine any conclusion reached
based on a simple Taylor rule of Fed. I report in the next section that the
change in volatility of model-implied variables that can be attributed to the
shift in posterior θY is negligible.
• The posterior estimate for investment adjustment cost (IAC) parameter,
ΦX is lower during the recession sample.
The lower estimate of ΦX reduces the time lags that takes for firms to re-
size their total physical capital involved in production following a(n) (adverse)
shock. A reasonable argument is that it captures the quick reaction of firms
in shrinking their capital investments following the first crisis signals in mid
2007. I analyse quantitatively the impact of this lower parameter estimate.
• The posterior estimates for firm parameters, µ and Aψ, are larger during
the recession sample. µ and Aψ are the steady state monitoring cost and
the measure of dispersion of borrowing firms returns respectively.
A critical result is that the posterior estimate for the monitoring cost param-
eter, µ, and the estimate of the dispersion of firms revenues (or profits), Aψ,
went up during the recession sample. The upper bound of the credible interval
of the posterior distribution for both parameters shifted up.
In the next section, I will focus on assessing the extent to which the increase
in volatility of model-implied variables can be attributed to the potential can-
didates identified in this section. I am aware that the current formulation of
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the policy rule does not take into account the additional measures that Fed
took during the crisis. Also, changes in estimates of parameters related to la-
bor supply are a probably a consequence of the absence of friction in wage
market and that their impact cancels out. Finally, the posterior estimates for
the bank friction parameter, ΘB, in the two sub-sample estimations are very
similar. The credible intervals indicate that this parameter is relatively stable
before and during the crisis. Therefore, my focus in the next subsection will be
on investment adjustment costs, ΦX, and the firm friction parameters, µ and
Aψ.
4.5.2 What are the drivers of efp fluctuations?
In this section I analyze the contribution of potential candidates, like changes
in severity of financial rigidities at firm level and changes in the adjustment
cost of firm investment in driving the shifts in business cycles properties of the
model-implied series during the recession.
Simulation Method
To assess the contribution of each potential candidate I run counterfactual ex-
cercises similar to Smets and Wooters (2007) and Arias et al. (2007). I proceed
in five steps.
1. Simulate the model economy with the estimated parameter set from the
sample period 1985-2004.
2. Simulate the model economy with the estimated parameter set from the
sample period 2005-2014.
3. Compute the ratio of standard deviations between the two samples.
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4. Simulate the model economy using the estimated parameter vector of
the period 1985-2004, overwritten by the counterfactual parameter selected
from the estimated parameter vector of the period 2005-2014.
5. Compute the ratio of standard deviations obtained from the counterfactual
exercise (from step 4) relative to the standard deviations obtained with
the estimated parameter vector of the period 1985-2004 (from step 1).
I report the results for steps 1 to 3 in table C.11 of appendix (columns
[4] and [5]). They are the standard deviations of model-implied variables ob-
tained by simulating the model economy with the vector of estimated posterior
means of parameters from each respective sub-sample, tranquil and recession
(as shown in steps 1 to 3).
.
< Table C.11 here >
For comparative purposes I report in columns [1] and [2] the standard de-
viation of the cyclical component of filtered data series before and after the
recession. I use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering method to extract the cycli-
cal component of each series. Their ratio in third column is a rough measure
of the behaviour of each variable during the recession relative to normal times.
The simulation with the posterior means replicates main dynamics of the
model-implied economy during the recession similar that in the data. This
result is of no surprise as most variables listed in this table are used as ob-
servables during the estimation. Clearly the estimated posterior means of the
recession sample, replicate the higher volatility of most observable series. The
model predicts the higher volatility of bank net worth during the recession
though it under-predicts the volatility of firm net worth.
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Simulation Results
In the remaining part of this section I study the results from the counterfactual
exercises, step 4 and 5. In the first two columns of table C.12 on page 234 I
report the ratios of standard deviation of variables during recession relative to
the tranquil period for both, actual filtered data and model-implied variables.
They are copies of 3−rd and 6−th columns of previous table C.11.
< Table C.12 here >
In columns [1] through [6] of table C.12 I report the ratio of standard devi-
ation of a model-implied economy with the 1985-2004 parameter vector plus
the counterfactual parameter of 2005-2014 relative to standard deviation of the
variable in tranquil sub-sample. These results are obtained by repeating steps
4 and 5 from the list of exercises in the previous subsection. The ratio reported
in each of the columns [1] to [6] of C.12 is an approximate measure of the in-
crease in volatility of model-implied variables that can be attributed to changes
in the estimate of each parameter for the recession period.
• Counterfactual 1. In counterfactual 1, I study the relative contribution of a
lower estimated posterior mean of investment adjustment cost (IAC) during the
recession period.
The results from this exercise are shown in column [1] of table C.12. A lower
IAC during the recent sub-sample accounts for 129% of the model-implied
increase in cyclical volatility of investment. It also accounts for 41% increase
in model-implied cyclical volatility of output and 32 % increase in working
hours volatility. Lower (IAC) accounts for about 15% increase in the cyclical
volatility of the lender premium.The latter is mirrored in a similar increase
in volatility of model-implied total efp. The impact of lower IAC on business
cycle properties of other model-implied variables is negligible.
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The common motivation for the presence of IAC dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models (hereby dsge) has been to introduce inertia in investment
and generate a hump-shaped response to monetary shocks in new Keynesian
models (i.e. Christiano et al. (2005)). A lower IAC parameter implies greater
sensitivity of current investment to the shadow value of installed capital.
I can relate the lower estimate of IAC during the recession sub-sample to
the borrowing firms’ speed of adjusting to adverse circumstances. Borrowing
firms delay investment for the same fall in price of capital ’q’.
A similar behaviour is that of firms during the recession in US. As news
of a failing large bank, like Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns hedge funds,
spreads out the borrowing firms’ momentum of cutting down on investment
may gain pace even though the magnitude of the fall in ’q’ is not unusually
large. That momentum, when is not explicitly modelled, could be captured
by the lower value of an IAC parameter that delivers similar dynamics in the
model for small decline in asset prices. The counterfactual exercise showed that
indeed model-implied investment can become 129% more volatile with the
lower IAC even though the volatility of shadow price of capital barely changes
(q is 4% less volatile). In short, it takes much less time for firms to delay a new
investment or cut on existing investment than to actually materialize it when
facing rare adverse circumstances.
• Counterfactual 2. I analyze the effect of an increase in the standard deviation
of idiosyncratic shock, Aψ, in counterfactual 2. The results from this exercise
are shown in column [2] of table C.12.
There are two implications of a fall in Aψ. First, from a single firm’s per-
spective Bernanke et al. (1999) interpret Aψ as a measure of uncertainty on
the firm’s return on project. Alternatively, Aψ is a measure of the dispersion
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of project return across firms. The greater dispersion of firms profits, implies
the default threshold of borrowing firms follows a sharper increase upon an
adverse shock and bank net worth declines faster.
Second, in setting up the model I assume the survival of the firm and the
transfer to the newly entering firms are kept fixed through all periods, a com-
mon feature in these models. With these two parameters fixed, the lower poste-
rior estimate (sub-sample 1985-2004) of the dispersion parameter, Aψ, matches
the fact that the borrowing firms were highly leveraged before recession.
A higher estimate of Aψ accounts for a sharper decline in model-implied
bank net worth forcing banks to cut back on lending. The standard deviations
of bank net worth and price of capital, q, go up by 13% and 23% respectively.
As a result, it accounts for a 13% and 15% increase in volatility of model-
implied lender premium and total premium efpB. Finally, it accounts for a 47%
increase in volatility of model-implied borrower premium. The latter has a
negligible weight on the volatility of total premium efpB.
This result accords well with findings from empirical studies and general
equilibrium models (Kehrig (2011), Bloom et al. (2013), Christiano et al. (2014)
and Arellano et al. (2010))19.
• Counterfactual 3. In counterfactual 3 I evaluate the impact of an estimated
shift in the mean of cost of monitoring, µ, from 0.07 to 0.11 during the recent
recession. The results are shown in column [3] of table C.12.
19Kehrig (2011) calculates a measure of dispersion of plant level TFP for the period 1972-2009
which shows a significant jump during the last recession (figure 1). Bloom et al. (2013) results
also reject the hypothesis that uncertainty (measured by dispersion) is driven by the TFP
shocks themselves. The latter result is critical to rule out the possibility that dispersion across
firms’ returns be a function of TFP movements. A significant role for the idiosyncratic shock
during the recession is reported in few recent studies (Christiano et al. (2014) and Arellano
et al. (2010)).
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This is the cost banks incur when firms declare default and is expressed as
percentage of seized assets of defaulting firms. The greater magnitude of µ is
proportionally linked to the borrower’s premium as these costs motivate the
charging of an extra premium in a typical financial accelerator framework. The
higher monitoring costs can account for 67% increase in model-implied bor-
rower premium volatility. It accounts for greater volatility of bank net worth
by 17% but has negligible effect on other variables.
• Counterfactual 4. I report the impact of the estimated looser monetary policy
feedback to output gaps at the onset and during the recent crisis in counterfactual
4. Results are shown in column [4] of table C.12.
Estimated posterior mean for θY declined from 0.14 to 0.11 in table C.10.
The impact of lower θY on the volatility of most macroeconomic and financial
indicators is negligible. The design of policy feedback here does not take into
account alternative instruments that were undertaken by the FED after the
third quarter of 2007 like monetary measures in terms of quantitative easing.
Analyzing the policy effects based on the interest rate rule can not account for
a full evaluation of policies during this period. Therefore, I do not elaborate
further on this parameter.
• Counterfactual 5. in counterfactual 5 I report the joint effect of changes in two
parameters related to labor supply, ρh and σH. Results are shown in column
[5] of table C.12.
The parameter ρh is the labor supply shifter in household’s utility function
while σH is the magnitude of labor supply shock. The posterior estimates for
these two parameters have been significantly larger during the recession sub-
sample (from table C.10). Their joint effect is negligible across most variables of
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interest, except for real wages. I have motivated the change in estimated values
of these two parameters with the fact that I assumed flexible wage setting in
the model. To account for higher volatility of wages during the recession the
model re-evaluates these two parameters to match the higher wage volatility.
Due to the limited impact on other variables other than real wages I do not
consider these two parameters as primary drivers of the increase in volatility
during the recession.
• Counterfactual 6. For illustrative purposes my final exercise in counterfactual
6 is to quickly illustrate the impact of the lower adjustment cost in downturns
and of larger dispersion of firms’ returns (column [6] of table C.12).
From the above exercises I distinguish two key factors that had a significant
effect in shaping the behaviour of the business cycle properties of key financial
and macro indicators identified with the recession. The first, lower investment
adjustment costs, refer to the speed at which borrowing firms adjust their in-
vestments upon usual shocks under rare adverse circumstances. For the same
decline in the price of capital, the decline in investment, and therefore output,
is of greater magnitude upon the same size of shocks. The second, higher
standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock, relates to the greater dispersion of
borrowing firms’ return on capital. It drives up the cost of external financing,
due to both greater borrower spread and lender spread.
The shifts in estimated values of these two parameter can replicate the
business cycle properties of most model-implied macro and economic financial
variables during the recession period in US. The higher monitoring costs have
had only limited effects on the borrower’s premium.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have estimated three models with nominal, real and financial
frictions for the period 1955-2014. I conclude that the baseline model FAGK
with two financial frictions, a financial accelerator and a bank friction, best
captures the business cycle properties of key macro and financial indicators.
Estimation of the model in two sub-periods showed that shock sizes and
their persistence have not changed significantly to account for the increase
in the amplitude of the cyclical volatility in 2005-2014. Instead, the quicker
adjustment of firms’ investments towards usual shocks, IAC, and the higher
dispersion of borrowing firms profits are critical for the evolution of events in
the model economy during recession.
The lower investment adjustment cost, IAC, implied a faster shrink of in-
vestment by the borrowing firms upon usual shocks of similar size as before.
A potential explanation for the lower IAC is a shift in the attitude of borrow-
ing firms towards new investment due to unusual circumstances captured by
a lower IAC parameter in the model.
The greater dispersion of borrowing firms returns implies that the default-
ing firms trigger larger losses on the bank’s balance sheet. As lender net worth
declines the (lender) premium they charge on new loans spikes up.
I can reconcile the sequence of events in the model implied economy with
actual outcomes during the recent crisis. A rare event during the recent re-
cession is the looming news of a bankruptcy of a major investment bank in
US, like Lehman Brothers. It is after this episode that firms cut on investment
which was followed by declining output. As highly leveraged firms relied on
the high growth rate to turn positive profits, they failed to meet their finan-
cial obligations which triggered a chain effect through the economy. The latter
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triggered huge losses on banks’ net worth and drove the premium on new
external financing to unprecedented high.
It is commonly agreed in literature that the crisis worsened due to the in-
volvement of banks in financing the firms through equity securities (Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010)). In my framework the presence of banks allows for firms
losses to be transmitted on banks’ balance sheets, while the presence of finan-
cial accelerator block allows to replicate the impact of higher dispersion of firm
revenues on lender balance sheets.
Finally, the large spike in external finance premium during the recent re-
cession in US is largely attributed to the spike in lenders’ premium. The sharp
increase in monitoring costs can drive up the borrower’s premium but has less
effect on total external finance premium.
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C.1 Tables and Figures
Table C.1: Standard deviations in absolute value of actual observables and model-
implied series using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Standard Deviation [σi] Correlation [ρi]
Series i 1985-2004 2005-2014 [2][1] 1985-2004 2005-2014 Change [5] − [4]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Y 1.17 1.45 1.25 1 1 –
C 0.83 1.00 1.20 0.86 0.92 0.06
I 3.59 6.06 1.69 0.88 0.95 0.07
H 1.08 1.66 1.54 0.88 0.91 0.04
W 1.26 0.90 0.71 0.25 -0.08 -0.33
Π 0.16 0.20 1.23 0.32 0.42 0.09
Rn 0.27 0.32 1.16 0.42 0.77 0.36
EFPba 0.03 0.10 3.20 -0.40 -0.44 -0.04
EFPa 0.23 0.32 1.39 -0.55 -0.78 -0.23
EFP total 0.24 0.37 1.53 -0.57 -0.79 -0.22
BAA real 0.68 0.96 1.40 -0.35 -0.61 -0.26
NW (FoF) 2.74 9.88 3.60 0.34 0.93 0.58
NB (FoF) 13.6 15.2 1.11 0.45 0.73 0.28
NW (DS) 12.8 11.0 0.86 0.61 0.81 0.20
NB (DS) 14.5 22.6 1.56 0.42 0.82 0.40
’EFPba’ stands for the spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond yields.
’EFPb’ stands for the spread between Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield and Fed rate.
’EFP’ stands for the total spread between Moody’s BAA corporate bond yield and Fed rate.
’BAA real’ stands for the spread between Moody’s BAA corporate bond yield and Fed rate.
’NW’ and ’NB’ stand for Firm and Bank net worth respectively.
’FoF’ stands for Flow of Funds data; ’DS’ stands for Datastream data.
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Table C.2: Priors
FAGK GK FA
Parameter Description Density Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 95 % CI
β Discount Rate Fixed 0.99 – 0.99 – 0.99 –
δ Depreciation Rate Fixed 0.025 – 0.025 – 0.025 –
α Labor share on output Beta 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1
χ Degree of habit formation Beta 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1
φx Investment adjustment cost Gaussian 4 1.5 4 1.5 4 1.5
 Elasticity of substitution among goods Gamma 7 1 7 1 7 1
σc Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution Gaussian 1 0.375 1 0.375 1 0.375
ρh Inverse of labor Frisch-elasticity Gamma 1 2 1 2 1 2
G
Y Public Spending Share Fixed 0.20 – 0.20 – 0.20 –
Hss Average number of hours of work Fixed 0.35 – 0.35 – 0.35 –
ξp Calvo parameter (1-prob of re-optimizing) Fixed 0.75 – 0.75 – 0.75 –
γp Degree of price indexation to past inflation Beta 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2
Πss Steady State Inflation Fixed 1.0084 – 1.0084 – 1.0084 –
ρR Policy rate smoothing parameter Beta 0.75 0.15 0.75 0.15 0.75 0.15
θpi MP reaction to inflation expectation Gaussian 1.5 0.15 1.5 0.15 1.5 0.15
θY MP reaction to output gap Gaussian 0.5/4 0.10 0.5/4 0.10 0.5/4 0.10
µ∗ Monitoring costs parameter Beta 0.15 0.10 – – 0.15 0.10
Aψ∗ Standard deviation of idiosyncratic shock Fixed 0.306 – – – 0.306 –
Fψ∗ Probability of Default Beta 0.75% 0.2% – – 0.75% 0.2%
σE∗ Survival probability of entrepreneur Fixed 0.985 – – – 0.985 –
ξE∗ Wealth transfer to new entrepreneurs (%) Fixed 0.003 – – – 0.003 –
ΘB+ Share of assets divertible by bankers Beta 0.54 0.15 0.54 0.15 – –
σB+ Survival probability of banks Fixed 0.977 – 0.977 – – –
ξB+ Wealth transfer to to new banks Fixed 0.0002 – 0.0002 – – –
ρi Persistence of exogenous shocks Beta 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2
σi Magnitude of Exogenous shocks Inv.Gamma 0.10 inf 0.10 inf 0.10 inf
(*) These parameters do not enter in the GK model with bank friction.
(+) These parameters do not enter in the Financial Accelerator Model.
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Table C.3: Posterior Distribution
FA Model GK Model FAGK Model
Parameter Mode Mean 90% CI Mode Mean 90% CI Mode Mean 90% CI
α 0.79 0.80 [0.84, 0.77] 0.73 0.73 [0.77, 0.69] 0.73 0.76 [0.80, 0.70]
χ 0.44 0.47 [0.54, 0.39] 0.34 0.36 [0.43, 0.29] 0.36 0.40 [0.47, 0.32]
φx 0.76 1.30 [2.03, 0.63] 0.72 0.91 [1.35, 0.44] 0.71 1.14 [1.75, 0.51]
 5.69 6.27 [7.73, 4.81] 5.60 6.19 [7.70, 4.66] 5.55 6.25 [7.75, 4.71]
σc 1.79 1.81 [2.18, 1.43] 2.20 2.24 [2.66, 1.82] 1.93 1.91 [2.26, 1.55]
ρh 0.73 0.73 [0.93, 0.53] 0.84 0.84 [1.05, 0.63] 0.87 0.84 [1.05, 0.63]
γp 0.09 0.35 [0.66, 0.04] 0.15 0.42 [0.69, 0.06] 0.11 0.38 [0.66, 0.06]
ρR 0.62 0.63 [0.67, 0.59] 0.62 0.62 [0.67, 0.58] 0.62 0.62 [0.66, 0.58]
θpi 1.62 1.60 [1.75, 1.44] 1.62 1.58 [1.73, 1.43] 1.62 1.57 [1.72, 1.42]
θY 0.13 0.19 [0.29, 0.08] 0.23 0.25 [0.34, 0.16] 0.22 0.24 [0.32, 0.15]
ΘB – – [ – , – ] 0.81 0.79 [0.91, 0.66] 0.80 0.78 [0.91, 0.66]
µ 0.08 0.07 [0.10, 0.04] – – [ – , – ] 0.04 0.04 [0.06, 0.02]
Fψ 0.56% 0.59% [0.85%,0.32%] – – [ – , – ] 0.60% 0.61% [0.87%,0.33%]
ρA 0.82 0.83 [0.87, 0.78] 0.82 0.82 [0.87, 0.78] 0.81 0.81 [0.86, 0.77]
ρG 0.78 0.76 [0.84, 0.69] 0.77 0.76 [0.84, 0.67] 0.74 0.74 [0.81, 0.66]
ρM – – – , – – – – , – – – – , –
ρΥ 0.31 0.30 [0.40, 0.19] 0.32 0.30 [0.43, 0.17] 0.30 0.23 [0.37, 0.08]
ρMS 0.56 0.36 [0.61, 0.10] 0.50 0.29 [0.53, 0.07] 0.53 0.32 [0.56, 0.08]
ρbU 0.68 0.68 [0.74, 0.61] 0.65 0.65 [0.72, 0.58] 0.67 0.66 [0.72, 0.59]
ρH 0.99 0.99 [0.999,0.998] 0.99 0.99 [0.999,0.998] 0.99 0.99 [0.999, 0.998]
ρµ 0.76 0.76 [0.80, 0.73] – – [ – , – ] 0.76 0.77 [0.84, 0.72]
ρΘB – – [ – , – ] 0.75 0.75 [0.79, 0.72] 0.72 0.72 [0.76, 0.68]
100 ∗ σA 0.67 0.66 [0.73, 0.61] 0.70 0.70 [ 0.80, 0.66] 0.73 0.71 [ 0.78, 0.64]
100 ∗ σG 2.38 2.43 [2.61, 2.23] 2.18 2.20 [ 2.38, 2.02] 2.29 2.34 [ 2.54, 2.14]
100 ∗ σM 0.20 0.20 [0.21, 0.18] 0.20 0.20 [ 0.22, 0.18] 0.20 0.20 [ 0.21, 0.18]
100 ∗ σΥ 2.13 3.62 [5.51, 1.74] 2.15 2.75 [ 4.10, 1.32] 2.12 3.53 [ 5.59, 1.59]
100 ∗ σMS 10.7 15.8 [22.8, 9.5 ] 11.4 16.7 [ 23.5, 9.5] 10.8 16.5 [ 23.4, 9.1 ]
100 ∗ σbU 0.72 0.76 [0.86, 0.68] 0.71 0.72 [ 0.80, 0.65] 0.71 0.73 [ 0.80, 0.66]
100 ∗ σH 1.64 1.73 [1.97, 1.46] 1.72 1.79 [ 2.03, 1.53] 1.62 1.67 [ 1.90, 1.45]
100 ∗ σµ 47.1 63.5 [95.4, 33.7] – – [ – , – ] 76.5 91.2 [ 134.1,43.4]
100 ∗ σΘB – – [ – , – ] 0.62 0.63 [ 0.72, 0.54] 0.54 0.56 [ 0.63, 0.48]
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Table C.4: Baseline FAGK model: Standard deviations relative to St.deviation of seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs
Model implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1 1.70 1.65 0.34 0.31 1.16 0.87 0.67 1.08 6.43 4.07 4.61 3.44
C 0.59 0.61 1 1 0.20 0.18 0.68 0.53 0.39 0.65 3.78 2.47 2.71 2.09
I 2.91 3.28 4.95 5.41 1 1 3.38 2.84 1.95 3.54 18.7 13.3 13.4 11.3
H 0.86 1.15 1.46 1.90 0.30 0.35 1 1 0.58 1.25 5.53 4.70 3.96 3.97
W 1.49 0.93 2.53 1.53 0.51 0.28 1.73 0.80 1 1 9.58 3.77 6.86 3.19
Π 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.41 0.05 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.27 1 1 0.72 0.85
Rn 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.48 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.31 1.40 1.18 1 1
efpBA 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.16
efpA 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.40 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.26 1.17 0.99 0.84 0.84
efpB total 0.20 0.26 0.33 0.43 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.28 1.27 1.07 0.91 0.90
BAA real 0.52 0.40 0.89 0.67 0.18 0.12 0.61 0.35 0.35 0.44 3.37 1.65 2.49 1.39
NW (FoF) 2.83 2.74 4.82 4.51 0.97 0.83 3.29 2.37 1.90 2.95 18.2 11.1 13.1 9.42
NB (FoF) 8.37 4.93 14.3 8.13 2.88 1.50 9.74 4.27 5.62 5.32 53.8 20.1 38.6 17.0
NB (DS) 8.33 – 14.2 – 2.86 – 9.69 – 5.59 – 53.6 – 38.4 –
NW (DS) 6.19 – 10.5 – 2.13 – 7.20 – 4.16 – 39.8 – 28.5 –
Model empirical moments are drawn from the posterior distribution.
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.5: Baseline FAGK model: Correlations with seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs Model implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1
C 0.85 0.50 1 1
I 0.90 0.76 0.74 0.28 1 1
H 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.22 0.87 0.62 1 1
W 0.85 0.39 0.81 0.49 0.75 0.25 0.74 0.20 1 1
Π 0.20 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.30 0.45 0.18 0.12 1 1
Rn 0.37 0.17 0.34 -0.21 0.34 0.04 0.51 0.43 0.21 -0.25 0.55 0.54 1 1
efpBA -0.54 -0.11 -0.45 0.08 -0.57 -0.16 -0.46 -0.12 -0.46 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.02
efpA -0.54 -0.45 -0.49 -0.13 -0.52 -0.66 -0.66 -0.29 -0.40 -0.14 -0.52 0.10 -0.91 0.14
efpB total -0.60 -0.43 -0.54 -0.11 -0.59 -0.64 -0.69 -0.29 -0.46 0.24 -0.51 0.10 -0.87 0.13
BAA real -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.48 -0.35 -0.09 -0.31 0.18 -0.61 0.12 -0.27 0.66
NW (FoF) 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.26 -0.30 0.46 -0.61
NB (FoF) 0.46 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.001 0.43 0.18 -0.16 -0.29 0.01 -0.64
NB (DS) 0.41 – 0.37 – 0.51 – 0.41 – 0.33 – -0.13 – 0.01 –
NW (DS) 0.41 – 0.46 – 0.43 – 0.41 – 0.36 – -0.08 – 0.12 –
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.6: GK model: Standard deviations relative to St.deviation of seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs Model
implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1 1.70 1.59 0.34 0.26 1.16 0.74 0.67 1.10 6.43 4.66 4.61 3.57
C 0.59 0.63 1 1 0.20 0.17 0.68 0.47 0.39 0.69 3.78 2.94 2.71 2.25
I 2.91 3.78 4.95 5.99 1 1 3.38 2.79 1.95 4.16 18.7 17.6 13.4 13.5
H 0.86 1.35 1.46 2.15 0.30 0.36 1 1 0.58 1.49 5.53 6.31 3.96 4.84
W 1.49 0.91 2.53 1.44 0.51 0.24 1.73 0.67 1 1 9.58 4.23 6.86 3.25
Π 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.24 1 1 0.72 0.77
Rn 0.22 0.28 1.70 0.44 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.31 1.40 1.30 1 1
efpBA 0.04 – 0.06 – 0.01 – 0.04 – 0.02 – 0.24 – 0.17 –
efpA 0.18 – 0.31 – 0.06 – 0.21 – 0.12 – 1.17 – 0.84 –
efpB total 0.20 0.26 0.33 0.41 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.28 1.27 1.19 0.91 0.92
BAA real 0.52 0.42 0.89 0.66 0.18 0.11 0.61 0.31 0.35 0.46 3.37 1.94 2.49 1.49
NW (FoF) 2.83 – 4.82 – 0.97 – 3.29 – 1.90 – 18.2 – 13.1 –
NB (FoF) 8.37 3.95 14.3 6.26 2.88 1.05 9.74 2.92 5.62 4.35 53.8 18.4 38.6 14.1
NB (DS) 8.33 – 14.2 – 2.86 – 9.69 – 5.59 – 53.6 – 38.4 –
NW (DS) 6.19 – 10.5 – 2.13 – 7.20 – 4.16 – 39.8 – 28.5 –
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.7: GK model: Correlations with seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs Model implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1
C 0.85 0.54 1 1
I 0.90 0.70 0.74 0.29 1 1
H 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.46 0.87 0.56 1 1
W 0.85 0.15 0.81 -0.07 0.75 0.20 0.74 0.09 1 1
Π 0.20 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.18 0.05 1 1
Rn 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.18 0.34 0.18 0.51 0.40 0.21 -0.12 0.55 0.43 1 1
efpBA -0.54 – -0.45 – -0.57 – -0.46 – -0.46 – -0.12 – -0.14 –
efpA -0.54 – -0.49 – -0.52 – -0.66 – -0.40 – -0.52 – -0.91 –
efpB total -0.60 -0.20 -0.54 0.21 -0.59 -0.55 -0.69 -0.09 -0.46 -0.19 -0.51 0.04 -0.87 0.18
BAA real -0.33 -0.03 -0.34 0.09 -0.32 -0.36 -0.35 0.01 -0.31 -0.25 -0.61 0.01 -0.27 0.68
NW (FoF) 0.33 – 0.33 – 0.47 – 0.48 – 0.13 – 0.26 – 0.46 –
NB (FoF) 0.46 0.06 0.35 0.11 0.52 0.18 0.38 -0.06 0.43 -0.13 -0.16 -0.21 0.01 -0.70
NB (DS) 0.41 – 0.37 – 0.51 – 0.41 – 0.33 – -0.13 – 0.01 –
NW (DS) 0.41 – 0.46 – 0.43 – 0.41 – 0.36 – -0.08 – 0.12 –
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.8: FA model: Standard deviations relative to St.deviation of seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs Model
implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1 1.70 1.37 0.34 0.34 1.16 0.88 0.67 1.02 6.43 3.88 4.61 3.52
C 0.59 0.73 1 1 0.20 0.25 0.68 0.65 0.39 0.75 3.78 2.83 2.71 2.57
I 2.91 2.92 4.95 3.99 1 1 3.38 2.58 1.95 2.98 18.7 11.3 13.4 10.3
H 0.86 1.13 1.46 1.55 0.30 0.39 1 1 0.58 1.16 5.53 4.39 3.96 3.99
W 1.49 0.98 2.53 1.34 0.51 0.34 1.73 0.87 1 1 9.58 3.80 6.86 3.45
Π 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.26 1 1 0.72 0.91
Rn 0.22 0.28 1.70 0.39 0.07 0.10 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.29 1.40 1.10 1 1
efpBA 0.04 – 0.06 – 0.01 – 0.04 – 0.02 – 0.24 – 0.17 –
efpA 0.18 – 0.31 – 0.06 – 0.21 – 0.12 – 1.17 – 0.84 –
efpB total 0.20 0.22 0.33 0.30 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.22 1.27 0.85 0.91 0.77
BAA real 0.52 0.36 0.89 0.49 0.18 0.12 0.61 0.31 0.35 0.36 3.37 1.38 2.49 1.26
NW (FoF) 2.83 2.01 4.82 2.75 0.97 0.69 3.29 1.77 1.90 2.05 18.2 7.79 13.1 7.07
NB (FoF) 8.37 – 14.3 – 2.88 – 9.74 – 5.62 – 53.8 – 38.6 –
NB (DS) 8.33 – 14.2 – 2.86 – 9.69 – 5.59 – 53.6 – 38.4 –
NW (DS) 6.19 – 10.5 – 2.13 – 7.20 – 4.16 – 39.8 – 28.5 –
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.9: FA model: Correlations with seven key Macro Variables: HP filtered data (1955-2014) vs Model implied statistics.
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Series Y Y C C I I H H W W Π Π Rn Rn
Y 1 1
C 0.85 0.61 1 1
I 0.90 0.65 0.74 0.35 1 1
H 0.88 0.76 0.78 0.27 0.87 0.57 1 1
W 0.85 0.33 0.81 0.56 0.75 0.12 0.74 0.04 1 1
Π 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.30 0.43 0.18 0.08 1 1
Rn 0.37 0.11 0.34 -0.23 0.34 0.02 0.51 0.40 0.21 -0.39 0.55 0.50 1 1
efpBA -0.54 – -0.45 – -0.57 – -0.46 – -0.46 – -0.12 – -0.14 –
efpA -0.54 – -0.49 – -0.52 – -0.66 – -0.40 – -0.52 – -0.91 –
efpB total -0.60 -0.15 -0.54 0.03 -0.59 -0.22 -0.69 -0.12 -0.46 -0.07 -0.51 0.06 -0.87 0.07
BAA real -0.33 -0.17 -0.34 -0.31 -0.32 -0.21 -0.35 0.01 -0.31 -0.43 -0.61 0.03 -0.27 0.68
NW (FoF) 0.33 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.47 0.16 0.48 -0.12 0.13 0.29 0.26 -0.34 0.46 -0.67
NB (FoF) 0.46 – 0.35 – 0.52 – 0.38 – 0.43 – -0.16 – 0.01 –
NB (DS) 0.41 – 0.37 – 0.51 – 0.41 – 0.33 – -0.13 – 0.01 –
NW (DS) 0.41 – 0.46 – 0.43 – 0.41 – 0.36 – -0.08 – 0.12 –
In the text I refer to each column as [Y] instead of ’Y’ or [C] instead of ’C’.
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Table C.10: Posterior Distribution for the two sub-samples
1985-2004 2005-2014 Full sample
Parameter Mode Mean 90% CI Mode Mean 90% CI Mode Mean 90% CI
α 0.82 0.82 [0.88, 0.77] 0.78 0.78 [0.84, 0.72] 0.73 0.76 [0.80, 0.70]
χ 0.47 0.47 [0.56, 0.37] 0.49 0.52 [0.64, 0.40] 0.36 0.40 [0.47, 0.32]
φx 3.41 3.83 [5.22, 2.38] 0.91 1.10 [1.83, 0.34] 0.71 1.14 [1.75, 0.51]
 6.36 6.65 [8.20, 5.10] 6.44 6.63 [8.18, 5.11] 5.55 6.25 [7.75, 4.71]
σc 1.51 1.49 [1.91, 1.08] 1.42 1.17 [1.68, 0.66] 1.93 1.91 [2.26, 1.55]
ρh 0.59 0.67 [0.97, 0.35] 1.46 1.68 [2.35, 0.96] 0.87 0.84 [1.05, 0.63]
γp 0.06 0.14 [0.27, 0.01] 0.08 0.19 [0.35, 0.01] 0.11 0.38 [0.66, 0.06]
ρR 0.70 0.71 [0.76, 0.65] 0.75 0.72 [0.79, 0.65] 0.62 0.62 [0.66, 0.58]
θpi 1.69 1.68 [1.88, 1.47] 1.59 1.60 [1.82, 1.38] 1.62 1.57 [1.72, 1.42]
θY 0.09 0.14 [0.26, 0.01] 0.06 0.11 [0.22, 0.00] 0.22 0.24 [0.32, 0.15]
µ 0.07 0.07 [0.11, 0.02] 0.13 0.11 [0.17, 0.05] 0.04 0.04 [0.06, 0.02]
ΘB 0.75 0.73 [0.88, 0.58] 0.67 0.65 [0.85, 0.47] 0.80 0.78 [0.91, 0.66]
Aψ 0.19 0.19 [0.22, 0.17] 0.24 0.25 [0.30, 0.19] – – [–, –]
Fψ 0.71% 0.72% [1.04%,0.40%] 0.70% 0.71% [1.02%,0.41%] 0.60% 0.61% [0.87%,0.33%]
ρA 0.83 0.81 [0.93, 0.69] 0.61 0.65 [0.85, 0.46] 0.81 0.81 [0.86, 0.77]
ρG 0.71 0.70 [0.83, 0.56] 0.63 0.64 [0.81, 0.47] 0.74 0.74 [0.81, 0.66]
ρM – – – , – – – – , – – – – , –
ρΥ 0.03 0.05 [0.09, 0.01] 0.18 0.25 [0.43, 0.07] 0.30 0.23 [0.37, 0.08]
ρMS 0.74 0.65 [0.84, 0.47] 0.18 0.22 [0.39, 0.04] 0.53 0.32 [0.56, 0.08]
ρbU 0.68 0.67 [0.76, 0.57] 0.68 0.69 [0.81, 0.58] 0.67 0.66 [0.72, 0.59]
ρH 0.99 0.98 [0.998,0.97] 0.99 0.98 [0.999,0.93] 0.99 0.99 [0.999, 0.998]
ρµ 0.77 0.76 [0.88, 0.65] 0.79 0.76 [0.88, 0.64] 0.76 0.77 [0.84, 0.72]
ρΘB 0.81 0.81 [0.87, 0.75] 0.84 0.83 [0.89, 0.78] 0.72 0.72 [0.76, 0.68]
100 ∗ σA 0.47 0.48 [0.54, 0.41] 0.60 0.62 [ 0.74, 0.50] 0.73 0.71 [ 0.78, 0.64]
100 ∗ σG 1.55 1.58 [1.79, 1.37] 1.56 1.64 [ 1.94, 1.33] 2.29 2.34 [ 2.54, 2.14]
100 ∗ σM 0.14 0.14 [0.15, 0.12] 0.16 0.17 [ 0.20, 0.13] 0.20 0.20 [ 0.21, 0.18]
100 ∗ σΥ 8.8 10.1 [13.9, 6.3] 1.83 2.27 [ 3.77, 0.72] 2.12 3.53 [ 5.59, 1.59]
100 ∗ σMS 6.8 8.3 [11.6, 5.1] 16.1 18.1 [ 24.4, 12.1] 10.8 16.5 [ 23.4, 9.1 ]
100 ∗ σbU 0.63 0.66 [0.78, 0.55] 0.76 0.82 [ 1.05, 0.59] 0.71 0.73 [ 0.80, 0.66]
100 ∗ σH 1.12 1.14 [1.35, 0.92] 1.97 1.96 [ 2.43, 1.47] 1.62 1.67 [ 1.90, 1.45]
100 ∗ σµ 28.5 36.4 [59.4, 15.0] 32.8 43.8 [ 70.3, 18.5] 76.5 91.2 [ 134.1,43.4]
100 ∗ σΘB 0.52 0.53 [0.66, 0.40] 0.53 0.57 [ 0.73, 0.41] 0.54 0.56 [ 0.63, 0.48]
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Table C.11: Standard deviations in absolute value of actual observables and model-
implied series using Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Data Model
Series 1985-2004 2005-2014 2005−20141985−2004 1985-2004 2005-2014
2005−2014
1985−2004 RATIO
[1] [2] [3]
(
[2]
[1]
)
[4] [5] [6]
(
[5]
[4]
)
Y 1.17 1.45 1.25 0.64 0.96 1.48
C 0.83 1.00 1.20 0.59 0.78 1.31
I 3.59 6.06 1.69 2.13 4.47 2.09
H 1.08 1.66 1.54 0.87 1.30 1.50
W 1.26 0.90 0.71 0.86 1.65 1.91
Π 0.16 0.20 1.23 0.19 0.26 1.38
Rn 0.27 0.32 1.16 0.20 0.20 0.99
efpBA 0.03 0.10 3.20 0.02 0.06 3.09
efpA 0.23 0.32 1.39 0.20 0.22 1.12
efpB total 0.24 0.37 1.53 0.20 0.24 1.17
BAA real 0.68 0.96 1.40 0.31 0.41 1.32
NW (FoF) 2.74 9.88 3.60 3.40 2.88 0.85
NB (FoF) 13.6 15.2 1.11 6.16 6.90 1.12
NB (DS) 14.5 22.6 1.56 – – –
NW (DS) 12.8 11.0 0.86 – – –
Table C.12: Change in Standard deviations attributed to each Counterfactual coming
from the last sub-sample estimation.
2005−2014
1985−2004 ∆ STD attributed to each Counterfactual
Series Data Model ΦX Aψ µ θY ρ
h,σH [1] & [2]
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Y 1.25 1.48 1.41 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.43
C 1.20 1.31 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.13 0.93
I 1.69 2.09 2.29 1.07 1.02 1.00 1.01 2.36
H 1.54 1.50 1.32 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.34
W 0.71 1.91 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.46 1.07
Π 1.23 1.38 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.16 0.97
Q – 0.86 0.96 1.13 1.04 0.99 1.05 1.07
Rr – 1.38 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.14 1.01
Rn 1.16 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.10 1.01
efpBA 3.20 3.09 1.00 1.47 1.67 1.00 1.00 1.47
efpA 1.39 1.12 1.15 1.13 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.31
efpB total 1.53 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.05 1.00 1.01 1.33
BAA real 1.40 1.32 1.09 1.09 1.03 1.00 1.07 1.20
NW (FoF) 3.60 0.85 0.93 0.94 1.05 0.99 1.03 0.94
NB (FoF) 1.11 1.12 0.97 1.23 1.17 1.00 1.01 1.23
NB (DS) 1.56 – – – – – – –
NW (DS) 0.86 – – – – – – –
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C.2 Financial Net Worth Data
• Net Worth Variables.
In the baseline framework I have both agents, firm and bank, facing a finan-
cial friction related to their respective financial health. While I do not include
net worth variables in the list of observable series for estimation, I closely
follow how their business cycle properties match that of the model implied
economy. I keep track of two data series related to net worth of firm and bank.
I summarize below the definitions of firm and bank net worth series that I
follow.
• The model considers the purchase of tangible assets by firms with financ-
ing from banks and its own net worth. A standard measure in literature
matching this definition is the difference between tangible assets and
credit market liabilities from the Flow of Funds account. This measure is
similar to the readily available net worth series of non-financial non-farm
net worth series provided in the Flow of Funds tables. Their growth rates
are highly correlated (86 %).
• The theoretical definition of bank in my model is that of an entity that
accepts deposits from households and issues standard loans, but can also
hold corporate equities in its balance sheet. I use corporate equities on
liability sides of financial business balance sheet from the Flow of Funds
(Table L108) as a proxy for bank net worth. The measure captures all
financial businesses, including investment banks and commercial banks.
There are other financial entities included in this measure which do not
accept household deposits, therefore not qualify based on the theoretical
definition. The weight of other entities not relevant to the definition in
my framework is negligible to affect the properties of the series.
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I do not refer to a commercial bank in my theoretical models (see Christiano
et al. (2010), Rannenberg (2016) for such definition). Limiting my definition of
net worth only to commercial banks would leave a gap between theoretical and
actual definition of net worth. Banks that can hold firm equity on the asset side
of their balance sheets are critical for the second financial friction related to
bank financial health. These kind of banks are financial institutions other than
commercial baks that issue only loans. These intermediaries hold the bulk of
corporate equities on their asset side of their balance sheets. Therefore, I follow
the second moments of the net worth of all financial institutions and compare
it to the theoretical moments of the net worth variable from the model.
As alternative measures I follow stock price indices. Christiano et al. (2010)
use the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 index but that does not distinguish between
firm and bank net worth. Datastream database provides sector based indices.
I consider stock indices relevant financial and nonfinancial sector provided by
Datastream as alternative measures that take into account the firm and bank
market value respectively.
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